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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1

THE WASHINGTON POST
6 December 1978

Carter Asks Advice From George Ball

By Jim Hoagland

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Carter administration has turned for advice on the continuing crisis in Iran to George W. Ball, one of the pillars of the foreign policy establishment of the 1960s, as part of a rapidly widening review of U.S. policy toward Iran.

Ball began his temporary appointment on Monday as a consultant to the National Security Council to work on the Persian Gulf. He was personally approved by President Carter, who in his 1976 election campaign was sharply critical of the Democratic Party's foreign policy regulars.

U.S. officials who confirmed Ball's appointment said he would spend one to two weeks in Washington consulting with Cabinet-level officials and drafting a long-range study on the Persian Gulf for the NSC's Special Coordination Committee.

The administration wants to draw on Ball's expertise and knowledge of foreign affairs for long-term options rather than for the crisis of authority that has resulted from widespread upheaval in Iran for the past two months, these officials emphasized.

Ball, 68, is now an investment banker in New York and was under secretary of state, then the department's No. 2 position, in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. He was high on the list as a potential secretary of state for many of the Democratic politicians who opposed Carter's bid for the presidential nomination in 1976.

In a separate development, two senior officials in the administration's intelligence community have just completed a visit to Iran and may be submitting a special report to the White House on their findings, according to government sources.

The two officials are Robert Bowie, head of the Central Intelligence Agency's analysis division, and Lt. Gen. E. F. Tighe, director of the Defense Department's Intelligence Agency. Both were in Tehran last week, but spokesmen for the two agencies declined to

confirm that Bowie and Tighe were on a joint mission.

A CIA spokesman did say that Bowie went to Iran at the agency chief's direction.

Tighe's office said his trip was part of a routine visit to the U.S. defense attaches in the region. Included in the visit was a briefing by Tighe for the shah of Iran.

Operating under Bowie, who also worked on foreign policy for the Kennedy administration, the CIA's analysis division appeared to be the ultimate target of a short but sharply critical memo President Carter sent last month to his national security affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and CIA Director Stanfield Turner complaining about the quality of intelligence assessments of the turmoil that has shaken national and foreign confidence in Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's rule.

As protests and calls for the shah's overthrow spread rapidly last month, NSC officials turned to Richard Helms, former CIA director and Richard Nixon's ambassador to Iran, for advice. Helms reportedly visited the White House for a lengthy discussion.

U.S. officials emphasized yesterday that the administration still supports the shah and feels he will survive the critical months of December and January, when religious demonstrations increase the chances for renewed protest and violent street confrontations with the army.

If that analysis is correct and the

crisis does level off at the end of January, the Carter administration may be able to undertake a serious review of policies and options in the Persian Gulf around the end of January, according to one U.S. official.

Ball's appointment reportedly was recommended to the president by Brzezinski, who has from time to time brought in outside consultants to produce studies for the NSC. Ball met with Brzezinski briefly yesterday and will be seeing other Cabinet members, including Vance and Defense Secretary Harold Brown, according to White House aides.

10 November 1978

Iranians protest Logan speech of ex-CIA head

By Roury Williams
staff writer

Iranian students protested noisily before and after a speech made by former CIA Director William Colby Thursday at Utah State University, then dominated a one-hour question-and-answer forum.

Colby spoke in the Fine Arts Center as part of the university's convocation lecture series and later answered questions in the University Center.

Prior to his lecture, about 60 Iranian students marched outside the Fine Arts Center, shouted in unison, and carried signs that read "CIA Go Home," "Carter's Human Rights Hypocrisy" and "Down With the Shah."

Colby's speech, before a crowded auditorium, was calculated to increase the credibility of the CIA by showing that it is no longer as secretive as in former times and that it has a charter requiring that its actions be law-abiding.

At the conclusion of his address, several Iranian students stood on chairs and led other Iranians in shouting rhythmic slogans like "Yankee Go Home" and "U.S. Advisers and CIA out of Iran."

As the Iranians loudly voiced their protest and clapped their hands in unison, a non-Iranian student shouted "Sit down and shut up" which was followed by an outburst of applause.

Immediately after the lecture, an unflustered Colby fielded questions in a packed Sunburst Lounge.

The bespectacled former CIA director, dressed in a pin-stripe gray suit, was asked why the CIA arranged the overthrow of Mossadegh, former leader of Iran, in favor of the Shah, Iran's current leader.

CIA helped Shah

He said the CIA did assist in the 1953 overthrow of Mossadegh and did help the Shah regain power.

Colby defended United States support of the Shah, and said the current leader's rule is better for America, the world and Iran than alternatives such as the governments of Pakistan and Iraq.

"The governments of Pakistan and Iraq cannot match Iran's progress and development," Colby said.

When the former director said Iran's literacy rate and life expectancy had increased under the Shah's modernization program, and that the Shah had brought a middle class economy to Iran, the Iranian students booed and cried out with a maze of questions.

They were further incensed when Colby said he supported and has great respect for some Moslem leaders, such as the president of Saudi Arabia and Sadat of Egypt.

Shouts of "He is lying" and "He's a traitor" were interrupted by a university official who threatened to throw out one of the Iranian students.

University officials, students and Colby urged the protestors to stop lecturing the crowd and to instead ask questions and allow others the same opportunity, which they did.

Colby said the Shah's opposition was coming from a leftist group that wanted the Shah to spread socialism, and from a rightist group that wanted to keep religious traditions such as having women wear

veils.

In response, a young Iranian woman asked emotionally, "Who can believe the people of Iran are risking torture and death just to fight modernization?"

The demonstrating Iranians claim the Shah, with military arms supplied by the United States, is tyrannically killing hundreds of innocent citizens in Iran.

CIA created SAVAK

Colby said the CIA created SAVAK, the Iranian police force, and taught it proper methods of intelligence. "But the CIA never condoned any violations of human rights by SAVAK. I don't know what SAVAK is doing now."

The United States supported the Shah instead of Mossadegh because, "We didn't want a hostile government in Iran," he said. It was a matter of whether Mossadegh would keep Iran developing and friendly or whether he would bring Soviet power back into the Persian Gulf.

Colby maintained that the internal conflict in Iran is a political, not a religious, question.

"We're entitled to support a political movement in a country," he said.

A Venezuelan student asked why the CIA supports governments against the will of the people being governed.

Colby responded, "The CIA doesn't make such decisions. It is a matter of foreign policy determined by the president and Congress."

"The CIA helped keep Italy democratic," Colby said. "That's a better alternative than communism."

He said it was difficult to determine the will of the people in Iran without elections which are now impossible because of riot conditions.

The statement brought jeers and scorn from the large bloc of Iranian students.

At the conclusion of the forum, Iranians roared their slogans while many non-Iranians gathered around Colby to ask questions.

In other comments, Colby said the cloak-and-dagger image of the spy of 30 years ago is no longer true.

Now, he said, the CIA has scholars in areas such as agriculture, economics, social science and foreign affairs. The spy part of the CIA is small, although the organization does still depend on brave foreigners and brave Americans to get foreign government secrets that are essential to the security of this country.

Colby was the CIA's director from 1973 to 1976 during a time of unprecedented public investigation into the agency's secret operations.

He said the CIA no longer operates without the approval of the president and Congress.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-20**

NEW YORK TIMES
4 DECEMBER 1978

Letters

Foreign Affairs: To Predict and Evaluate a Crisis Abroad

To the Editor:

As an erstwhile observer at various embassies abroad, I am startled by reported Presidential disgruntlement with C.I.A. failure to predict crisis in Iran (news story Nov. 23). It would have been more startling, however, had Admiral Turner, as coordinator of intelligence, pinpointed the date, or even come close.

Crisis prediction and evaluation is not just a matter of "intelligence." It is rare indeed that contacts with activist groups or local counterintelligence keeping watch on them can establish reliably just when trouble will boil over. It is easy, for instance, to know that trouble lies ahead in Nicaragua but difficult to know just when or how. Two other elements in relation to crisis situations seem to me more basic: country analysis and contingency planning. The first is indicative of a likely crisis; the second attempts to determine where the national interest lies in relation to it.

Analysis of crisis-prone situations is in the first instance, or should be, a matter for the ambassador in country X. Reporting, along with negotiation and representation, are the classic functions of a diplomatic mission. A competent ambassador and his staff should be thorough students of the country and have ready, overt access to authoritative sources at all levels — from the Shah on down, in the case of Iran — representing all points of view, all sectors, political, military, economic, social.

Only by analysis of all these factors and by factoring in external pressures, legitimate and otherwise, can there be adequate understanding of the state of that nation and how crisis-prone it may be. Covert information may add, even importantly, to this, but it is no substitute. Accordingly, in this matter, the foreign affairs, not the intelligence branch, should have predominance, although for other reasons I have long felt we do indeed need a

strong Central Intelligence Agency.

The other element of great importance in anticipation of crisis situations, namely contingency planning, is a Washington rather than a field function. If embassy analysis warns of a crisis-prone situation and Washington, with its broader spectrum of insight into the international situation, confirms this, there should be on hand a range of contingency plans. This is, of course, not a precise exercise, given the plethora of variables, but optimum preparedness is certainly a prerequisite.

The foregoing is elementary and, I like to assume, not wanting in the case of Iran. But The Times reports Presidential disgruntlement. Hence my two comments:

(1) We seem to overestimate the role of intelligence as opposed to that of the ambassador in a country. Other advanced Western countries properly regard the ambassador as a key cog in their foreign affairs apparatus. This is one reason why none have followed the American example in respect of am-

bassadorial appointments — all too often on a patronage basis, thus downgrading a primary ingredient of country analysis.

Were there more often professionals on the spot who would be held responsible for the quality of their analysis, we would be better off. And we would be more likely to hold the President accountable for the quality of his appointments.

(2) In part because we overestimate the role of "intelligence," we tend to create a far too complex foreign affairs apparatus. If the primary responsibility of the Secretary of State were re-established, I believe the President would be better served. Intelligence would not then be overvalued in crisis situations but placed in perspective with the other elements of crisis prediction and management.

J. GRAHAM PARSONS

Stockbridge, Mass., Nov. 26, 1978

The writer, former United States Ambassador to Laos and Sweden, was deputy chairman of the U.S. SALT delegation, 1970-72.

MINNESOTA DAILY
21 November 1978

CIA said to want students to monitor Iranians

By ERIC RINGHAM
Copyright 1978
Minnesota Daily

Men identifying themselves as representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) allegedly attempted this fall to recruit students to spy on Iranians attending the University.

The Daily received information about the alleged recruitment effort after locating a University student and army veteran who claims he was approached by the agency. The student agreed to discuss the subject last week if his name remained confidential.

The source said two white, middle-aged men claiming to be CIA agents came to his home in September. Although they presented no identification verifying their association with the intelligence agency, they knew details of the student's career as an army officer.

Those details included his work as a psychological operations officer and his security clearance for top-secret information.

Asking if the student had heard of SAVAK, the Iranian security police force, the agents allegedly said the CIA was helping SAVAK agents in the United States identify and observe Iranians opposed to the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The agents further said they wanted to get "something concrete" on Iranian students to facilitate their deportation back to Iran, according to the source.

"They said they wanted to find out who was stirring up trouble, who the 'terrorists' were," the student said. "They referred to these guys as 'terrorists.'"

The agents, the student said, explained that Iranians on U.S. campuses are harming the shah's image abroad. "Their goal was to discredit these Iranian guys. That was the main thing," the source said.

In a series of interviews the student said the men offered him money and appealed to his patriotism as a U.S. citizen in their attempts to get him to agree to their proposal.

"This one guy gave me this pitch that my responsibilities didn't stop when I got out of the army. They offered to pay my tuition, but I'm already getting that (through the G.I. Bill), so I didn't give a shit," the source said. "Besides, I wouldn't prostitute myself like that."

The student said he refused to observe Iranians and report on their activities. He said he agreed, however, to ask other veterans at the University if they were interested in working for the CIA.

Another veteran who did not want to be identified confirmed to the Daily that she had been informed by the source of the opportunity to work for the CIA. "He came to me and asked if I wanted to make some more money, if I wanted my school paid for," she said.

The veteran, a CIA sophomore, said she wondered at the time, "Who would get messed up in something like that? Who'd need the money that much?"

She said the cautious way in which the student approached the topic lent credibility to his story. "If he was BSing, I don't think he would have done that.

"I believe him. I know him pretty well," she said.

It is not known whether any stu-

dents accepted the offer.

The source said he believes his service record—detailing his army career in Southeast Asia, Germany and several bases in the United States—suggested to the agents that he might be willing to agree to their proposal.

"I think my psychological operations background was what prompted them to contact me," the 31-year-old veteran said. "It's the same sort of thing I was doing in Vietnam and several other places in Southeast Asia and Europe," he said.

But another explanation the student offered for why the CIA contacted him is that he had once volunteered information to the agency.

After serving in Vietnam as an infantry platoon leader, the veteran was trained in psychological operations and returned to Southeast Asia. He later was stationed in West Germany, again working in psychological operations but also serving as a drug and alcohol control officer at a U.S. base near Stuttgart. Military records confirm his assignments.

Ordered to stop the flow of illegal drugs to U.S. military personnel "at any cost," the officer reportedly developed contacts with the West German underground. Members of the underground, including fugitive radicals, finance their operations partly through drug sales, according to the former officer.

During this period, the officer reportedly met "seven or eight" persons who said they were associated with the Baader-Meinhof gang, otherwise known as the Red Army

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Faction. Andreas Baader, founder of the faction, committed suicide in prison in October 1977. Ulrike Meinhof, a former West German journalist and member of the group, hanged herself in prison in May of the previous year.

The officer's contacts in the faction, he said, suggested in 1976 that they were considering hijacking an airliner. They were vague as to the time and place of the attack, according to the source.

The following spring, after the officer had left the army and returned to his home in St. Paul, he decided that he should contact the authorities and tell them about the German terrorists. Looking in the St. Paul telephone directory under "U.S. Government offices," he located a number for the CIA. He dialed the number and requested a meeting.

According to the student, a single agent visited his house, listened to his story and left, promising to get back in touch.

The veteran did not hear from the agent again. For several months, he said, he suspected he was being followed, but he was not contacted by representatives of the intelligence agency. That fall, four terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa jet to Mogadishu, Somalia.

Nearly a year went by before the supposed agents allegedly contacted him about spying on Iranian students. Although the source and the Daily have been unable to determine whether the men were in fact from the CIA, they seemed to have had access to government files, according to the student.

"These guys studied my file," the student said.

The student said his conversation with the men ranged to other groups allegedly being watched by the CIA, including students from Hong Kong and Taiwan and members of the Young Socialist Alliance and Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

The men, the student said, resembled "anyone from 3M—executive types." They said they were concerned about "peace and order on campus," and about possible communist "insurgence" in Iran, according to the student. And, the student said, they seemed already well informed about Iranians at the University.

"As far as the masks go, you can tell them (the Iranians) that they don't need to wear them," the student said. "They know every Iranian student on campus." Iranian demonstrators often wear masks to conceal their identities.

The source said he agreed to discuss the story with the Daily because "they (the CIA) spend millions of dollars on intelligence activities and they don't know what they're doing." He said he is neither for nor against the cause of the Iranian dissidents.

"I'd just like to see them (the CIA) get their shit together," he said.

That U.S. authorities sometimes cooperate with the Iranian SAVAK has been reported frequently in the American press. Columnists Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, for example, have documented a relationship between Mansur Rafizadeh, the head SAVAK agent in the United States, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The New York FBI office trades information with SAVAK agents routinely, and "there is nothing covert about it," according to one FBI official.

And the presence of SAVAK agents in the United States also is well known. A House subcommittee chaired by Rep. Don Fraser (D-Mn.) has heard testimony from state-department officials that "there certainly are representatives (of SAVAK) in the United States."

Alfred Atherton, Jr., assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, told Fraser's subcommittee last year that "Iranian authorities are interested in knowing about potential terrorists who may be among students who would return to Iran."

"There's not much question that SAVAK has been making efforts to keep track of Iranian students," Fraser said during a telephone interview last week. "But I'm slow to accept that the CIA might be involved in recruitment efforts," although "I've made a lot of assumptions in the past that turned out to be wrong."

"Even if the CIA were doing it, they certainly wouldn't confirm it," Fraser said.

But to Iranian dissidents contacted about the story, CIA cooperation with SAVAK was a familiar topic.

Preferring to remain anonymous, the Iranians identified themselves as members of the Iranian Student Association. One said he was the regional director of defense for the student group, which is organized on local, regional and national levels. The regional official said that while his organization had not heard of CIA actions against Iranians at the University, "in other cities it's an old story."

It is a common strategy, he said, to portray Iranian students as "terrorists" and then deport them. SAVAK, he said, works either alone or with local authorities in provoking fights at anti-shah demonstrations. Protesters then are arrested, he said.

"Whether these things are done by SAVAK or the local police, they are controlled by the CIA," the dissident said. The local Iranian Student Association has escaped such harassment so far, he said, "because it's a young chapter. I don't mean to say SAVAK is careless."

Contacted by telephone Monday, the CIA refused to comment on the particulars of its relationship with SAVAK. Dale Peterson, a public relations officer, said he was unable to gather facts that might relate to the story without the name of the Daily's source.

Asked whether the CIA works with SAVAK in conducting surveillance against Iranians in the United States, Peterson said no "agreement" between the agencies gives SAVAK the authority to operate in this country.

Asked if it were possible that the CIA might have tried to recruit American students, Peterson replied, "I can't answer that. You're asking me to get into detail about activities we may or may not be conducting against foreigners in the United States."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2EMIAMI HERALD
26 NOVEMBER 1978EDITORIALS

U.S. Intelligence Community Indicted by Series of Failures

PERHAPS the most disturbing report yet on the U.S. intelligence community is the news that President Carter is not satisfied with the quality of its reporting and analysis.

Mr. Carter was caught off guard by the rioting in Iran. His intelligence reports said the shah had such tight control of his nation's political system that the opposition would be no more than a troublesome irritation.

Apparently the CIA was giving more weight to the shah's secret police than any of its other sources, assuming that the huge CIA station in Teheran has other sources. But the CIA wasn't alone. The huge U.S. embassy staff was unable to get any contrary information back to the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the even larger Defense Attache's Office did not make a convincing report to the Pentagon. Or, worse yet, any other reports were dismissed by the intelligence community staff as the report to Mr. Carter was prepared.

This does not seem to be an isolated instance.

The intelligence community discounted the possibility of war in the Middle East in the fall of 1973. The Yom Kippur War followed.

Military intelligence was unable to foresee the total collapse of the South Vietnamese army in 1975, and the CIA's Saigon station chief had been hornswoggled into thinking a settlement would be negotiated.

The bureaucratic politics involved in the preparation of intelligence estimates went on for so long that the White House was unable to get timely, accurate information on the Soviet Backfire bomber in 1976.

The CIA confessed in 1977 that its economic analysis had been faulty and that the Soviet Union was spending

about twice as much money on defense as CIA analysts had ever predicted.

And the best information available indicates that the State Department failed to keep the President up to date on Fidel Castro's plans to release 3,600 political prisoners.

Only the National Security Agency, which collects information by means of satellites and electronic eavesdropping, seems to have come through these years relatively untainted.

The failures we list here are not aberrant stunts like putting poison in Patrice Lumumba's toothpaste or sneaking itching powder into Mr. Castro's skin-diving suit. Nor are they the significant and systematic violations of Constitutional rights that Congress and the White House allowed the intelligence agencies to commit through lack of control.

This is a breakdown in the cardinal function of U.S. intelligence — collecting accurate information and getting it to the President and other decision-makers when they need it.

We can anticipate the argument that we'll get from the CIA: All the leaks, the revelations of dissident ex-CIA agents have closed off sources in allied spy agencies.

Hogwash!

The failures have gone on too long and are too pervasive. The intelligence agencies apparently were more interested in being James Bond swashbucklers than in being successful reporters.

When President John F. Kennedy dedicated the then-new CIA office building in Langley, Va., he told agency employees that history would trumpet their failures and no one will know of their successes. Apparently Mr. Kennedy's statement is being used by the spies to justify all their failures, because the successes are few and far between these days.

BARRY GOLDWATER
ARIZONA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

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78-7020

December 4, 1978

The Editor
The Miami Herald
529 14th Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20045

Dear Sir:

In your Sunday, November 26th issue there is an article to which I take exception. It concerns further abuses on the United States intelligence community. First, please keep in mind that every abuse that befell this community came as a direct result of Presidential orders by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon with no evidence on Ford yet. Our intelligence collection system is as good as you will find in the world, but how do you expect intelligent, highly trained personnel to stay on the job after being repeatedly abused and slandered by the press of this nation, including your own paper? Yes, we are having a hard time keeping men with excellent ability on hand, and, yes, we do have a hard time finding people who can understand assessment. But, if you and your brothers in the newspaper profession want to help the intelligence community in this country, for God's sake, get off their backs. Either support them or say nothing about it until you know more about it than your continuing writing evidences.

Sincerely,

Barry Goldwater
Barry Goldwater

THE WASHINGTON POST
7 December 1978

Article appeared
on page A-1, 27

Shah Releases 2 Top Opponents In Peace Attempt

By Jonathan C. Randall

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Dec. 6—Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi released two top leaders of the National Front opposition from detention today in a conciliatory gesture designed to ease pressure on the approach of a potentially explosive Shiite Moslem holy day.

His move also was intended to speed the long-stalled formation of a civilian Cabinet to replace the floundering military government.

Karim Sanjabi and Darius Foruhar, followers of the late nationalist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh who was overthrown in a CIA-aided coup in 1953, made no statement on their release from a house run by SAVAK, Iran's dreaded security police.

They had been arrested Nov. 11 at Sanjabi's luxurious north Tehran home in front of journalists to whom Sanjabi was about to read a hard-line opposition communiqué.

Reflecting on Sanjabi's visit in France with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the exiled Shiite Moslem leader dedicated to the shah's overthrow, that communiqué had condemned the shah's "hegemonic, monarchical regime" and called for a referendum to permit Iranians to decide if Pahlavi rule should continue.

Veteran observers said Sanjabi's release was the outcome of feverish efforts by the shah and the often bickering opposition to find a political compromise that so far has eluded them in the nearly year-long political crisis.

The freeing of Sanjabi, 73, and his younger associate came only hours after an announcement that the shah had ordered for Saturday the release of a further 120 political prisoners and 352 other Iranians sentenced by military courts to mark International Human Rights Day.

Saturday is the eve of the two-day mourning period marking the anniversary of the death of Hussein, the founder of Shiite Islam. This year, Khomeini has turned the observance into total confrontation with the shah.

A three-day-old strike that Khomeini called among oil workers has reduced production from a normal 6 million barrels a day to 2.9 million barrels, with a further decrease predicted. Each million barrels of unsold oil represent the loss of about \$12.5 million in foreign exchange.

The shah's gestures reflected fears of major violence and bloodshed over the mourning period, which starts Saturday at dusk and ends 48 hours later. They also seemed designed to ease formation of a civilian government acceptable to the domestic political opposition.

Its principal task would be to organize free elections within six months. Left unsaid was the assumption that in the process the shah would cease to run Iran as a one-man show and become a constitutional monarch who reigns but does not rule.

Opposition leaders who had been willing to settle for such a deal earlier increasingly have begun to demand that the shah abdicate in favor of his 18-year-old son, Crown Prince Reza.

The very formation of a civilian government would mark the first serious blow to Khomeini's increasing prestige and influence in Iran.

The 78-year-old religious leader has opposed any dealings with the shah or his family—or for that matter any election under the constitution, which he wants scrapped to make way for a yet ill-defined Islamic republic.

Still unclear is whether the divided, but democratically inclined domestic opposition would dare risk Khomeini's wrath by thus advertising its privately expressed differences with him. So far, there has been silence for fear of losing public support.

The dearth of prominent young opposition leaders reflects a total vacuum the shah has imposed on Iran for the past generation. Most opposition leaders are French-speaking members of the elite, many in their 70s and of comfortable means.

The opposition claims that students, religious leaders, bureaucrats, bazaar merchants and the working masses of Iran's swollen cities have united in one movement. But there remains a sizable gap between the septuagenarian leadership and a generation whose median age is well below 20.

According to one opposition lawyer, the engineers and electricity company workers who almost nightly cut the power to given neighborhoods on a previously announced schedule are really signalling the shah they are part of a new technical elite that can run Iran without him.

Their ideas, often formed in American or Western European universities, reflect a desire for participatory democracy, which neither Khomeini or even the lay opposition of the same generation has grasped fully.

Mindful of such differences, the shah is scheduled to receive an old political critic Thursday in yet another effort to stitch together a political solution. His visitor is Dr. Ali Amini, a former prime minister whom Iranians

insist the liberal-minded Kennedy administration imposed—briefly—on a reluctant shah in the early 1960s.

The shah has once again over the past two months started receiving Amini after a five-year hiatus. This reflects less a change of heart than apparent desperation caused by the seemingly endless round of street demonstrations and crippling strikes that have all but ended effective government here.

Amini is said to have found someone who is loyal to the shah and capable of heading a civilian Cabinet that might lead the country back to political stability. Insiders claim the still unidentified candidate is honest, respected and likely to disarm opposition criticism because of service with Mossadegh and the torture and imprisonment it cost him.

Possible choices are believed to be Dr. Ali Akbar Salsani, a former Tehran University chancellor, and Gholam Hussein Sadiri, Mossadegh's interior minister at the time of the CIA coup.

If indeed such a person does succeed in forming a viable civilian government, its first task will be to reverse the trend that discredits the shah's every move and accords total credibility to the opposition.

One drastic action favored by respected politicians is summary punishment for former ministers and busi-

CONTINUED

nessmen now under arrest on corruption charges.

"It's not civilized," the politician said, "but if we don't show the public we are serious in this way, we will have a revolution in the real sense of the word and we will all be shot."

Other leading opposition demands are that the shah prove his good will by lifting martial law, punishing police officials accused of excesses and granting all political prisoners a general amnesty rather than releasing them in small numbers as has been the case so far.

The more conservative domestic opposition leaders favor a step-by-step approach for fear brusque overthrow of the shah could set off violent upheavals with incalculable consequences. They are especially worried by possible splitting of the armed forces and massive departure of middle class talent.

THE VILLAGE VOICE
4 December 1978

THE MOVING TARGET

By Alexander Cockburn & James Ridgeway

The Shah and the Hot-Egg Tango

The operating deadline for the next major turbulence in Tehran is December 11. At that time, the Shi'ite Muslims will pour into the streets to commemorate the 10th day of Moharram, the anniversary of the death of the founder of the Shi'a sect. It is their equivalent of the Christian Good Friday, but a considerably more fraught occasion. Adept in the religion flagellate themselves publicly and the day is given to lamentation for the low state to which mortal affairs have come.

This December, it is widely believed, lamentation will take the direct form of protest against the Shah and his military rule. A Shi'a demonstration—as this year has already evidenced—is no small thing. There are, in fact, no less than 5000 Shi'ite functionaries in Tehran alone whose task it is, on behalf of the mullahs, to organize processions and demonstrations. The mosques and these operatives are financed by the merchants of the bazaars.

In the United States embassy the frantic search goes on for a suitable strong man to take over from the enfeebled Shah. At the moment, the prime candidate is General Oveissi, military governor of Tehran, and a former classmate of the Shah in Tehran's military college. Oveissi has been a conspicuous hardliner in recent months.

The United States diplomatic and intelligence apparatus is working against a background of mounting anxiety in such conservative Arab nations as Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the Saudis are urging active U.S. military intervention before the situation gets totally out of hand.

Saudi discontent at American political conduct in the area is growing. In a recent off-the-record interview, the Saudi foreign minister confided to one journalist that his country was contemplating a radical departure in the coming months from its traditional close ties with the United States.

The conventional assumption among U.S. government officials—particularly in the wake of Camp David—has always been that Saudi Arabia's leaders are bound to issue *pro forma* public denunciations of Egypt's pursuit of a separate peace with Israel but, in fact, are quite contented with the trend of events. The truth is much more complex, and Saudi fury at the results of Camp David (not to mention the failure to settle or, indeed, refer to the status of East Jerusalem) gravely underestimated. At the moment, the Saudis are trying to influence the U.S. to take a much fiercer line against Israel by use of the oil-price weapon. OPEC meets in Abu Dhabi in December to consider price rises, and all present Saudi pronouncements in this matter must be seen as part of overall diplomatic pressuring.

It is, of course, possible that the Saudis will in the end do nothing and thus vindicate those who assumed that behind the sound and fury lay relative impotence. A measure of their long-term irritation will be given when or if the Israelis establish an embassy in Cairo. At the moment, the Saudis are declaring that if this event occurs they will withdraw their entire presence from Egypt.

Amid the continuing turmoil in Iran, the role of the United States in attempting to manipulate internal Iranian politics is coming increasingly to the fore. President Carter's angry reprimand to the CIA for failing to report adequately over the last year on opposition to the Shah conceals a prolonged saga of attempted manipulation.

It is well known that, beginning in the early spring of 1977, U.S. intelligence agents were in touch with the right-of-center wing of the National Front. This front is an alliance of groupings ranged in opposition to the Shah. Apparently, what the Americans were seeking to accomplish was the creation of a conservative political coalition to which the Shah could relinquish some political power. The same sort of ploy had been tried in Chile with Frei, in India, and most recently against Bhutto in Pakistan.

In the meetings in 1977, according to our sources, only one of the major Iranian contacts refused to remain a party to the discussions. He was the son-in-law of Mossadegh, the Iranian premier ousted in the CIA coup of 1953.

The American approach was amplified with President Carter's recent visit to Tehran: At that time, he met with opposition leaders and stated his sympathy for their complaints, took note of affronts to human rights and complaints of endemic corruption. In effect, his sympathetic attention was perceived as a political gesture of good will toward the Shah's opposition.

The president's visit resulted in postponement of demonstrations which had then been called then, would have been even larger than they are today.

Sometimes American interference, which the Shah has bitterly invoked in recent interviews, was unsavory in the extreme. Just before the Shah visited Washington, our sources report that he was pressured to liberalize his policies by such means as the following. It was indicated to him that a book written in Persian had been prepared which described in great detail the role of the CIA in restoring him to power in 1953. Covert distribution of this volume, so U.S. intelligence officials seem to have believed, would have further reduced the Shah's standing in the eyes of his fractious subjects. Whether the book was actually printed is unclear, but the Shah keenly resented the tactic.

But the timetable devised in Washington went awry. This was because the experts at the CIA and elsewhere in the government made serious analytical errors in projections of the stature and power of the Shi'a sect.

The common fallacy here is to cast the Shi'ites as a relatively minor force in the Muslim world. While the Shi'ites may be small in some countries, in Iran they occupy a major sector of social and political life. Furthermore, they have played an important role in the history of Iran. They have been much persecuted but remain firm as the inheritors of an anarchist and populist tradition.

CONTINUED

The Shi'ites have played a role in Iranian politics since the latter half of the 19th century, coming to the fore in the tobacco rebellion of 1895. They were important in the constitutional movement of 1904-5, which resulted in the adoption of an Iranian constitution. Perhaps most interesting was their part in the Mossadegh coalition. They supported Mossadegh even after he had nationalized the Iranian oil industry, though broke with him by the time of the CIA coup. Their opposition to the Shah is nothing new.

In sum, the Shi'ites have several important characteristics: they are strongly anti-imperialist, whether against the United States, Great Britain, or the Soviet Union. They are firm constitutionalists and flatly against the monarchy. They are reformist in the social-democratic sense. They believe in reform so long as it does not disturb the merchants of the cities and the middle peasant class. That is why they can be referred to in the American sense as populists.

This background was entirely misunderstood by U.S. intelligence analysts and by most of the American press. Viewed from this perspective, it is possible to see why opposition to the Shah—seated as it is preeminently among the Shi'ite Muslims—is not likely to abate or be deflected by last minute political manipulation.

From Tehran itself comes news of gloom expressed in the most traditional way: a decline in the housing market. Real estate prices in the richer parts of town have fallen by as much as 70 per cent. Many affluent Iranians are moving into somewhat poorer areas in the hope that they will thus escape the riotous populace, stampeding on errands of arson and pillage.

Former intimates of the Shah continue to flee. On the most-wanted-back list in Tehran are two important refugees. One of these fugitives is Parviz Sabeti, formerly the effective head of Savak and also in charge of the interrogation center in Tehran. He hijacked a Savak plane and is now in hiding in France. The other is Hushang Ansai, former minister of finance and reputed to be the most corrupt official outside the Royal Family itself. The official story is that Ansai is undergoing medical treatment in the U.S. This is not widely believed. Both have been threatened with confiscation of their property unless they return.

Those who might be inclined to take at face value the Shah's announcement of a new era for human rights in Tehran, release of political prisoners, and diminution of torture, should study the account of a recently released British prisoner, as reported in the *International Herald Tribune* for last weekend.

Richard Savin, a licensed British arms salesman arrested in 1976 for smuggling hashish (a charge he says was a frame-up), spent two and a half years in Vakilabad prison in eastern Iran. His descriptions defy belief. All newly arrived prisoners were housed automatically in the block reserved for the criminally insane. Those lucky enough to survive usually spent some of their sentence in isolation cells measuring one meter square. Political prisoners, of whom there were 350, were subjected to daily beatings and tortures, including electric shocks to the temples, red-hot needles under the fingernails, and a favorite at the jail, "the hot egg tango," so-called "because it makes you thrash about quite a bit." The treatment consists in forcing a scalding, hard-boiled egg up the rectum of the prisoner. "It slowly cooks your insides," Mr. Savin said. "Also popular was anal rape with riot sticks." Juvenile prisoners were routinely raped by prison officials and then sold to the convicts.

Any Afghan prisoner complaining about treatment would have his mouth sewn up with thread for a couple of days. Savin says he saw Afghans "being made to walk on all fours, licking the ground as they went and being forced to clean out toilet bowls with their tongues."

He says that international teams investigating treatment of prisoners were often shown Iranian army troopers rounded up and dressed for the occasion. Savin, after an endless litany of such horrors—about which he is writing a book—concludes: "The Shah's claims that no tortures or beatings go on in his jails are complete rubbish. It is also totally untrue that thousands of political prisoners have been pardoned. Maybe one or two were let free at Vakilabad, but no more."

Barbara Walters, recently observed on a date with Ardeshir Zahedi, Iran's ambassador to the U.S., might care to interview Savin on ABC News, if possible before a studio audience of New York's cafe-society supporters of the Shah—ranging from Marion Javits through Andy Warhol and his Factory workers to liberal party goers at the home of Ferydoun Hoveyda such as Shirley MacLaine and others. Many of them still maintain that the Shah is one of the great reformers of the 20th century.

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
7 December 1978

Article appeared
on page A-6

U.S. Taking No Special Steps to Protect Secrets of Arms Now in Iran

By Vernon A. Guldry Jr.
Washington Star Staff Writer

The Defense Department says no extraordinary steps have been taken to protect U.S. military secrets that had been sold to Iran in the course of its military buildup.

"We will keep reviewing with them their responsibilities and precautions," said a spokesman.

The Moslem holy days this month are believed crucial for the embattled shah of Iran. Uncertainty about the future of his government has revived concerns about what might result if sophisticated American-made weapons fell into unfriendly or unstable hands.

The question of compromising U.S. military secrets was most sharply debated a year ago when Congress reluctantly acquiesced to a \$1.3 billion deal to sell a complicated airborne radar and computer system (called AWACS) designed to help control air battles.

THAT SYSTEM, plus brand-new F-16 fighter planes and new Navy destroyers were not scheduled for delivery until the 1980s so their technology is not directly at risk.

But the Iranians have a good deal of sophisticated American weaponry, including 80 F-14s, the U.S. Navy's first-line fleet defense fighter made by the Grumman Corp. This fighter has highly secret black-box electronics aboard, including a computer and radar system that can track multiple

targets at great distance and attack them with the Phoenix missiles carried on the fighter.

At the time of the AWACS controversy, CIA Director Stansfield Turner did not seem to have much confidence about Iran's security in the best of times.

IN A CLASSIFIED document circulated on Capitol Hill Turner said, "The shah is a proponent of the divide-and-rule principle. There is little cooperation among the intelligence and security services, and jurisdictional rivalries are a way of life."

Turner went on to say that, while U.S. observers believed security was tight in Iran, "it would appear prudent to recognize that the risk of Soviet penetration exists along with a consequence risk of compromise for information and equipment provided."

One source familiar with conditions in Iran said the unrest in the

cities has not penetrated military bases where the armed forces remain loyal to the shah. The F-14s and associated equipment are maintained on double-guarded bases, said a source.

Grumman has about 450 employees in Iran who have with them nearly 500 dependents. The company has not joined other firms such as General Electric and Westinghouse in ordering their employees evacuated from the country.

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MEMORANDUM FROM PRESIDENT

CIA and Iran:

Intelligence Test

TO THE secretary of state, the assistant for national security and the director of central intelligence, the President of the United States has passed the word: The quality of political intelligence we get from abroad is unsatisfactory.

The President, in his handwritten memorandum, released late last week to the media, was speaking generally. But most of all he was "dissatisfied," to use his own word, with recent reports on Iran. He had been told everything was fine in Iran; the shah, an invaluable U.S. ally, was in no danger. Then the riots and strikes erupted. The Peacock Throne began to totter.

Why didn't someone tell me? Such was Carter's acrid complaint.

Why indeed didn't someone tell him? There may well be more than one reason, but the paramount reason is that in the past few years, the eyes of our intelligence agents have been dimmed, their ears stopped up, their tongues made fuzzy.

Intelligence? Who needs intelligence? Who needs spies, with their penchant for secrecy, their disregard for the constitutional niceties?

The questions may sound absurd enough; and yet, in one form or another, they have flitted through the minds of countless Americans over the past few years. The Great CIA Flap of 1975-76, initiated by the media, pursued by the politicians, served to persuade many that the CIA (like the FBI) was as much threat to American Liberties as guardian thereof.

We were told of clandestine operations, of mail openings, of

manipulation of journalists and businessmen — enterprises that, ripped from context, made the CIA sound like some sinister capitalistic counterpart of the Soviet KGB.

Amid these thunderings, the morale of the CIA plummeted like a failed parachute. The men out in the field had scarcely to be convinced the American people had lost confidence in them. They had only to read the papers.

What kind of work can be expected of a demoralized intelligence agency? Just about the kind that has stirred the President to anger and will surely provoke him again unless something is done to persuade the CIA that we, the people, still believe in its mission.

That is no easy achievement to arrange. The President's own CIA director, Adm. Turner, is likely as responsible as anyone for the agency's condition, having heavy-handedly tried to clean house when he took over. Would anything be wrong with letting a professional spy, for a welcome change, command our other spies?

It is no frivolous point. After all, whom did the White House turn to for accurate reports on Iran after the CIA had flunked the intelligence test? To none other than the much-abused Richard Helms, a former CIA chief who was ambassador to Iran until recently. Spies, one readily learns, have their uses, however much they are out of favor when TV cameras roll and congressmen clear their throats to speak.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 42U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
11 December 1978

Analysis

Why the CIA Is Under Fire Again

President Carter complains he's being hampered by intelligence failures. Result: a probable comeback for the old-fashioned spy.

Why was the Central Intelligence Agency caught by surprise by the crisis now rocking Iran?

And: Why has U.S. intelligence failed to forewarn the White House of other critical political developments in recent months?

The President himself is demanding answers to these questions—and he is addressing his demand principally to an Annapolis classmate whom he drafted to manage the nation's troubled intelligence services.

Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has received a handwritten "Dear Stan" note in which Carter says bluntly that "I am dissatisfied with the quality of political intelligence."

The note also went to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and White House National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who share responsibility for alerting the President to potential crises overseas.

Carter's complaint was triggered by the CIA's optimistic assessments of the Iranian crisis. A mid-August report by the agency concluded that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even prerevolutionary situation."

The President is disturbed by other recent episodes. In one, the CIA failed to alert him to an imminent pro-Communist coup in Afghanistan. In another, the CIA gave no advance warning of a large-scale Rhodesian incursion into Zambia at a time when Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith was in Washington negotiating with the Carter administration.

Poor morale. One fundamental explanation cited for the intelligence failures that resulted in Carter's demand for an in-house inquiry: The CIA is suffering from the demoralizing effects of four years of scandals, investigations and reorganizations. The demoralization is especially acute among operatives engaged in clandestine activities overseas. These operatives have taken the brunt of the criticism and, despite his denials, they feel that Turner has downgraded "human intelligence" in favor of



CIA Director Stansfield Turner, Carter's Annapolis classmate, is key figure in new controversy.

technological spying, such as satellite reconnaissance.

President Carter tended to lend weight to this criticism at a November 30 news conference with the assertion: "I have been concerned that the trend that was established 15 years ago to get intelligence from electronic means might have been overemphasized."

Turner's preoccupation with running a "clean" espionage agency—a pledge he gave to Congress—also is blamed for inhibiting the initiative of American spies. A former overseas operative says that senior officers are loath to risk dismissal by exercising too much initiative or participating in an unsuccessful operation.

The CIA has worked in Iran under exceptional handicaps.

There was an understanding with the Shah—a tacit one, if not explicit—that intelligence officers and diplomats from the United States would not contact dissident groups or engage in any independent intelligence-gathering operations.

Washington, as a result, was largely dependent on information provided by the Shah's personal intelligence service, Savak, which itself miscalculated the scope and nature of the violent upheaval that threatens survival of the monarchy.

Administration policymakers express dismay over the failure of CIA analysts to question the erroneous information they were receiving from Teheran, especially given the fact that other intelligence organizations, Israel's for example, and private business analysts earlier this year report-

ed evidence of a possible revolutionary crisis brewing there.

In the new controversy over the CIA, Turner personally is in an especially vulnerable position. He conducted a bruising but unsuccessful battle to secure control over every element of the American intelligence community.

Also, he introduced a sweeping reform, ostensibly to insure maximum efficiency in the collection and analysis of information by a half dozen agencies. He assumed overall

responsibility for coordinating the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence and also for managing the budget for all intelligence activities.

When policymakers over the past year complained of serious shortcomings in the "product" that they were getting from Turner's organization, critics say that he rebuffed the complaints with the argument that the President was satisfied.

At his news conference, Carter praised the work of the intelligence community but indicated clear dissatisfaction with Turner's performance in political intelligence.

Turner's apologists say the CIA is simply being made a scapegoat by frustrated policymakers. Scapegoat or not, the fact is that the White House repeatedly has complained of CIA failures since the early 1960s.

Long list. President Kennedy privately blamed the CIA for disastrous miscalculations that led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger treated the agency's assessments with contempt. And former President Nixon charged on French television on November 28 that the CIA for 11 years underestimated Russia's military buildup.

Whatever the outcome of this latest inquest, a ranking Carter administration official says that this is clear:

The U.S. must revitalize the role of the old-fashioned spy, which has been undermined by four years of scandal, organizational turmoil and preoccupation with technology.

This analysis was written by Associate Editor Wendell S. Merick.

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SALT

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ARTICLE APPEARED
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6 December 1978

How US, Soviets compete in electronic espionage

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Have Soviet spies operating in the United States compromised American electronic surveillance capacity in such a way as to interfere with future verification of their country's weapons systems under a new strategic arms-limitation treaty (SALT)?

The short answer to this, say senior US Defense Department officials, is that both SALT I and the draft SALT II agreement now under negotiation forbid such interference.

This has not stopped the Soviets from scrambling or encrypting the signals sent out by their own missile tests, making it more difficult for US monitoring devices to gather vital data on them.

Clues to Soviet priorities in their espionage efforts are found in the main spy cases uncovered in the US over the past year:

- Last month, former low-level Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) staffer William P. Kampiles was convicted in a Hammond, Indiana, court of selling a highly secret manual on the US KH-11 satellite surveillance system to a Soviet military attaché in Greece.

The Soviets, according to US agents, gave Mr. Kampiles \$3,000 as "partial payment" for the manual, which described operation of the satellite as part of the "national technical means" of US intelligence collection. Satellites can be used for both communications and photo spying. They would play a central role in SALT verification.

Deputy CIA director for science and technology Leslie C. Dirks testified at the Kampiles trial that US national defense would be "seriously harmed" by the sale. However, another CIA official said not just one, but 17 out of 350 copies of the manual in question were missing and unaccounted for as of Nov. 1.

- In September, two former Soviet employ-

ees of the United Nations were convicted of conspiracy and espionage in a Newark, New Jersey, court. The Federal Bureau of Investigation in cooperation with US Navy intelligence officials caught the two Russians, who thought they were buying from US Navy personnel data on the Gormman Tomcat F-14 fighter and the Navy's LAMPS anti-submarine warfare program. The latter is a system for gathering undersea intelligence electronically from light helicopters.

- In Miami on Nov. 10, 1977, an American and a West German were convicted of attempting to obtain for the USSR components of the US Navy's Tomahawk cruise missile.

Defense analysts think possession of the electronic missile ingredients that emit data signals, called telemetry, would enable the Soviets to reinforce their own "national technical means" of gathering data on US missile tests.

- In May, 1977, Christopher J. Boyce, a former employee of TRW Corporation's Space and Defense Systems, was convicted in Los Angeles on eight espionage counts for passing to the Soviets information on how intelligence data are transmitted between US ground stations and satellites in space.

- Two months before the Boyce conviction, two executives of another California defense electronics firm, L. I. Industries, were convicted of conspiring to export illegally other electronic equipment to the Soviets.

To prevent US surveillance, the Soviets have encrypted the telemetry of their SS-18 and SS-20 missiles, now deployed in both Eastern Europe and the northwestern Pacific.

Carter administration analysts, asked whether this tactic does not violate the SALT I agreement, usually reply that SALT I was never formally ratified. Electronic ciphers used by the Russians, they say privately, probably can be broken by the US, but the process is time-consuming and would delay verification of future missile tests under a SALT II agreement.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1THE BOSTON GLOBE
5 December 1978

CIA warns of need to block cheating US weighs plan to monitor SALT-

By William Beecher
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The Carter Administration is seriously considering tough new provisions in the draft treaty to limit strategic arms that would be aimed at preventing cheating and increasing chances for its passage by the Senate.

Senior officials say the United States may seek to ban the coding of any data sent back from missile tests to engineers on the ground to tell how guidance and other systems are working. By intercepting and analyzing the data — or telemetry — US analysts try to keep tabs on improvements in Soviet weaponry.

The draft SALT-2 treaty contains restrictions on certain missile improvements. Thus the monitoring of tests by spy satellites and other intelligence-gathering devices is considered essential to ensure the accord is adhered to, the officials explain.

"Unless the Senate is convinced we can verify with confidence the terms of a new treaty," one State Department official said, "the chances of ratification are not good."

The principal impetus behind a ban on encoding telemetry, sources say, came from Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who argued that without it the United States could not be confident the Russians were not cheating.

He is known to have cautioned the White House that unless Moscow can be persuaded to accept such a ban, he would be duty bound to warn the Senate during ratification hearings of the immense difficulties of verifying the treaty.

But when Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was in Moscow for SALT discussions in October, well-placed officials said, the Soviets rejected an even milder proposal to ban encoding. It would merely have called for a common written understanding on what test data could and what could not be scrambled.

It was after the Russians turned down the part-way measure, sources say, that Turner called for a total ban. He is being supported by some officials in the Defense and State departments.

Sources say the telemetry issue is but

one of a series of obstacles that have arisen recently to bedevil attempts to conclude the SALT negotiations.

Another involves the Backfire bomber. The Russians insist it does not have strategic range, but all elements of the US intelligence community argue it does.

American negotiators have tried to persuade the Soviets, among other things, to agree not to increase the production rate of the Backfire through 1985, the life of the projected treaty.

The Soviets have said this may be acceptable, but they refuse to divulge the current production rate. When US negotiators said the American understanding is that the rate is 2½ a month, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said the Russians wouldn't argue with that number, according to a senior Administration official.

But the Russians have been expanding the plant that builds the Backfire, and a recent US intelligence exercise concluded that it could not be determined whether the rate is the same or has gone up, to anywhere from three to five a month, twice the previous understanding.

Failure of the Russians to provide information on their own programs is pointed to by some negotiators as an example of the kind of loophole that created problems with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Strategic Weapons accords.

For example, the ABM treaty banned certain tests except at existing test ranges. There the United States enumerated during negotiations when the Russians declined to do so. Later on, after ABM tests at a nonenumerated site in Soviet Asia were protested by the Americans, the Russians claimed the test range had long been in existence and it wasn't their fault the United States had failed to mention it during negotiations.

Another obstacle to a new treaty, Administration officials say, is the lack of movement in the Soviet bargaining position since Gromyko was in Washington in September.

Officials have passed word to Moscow that unless the Russians provide specific details on compromises they are prepared to make, there is no point in scheduling another Vance-Gromyko round of talks.

The Administration is concerned not only about the Russian technique of expecting new US proposals at each high-level bargaining session, often without substantive new Soviet positions, but also about the image being created in the Congress that the Americans are making most of the basic concessions in the last stage of negotiations.

Thus the United States is asking that new Soviet positions be passed along by Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington before a new round of talks is scheduled, probably in Geneva.

The coding of missile telemetry became a pressing issue recently after the Russians encrypted several high-frequency radio channels during a test of the SS18, the largest ICBM in their arsenal. Sources say this was the first time the Russians have done that on the SS18.

A key provision of the SALT-2 agreement would prohibit major modernization of existing missiles, such as providing new guidance systems. Another important provision would restrict the number of warheads that could be placed on each ICBM.

But if tests of such improvements could be masked from US spy satellites, provisions would be a sham, some American officials argue.

Some, in fact, would go even further than barring telemetry encoding. They also would ban the use of low-frequency telemetry — which could only be read by ground stations on the test range — and would prohibit test data being recorded in a capsule on the missile and parachuted down to the ground to be analyzed by Soviet engineers — but not monitored by US intelligence systems.

Sources say the United States does not encrypt its missile test telemetry, but does employ low frequency signals.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE D-3WASHINGTON STAR
3 DECEMBER 1978

William F. Buckley Jr.

Skulduggery, the satellite and SALT

Early this year a junior clerk in the CIA doing night duty at the operations center in Langley, Va., spotted a manual on a desk, stuck it into his briefcase, and took it home. On March 2, he sold this document to a Russian in Athens for \$3,000. Now listen carefully.

Returning to the United States, the young man wrote to a former colleague in CIA advising him that the Soviet Union had offered money to induce the clerk to transmit secret information. This bizarre communication alerted the agency to one almost certain, and another probable, piece of bad news. The first was that the young clerk had already turned something over to the Russians. Why? Because even the KGB has traditions, and one of them, very well established, is that cash is paid not for prospective, but for past services.

The KGB, in the words of Michael Ledeen in New York Magazine, does not buy "on spec." But if the clerk — William Kampiles is his name — whose letter suggested that it might be useful to the agency if he transmitted "disinformation" to the Russians, i.e. information designed to throw the KGB off the track, took a

step which would clearly lead to an investigation of him as someone who had almost certainly already committed a crime, why did the KGB encourage him to make the offer? In effect to burn him. The supposition is that the CIA would in due course have discovered the identity of the stolen document, and that the clerk who stole it must be thought to have been the man solely responsible. Why? Because there was — is — someone else, higher up in the agency, who was critical to the entire operation. The word they use in the spy world is a "mole."

What we did find out was what Kampiles gave to the Russians, simply put, probably the most important piece of technological information stolen from the agency since 1960 — the supersecret KH-11 manual. What the KH-11 does is transmit directly, from a distance as great as 300 miles above the earth, electronic signals that can distinguish between ugly and handsome Russians, even through cloud cover. That information is reproduced on a digital receiving set which composes facsimiles of the photographed information more

accurate even than the photographs themselves on which we have been relying, which are dropped by parachute from our workhorse satellites, intercepted by airplanes, and developed in our laboratories.

It is bad enough that the Soviet Union now knows what are the far reaches of our surveillance technology, but what is worse is that anyone who knows what it is we have, and how we bring it off, can reason effortlessly into how to make it inoperative.

The KH-11, for all its extraordinary sophistication, is, one learns, forlornly vulnerable. All you need to know is just how it works in order to develop something which causes it to become instantly inoperative.

Now the bearing of this development on SALT II is crucial, because SALT II, like its predecessor, depends entirely on the verifiable good faith of the contracting partners. A provision of the SALT Treaty called for no effort by either party to dissimulate, or to get in the way of the other party's instruments of detection. Needless to say, the Soviet Union cheated, as former Secretary

of Defense Melvin Laird revealed in an article for the Reader's Digest early in the year. But they cheated on the ground. They did not attempt to interfere with our satellites. There would not be much point in doing so unless they were prepared to go to war. And they did not have the conclusive technology to knock our satellites down.

But now that they are on to our KH-11, which was the "wild card" in our surveillance system, giving us that incremental protection indispensable to our well-being, the Soviet Union can get on with its killer satellite program, looking forward to the hypothetical day when it can simultaneously knock down the conventional satellites, and blind the KH-11.

So that we have prima facie evidence that there is infiltration in the CIA; and we have a factor in respect of SALT II that raises questions as to the feasibility of any understanding whatever. There are men in America who would trust the Russians even without invulnerable systems of verification. One hopes they are not running the government.

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MIG-23's

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ON PAGE 22WALL STREET JOURNAL
1 DECEMBER 1978

Reading the Leaks

You can tell a lot about an administration by which news story becomes a "leak." The observation springs to mind from two of the past week's news stories, about the MIG-23s in Cuba and the CIA in Iran.

Last Sunday James Reston reported the administration's reaction to the news stories that the MIGs being sent to Cuba are ground-attack planes that can carry nuclear weapons, in violation of 1962 Soviet pledges not to base offensive nuclear weapons there. The administration has known about the MIGs for a year, he reported, and officials suggest that this somehow makes them OK. He continued:

"What has troubled the administration, however, is that the opponents of the strategic arms agreement, and particularly members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their aides, have tried to use this MIG-23 deal as a propaganda weapon against a SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union."

In other words, the administration's problem is not with the Soviet Union sending MIGs to Cuba, but with the American people learning that it has done so. The administration would appear to have concluded that the MIGs are not relevant to the 1962 pledge or to SALT. The President indicated in his press conference yesterday that it is relying on Soviet promises not to ship nuclear weapons for the planes, but it is most doubtful that we can verify whether this has or will be done. In all probability the memo was leaked by someone disturbed at this decision. Yet now that the facts are out, the people and the Senate can

judge for themselves their relevance. In our view, the episode is exceedingly relevant to the kind of pledges we are likely to receive regarding Soviet use of their Backfire bomber, which is not counted in SALT though it can fly from the Soviet Union over the U.S. and land in Cuba.

Meanwhile, a Washington Post story by Don Oberdorfer carries the headline, "U.S. Makes Contacts With Shah's Foes." It describes "substantial and continuing contacts" with opponents to the Shah in recent weeks, "coming after years of minimal connections." In short, this leak describes what our intelligence agents are currently doing in the field. Even worse, it is bound to undercut our announced policy of supporting the Shah. It tends to legitimize the opposition, and to suggest that the U.S. is hedging its bets against his overthrow. (Especially since a CIA agent sat in on the plotting of the generals who overthrew Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam in 1963.)

This especially destructive leak carries all the earmarks of bureaucratic infighting, since it comes in the context of badly mistaken CIA estimates of strength of the Shah's opposition. Perhaps the leak is intended to show that the CIA is shaping itself up; or perhaps it's intended to show that the President is cracking the whip to correct the deficiency. Either way, it's a small motive for the cost involved.

We have no way to know whether the administration is worrying about the CIA-Iran leak the way Mr. Reston described it worrying about the MIG-Cuba leak. We hope it is, but without much expectation.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 16

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
11 December 1978

Washington Whispers

U.S. jets that flew over Cuba to spy on MiG-23s there came back with an unexpected intelligence bonanza: The American planes were able to chart the Cuban air-defense system by pinpointing location of radar units tracking the high-flying planes.

How much does it cost the Kremlin to support Cuba? About 9 million dollars a day—more than 3 billion a year—according to latest intelligence estimates. That is twice the rate of last spring.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 25

NEWSWEEK
11 December 1978

Periscope

SPYING ON CUBA'S MIG-23s

An extraordinary U.S. intelligence effort backed up President Carter's assurance last week that the new Soviet MiG-23 jet fighters now in Cuba pose no nuclear threat to the U.S. Among other reconnaissance tactics, the U.S. employed sensors that can detect nuclear weapons—and that are so secret that no one will say whether the sensors are land-based, airborne or beamed from ships. But it is known that an SR-71 Blackbird spy plane made a rare flight over Cuba to collect information on the MiG-23s, and that the Blackbird carries some kind of sensor in addition to its cameras. U.S. Navy P-3 patrol planes also flew near Cuba to do some spying, presumably by radar.

Article appeared
on page A-12

2 December 1978

Cuba Migs Discounted As U.S. Nuclear Peril

By Don Oberdorfer

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Mig 23 warplanes recently supplied to Cuba by the Soviet Union show no signs of having a nuclear weapons delivery capability and do not appear to be a threat to U.S. security, a senior Defense Department official said yesterday.

The official, who spoke to reporters on condition that he not be identified, said the limited number of planes supplied is a factor in his judgment of their military importance. U.S. intelligence has reported that less than one squadron of 16 Mig 23s has been acquired by the Cubans, according to officials.

The unstated implication of the defense official's remarks, as well as of the comments by President Carter to his news conference Thursday, is that the Mig 23s are not a military problem so long as their number and capabilities are restricted. Administration sources said the United States is carrying on still-incomplete discussions with the Soviet Union in an attempt to define more clearly what level of weaponry in Cuba is acceptable here.

The Soviet Union long ago supplied Cuba with Mig 21 warplanes, which are primarily air defense aircraft but have some air-to-ground capability, the defense official said. Some of the more advanced Mig 23s, which began to arrive in small numbers late this spring, have a conventional weapons ground attack capability, the official said.

The 1963 U.S.-Soviet understanding reached at the end of the Cuban missile crisis is not precise, according to American officials and students of the period, but in general it bans the Soviet placement of offensive weapons in Cuba. The line between offensive and defensive weapons in the high technology age is difficult to establish, however.

Both Carter and the defense official said there is no evidence that nuclear weapons are in Cuba. While any aircraft could be adapted to carry a limited number of nuclear weapons, special characteristics are required to give a plane nuclear delivery capability in an effective military sense, according to experts.

Regarding Iran, an area of great importance to the United States on the border of the Soviet Union, the defense official said a shift to a regime unfriendly to the West would have very serious military consequences.

The official refused to discuss U.S. contingency plans for intervention in Iran, but noted that the present turmoil there was not principally due to outside military threats. The potential of military action by the Soviet Union, is neutralized to some degree by U.S. statements and capabilities, and potential U.S. action is neutralized in part by Soviet statements and capabilities, the official noted.

In recent days Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev has warned against any U.S. military intervention in Iran. President Carter, saying the United States has no such intention, has cautioned the Soviets against intervention there.

High officials of the Carter administration, including those with top defense responsibility, made several statements in past months emphasizing the importance of the Persian Gulf and suggesting that the United States would dispatch military forces to the area in response to a Soviet or Soviet-backed threat.

In present circumstances, however, neither the military power of the United States nor the billions of dollars in sophisticated U.S. military equipment purchased by the shah is of much effect. Iran's current problems, the defense official said, present striking evidence that large military forces will not ensure internal security or the coherence of a society.

Approved For Release 2009/04/27 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0

MISCELLANEOUS

Approved For Release 2009/04/27 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0

Article appeared
on page B-6

THE WASHINGTON POST
7 December 1978

Judge Dismisses Suit by Widow Of a Mercenary

U.S. District Court Judge Charles R. Richey has dismissed a \$33 million damage suit brought against former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger and the Central Intelligence Agency by the widow of a Kensington man who was hired as a mercenary in the 1976 war in Angola.

Sheila Gearhart and her four children had claimed that Kissinger, the CIA and other U.S. officials were responsible for the Angola government's execution of Daniel F. Gearhart, by not warning him of the dangerous situation in the African nation at the time he went there.

But Richey ruled Tuesday that the Gearharts had failed to "state with sufficient specificity facts upon which relief could be granted" and dismissed the suit.

THE WASHINGTON POST
7 December 1978

Article appeared
on page / B-11

Former CIA Pilot Loses in Long Fight for Back Pay

By Loretta Tofani
Washington Post Staff Writer

A saga that began nearly four years ago and 12,000 miles away during the American evacuation of Saigon, when a pilot for the CIA boarded a refugee ship with his Vietnamese wife of four days instead of flying a plane out of Saigon without her, wound to a close yesterday in D.C. Superior Court.

Judge James Belson ruled that the pilot, James L. Roberts, was not entitled to back pay from Air America, a company then owned by the CIA, which fired him for abandoning the plane to the North Vietnamese.

After his firing, Roberts spent two years as a security guard, an appliance repairman and a tugboat dispatcher. He sued Air America for \$100,000 damage to his reputation in the airline industry and \$15,000 back pay.

Roberts claimed he had failed to fly the plane out of Saigon because he could not get to the airport, and that he could not get to the airport because an Air America helicopter never came to pick him up from a rooftop and take him there as scheduled.

Air America countersued for the value of the plane, \$150,000, saying that Roberts could have radioed his supervisor that he was stranded, and had his supervisor summon a helicopter.

In ruling against Roberts, Judge Belson said he had showed a "passive attitude" about getting to the airport and flying the Volpar plane to the United States. His attitude, Belson said, was influenced by "family circumstances."

"As of April 28, Roberts had not secured an American passport for them (his Vietnamese wife, stepdaughter and mother-in-law) to leave Vietnam as dependents of his as opposed to be-

ing in refugee status," Belson said. "He knew that unless he stayed with them as an American sponsor there was a very real chance that they would not be airlifted out of Vietnam."

As it turned out, Roberts and his family spent eight days aboard a refugee ship with 6,000 Vietnamese escaping from Vietnam to Guam.

"During the voyage to Guam, I ate two 8-ounce tins of rice a day, had no shelter, no clothes and no bath," Roberts wrote in a letter to Air America. "We endured 110 degrees heat by day and freezing rain at night. How only three people died I will never know."

Although Roberts lost his lawsuit, Air America also lost its countersuit. Belson said Roberts did not have to pay for the stranded plane because of a clause in an Air America contract absolving pilots of responsibility in such cases.

Air America also had sued Roberts for \$11,200 in cash that he had been given to distribute to other pilots. Roberts said he had left the money in a locked desk drawer at the airport.

Belson ruled that Roberts did not have to reimburse Air America for that sum because his supervisors never tried to return to the airport and retrieve the money from the drawer.

Air America's lawyer, William Nelson, suggested that Roberts could not have been deeply concerned about keeping his appointment at the airport, since he failed to wear a watch.

"During an evacuation, isn't time a crucial element?" Nelson asked Roberts in cross-examination. "Isn't time a crucial element in meeting objectives?"

Roberts replied that he did not need a watch because he had "nothing to do but wait for the aircraft to pick us up from the roof."

NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PACAYUNE
25 November 1978

Secrets and Public Trials

There have been several examples in recent years of accused criminals whose past connection with security agencies have afforded them a free pass to break the law. Rather than risk the release of national security information in public courtrooms, the government has dropped or lowered criminal charges.

Now, the Justice Department, CIA and other intelligence agencies have decided to file a test against the technique of "gray-mail" — the threatened disclosure of national secrets by criminal defendants during their trial. Attorney General Griffin Bell and others now that dismissal of criminal charges is too high a price to pay for the government to keep its secrets.

The test case will be filed in connection with the trial of Robert Berrellez, an official of International Telephone and Telegraph, who is accused of making false statements to a Senate committee. Mr. Berrellez's attorney has demanded access to classified information to prepare his defense,

which will apparently include references to still-secret CIA operations in Chile.

Under the Justice Department proposal, a secret pre-trial hearing would be held in which the defense would be required to disclose what secret information it plans to bring out during the trial. If the judge rules the information is irrelevant — and therefore inadmissible — the defendant would be barred from mentioning it.

Defense attorneys are normally permitted to talk about their cases in opening arguments, including any information involving national secrets which the defense plans to introduce during trial. During the trial, the judge would rule — in public — whether the information could be considered by the jury. Under the Justice Department's plan, the entire question would be settled in secret before the trial.

The proposal raises significant legal questions, including whether a defendant's "due process" rights would be violated if he is forced to

disclose his case before trial. In addition, a defendant has a right to a "public trial," and it is questionable whether this right would be satisfied if there is a secret pre-trial hearing.

Justice Department attorneys suggest that much more public information would be available under the plan because if a case is dropped due to the risk secrets might be made public, no information would come out.

It is a thorny problem, and there is no clear-cut answer. The danger is that if secret proceedings are permitted in national security cases, the precedent might be extended to other cases where prejudicial publicity is at issue. Pre-trial proceedings are often critical junctures in the criminal justice system. If the public and the press are excluded from such proceedings, matters of important public concern would be resolved in secret, and without public oversight.

NEW SOLIDARITY
1 December 1978

In Defense of the Central Intelligence Agency

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

NEW YORK, Nov. 26 (NSIPS) — Last summer, CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner launched a massive purge of the so-called "clandestine services" of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Now, more than a year later, some very foolish people pretend to be perplexed by the CIA's alleged incompetence in reading the situation in Iran.

The facts are as follows:

First, Turner's purge of E. Henry Knoche and hundreds of other senior CIA specialists gutted the CIA's capabilities in the Middle East and many other regions. This left the CIA analytical sections dependent on what was predominantly second-hand information, fed into the Agency through predominantly British and Zionist conduits.

Second, as a result of leaks to Congressmen, exposing Admiral Turner and Zbigniew Brzezinski as liars in their efforts to blame Cuba for the Shaba II affair, heavy clamps were imposed by Brzezinski et al. on CIA consultation with private channels of relevance outside the Agency itself. This was aggravated by the conviction of former CIA operative Snapp, which had the effect of gagging the CIA's discussions even in matters where no secret information was transmitted.

Third, since approximately mid-August, and increasingly since the conclusion of the "Camp David Summit," elements of the U.S. intelligence establishment have been under strict orders not to receive or take into account any information which might suggest that the "Camp David" package was anything less than a new religious miracle. This gag-rule had the effect of preventing the CIA (in particular) from receiving any of the kinds of information which would have informed them that the national estimate subsuming the Iran situation was a fatally flawed misconception from the start.

Purged and Gutted Agency

These and related facts fully account for the current problems of the CIA: It is a purged and gutted agency which has operated under orders not to contradict any national estimates authored in support of the policies of Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry A. Kissinger.

There are two additional matters to

be taken directly into account in this connection. The first is the prevailing illusions concerning the relative weights of the CIA in the U.S. intelligence community. The second is the specific idiocies of national estimates directly responsible for CIA misjudgment in various matters, including the Iran case.

On the first, The CIA purge of "clandestine services" under Mondale, Brzezinski, Schlesinger and Turner has wiped out the CIA's general ability to independently cross-check and correct intelligence information and estimates generated by other elements grouped under the National Security Council. At present, the center of gravity of official intelligence operations is technically located in the Pentagon, with the British- and Zionist-penetrated National Security Agency, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Air Force Intelligence the principal official bastions of Brzezinski's operations.

The increasing of the relative weight of the NSA, ONI and Air Force Intelligence is consistent with Brzezinski's technetronic policies, policies recommended in Victor Marchetti's *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, policies supported by Philip Agee and Agee's ally Morton Halperin. This places the emphasis of U.S. intelligence gathering on NSA telecommunications and mail taps and satellite and other, related forms of information-gathering. For qualitative, human political-intelligence gathering the USA is now virtually at the mercy of the combined resources of British-Canadian and Israeli-Zionist intelligence networks.

The importance of CIA "clandestine services" is the means to know situations on the ground intimately, to be able to develop intelligence concerning matters which no informant could possibly supply in advance: how various

forces will think and react under circumstances those forces do not yet anticipate as occurring. There is no substitute for the experienced, qualified senior clandestine operative in this aspect of intelligence-gathering, precisely the aspect of work in which the CIA's reported Iran estimates collapsed.

On the second point, although U.S. cooperation with the European Monetary System has been formal U.S. policy since the Bonn "summit," many elements in the Administration and in the leadership of the Republican and Democratic Parties have been dedicated to London's policy of intransigent opposition to the EMS. Exemplary is the pushing of a 1979 depression in the U.S. by Blumenthal and Miller, among others, and the disgusting antics of Robert Strauss and his Clay machine- and Israeli intelligence sidekicks at the GATT negotiations and in Japan.

EMS Is Policy Foundation

The significance of this inconsistency for CIA estimates is located in the fact that the development of a new world monetary system around the keystone of the Jan. 1, 1979 institutionalization of the EMS is the foundation of all strategic policy-making of the principal governments of continental Europe, the Middle East, southeast Asia, Japan, Mexico and numerous other nations. The EMS-centered policy is also a war-avoidance, pro-detente policy, and is in direct opposition to the resurrection of Henry A. Kissinger's policies in the Middle East, southern Africa and elsewhere.

On all the closely related policy-issues intersecting the EMS, the majority of the U.S. domestic national press media, most emphatically the TV news media and the Washington Post, have been consistently lying since May 1978. Similarly, the leadership of the Republican National Committee has been variously duped or outrightly lying — with the liars those most closely allied with Henry A. Kissinger and with the "free enterprise" campaign of the Mont Pelerin Society and the Heritage Foundation front-organization of British secret intelligence.

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the NSA, Air Force Intelligence, ONI and National War College under puppet-like control of British and Israeli intelligence, the overwhelming weight of influence on most of the policy-making arms of government has been composed of combinations of outright lies and other forms of disinformation. There has been a gross misestimate of all aspects of European, Middle East and other developments on all issues bearing on the EMS and new world monetary system.

Disregarding these facts in connection with the British effort to destabilize the Shahanshah of Iran meant overlooking the complex of countermeasures taken against the British, Bahai, British Freemasons, and other accomplices of the attempted "destabilization." These countermeasures were taken on the basis of the strategic correlation of economic, monetary and political forces being developed around the imminent institutionalization of the new monetary system, and were mightily aided by the mobilization of Arab and European forces against the hideous farce the "Camp David summit" was rightly regarded to be in those quarters.

What do you critics of the CIA expect that agency to do to correct such problems — perhaps shoot Brzezinski and Kissinger?

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-20NEW YORK TIMES
6 DECEMBER 1978

Issue and Debate

Civil Defense Drive: Turnabout in the Strategic Policy of the U.S.

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 — Earlier this month Carter Administration aides disclosed that the United States was about to embark on a new drive to save as many as 140 million American lives in the event of a major nuclear war. The disclosure stirred considerable skepticism, even, disbelief, in many circles. Observers asked why, after civil defense was essentially abandoned 15 years ago, President Carter had decided to revive it.

Officials involved with the new civil defense plan say it does not represent a "crash program," and in his news conference last week Mr. Carter denied reports that it would cost \$2 billion to carry out. Nevertheless, it is viewed by some experts as constituting a turnabout in American strategic policy.

In part, Mr. Carter's plan was stimulated by governmental unease over the apparent expansion of efforts by the Soviet Union to protect its population and industry in a nuclear war, as reported by the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. But American officials acknowledge that the program is also designed to help lay the political groundwork for Senate approval of a new Soviet-American treaty on limitation of strategic arms by catering to the concerns of Congressional conservatives.

Civil defense has long been a controversial issue, in and out of government, and officials report that Mr. Carter's decision was made only after an extended interagency debate in which State Department and arms control agency aides expressed strong opposition to an expanded effort.

Defense Department and White House civil defense advocates appear to have won this debate, and the Pentagon is now proposing to ask Congress for \$145 million next year to pay for the first installment of the new plan.

But judging by the tentative way Mr. Carter talked about an increase for civil defense financing last week, it is clear that the civil defense debate is still open. This debate is likely to spread to Capitol Hill when the White House submits its budgetary requests for approval early next year.

The Background

Widespread interest in civil defense from nuclear attack arose first in the late 1950's after Moscow's successful lofting of the first satellite, the Sputnik. The achievement demonstrated that Soviet missiles were capable of reaching the United States. The Eisenhower Administration reacted by proposing a modest plan for evacuating cities and building shelters to protect civilians from nuclear explosions and radioactive fallout.

After the East-West crisis over Berlin in 1961, the Kennedy Administration expanded this effort, focusing on the creation of large public shelters and advocating the construction of personal shelters in private homes. In 1963, at the high point of the program, the Administration was spending \$250 million for civil defense, and it was estimated that almost one million homes were equipped with shelters.

For several reasons, this program was abruptly abandoned in the mid-1960's. Tension between Moscow and Washington had abated somewhat and officials found the idea of an extensive shelter program to be prohibitively expensive.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, an early supporter of civil defense, also argued at the time that the Soviet Union's growing missile arsenal made the protection of large portions of the population nearly impossible.

Mr. McNamara and his aides, in addition, suggested that efforts to reduce the massive damage caused by nuclear weapons were counterproductive because they would remove the primary restraint inhibiting Moscow and Washington from using their missile forces in a crisis.

These arguments were accepted by successive Administrations. Over the last decade, the Pentagon received about \$90 million a year for civil defense, hardly enough to maintain the shelters constructed in the Kennedy era.

Unlike the program of the 1960's, Mr. Carter's new program is not based on protecting civilians with shelters but on developing plans for rapid evacuation of large cities. Although plans for con-

ducting major evacuations have just begun, civil defense aides maintain that, with a week's warning, a mass urban exodus could save the lives of almost two-thirds of the nation's population.

The new program would be taken out of the Pentagon and handed over to the Administration's new Federal Emergency Management Agency. In addition to planning for nuclear contingencies, the agency also has responsibility for natural disasters, and officials hope to achieve a better mesh between civil defense and other disaster activities.

The Supporters' Case

The principal argument used to justify a renewed emphasis on civil defense is that the Soviet Union has gone to great lengths to protect its own population and that an American failure to match these efforts could tip the overall strategic balance.

Supporters of civil defense argue that Moscow's preparations in that field are extensive, costing some \$2 billion a year, ranging from numerous shelters in cities to the storage of large reserves of food in the countryside and even the construction of underground industries.

Arguing that these preparations reflect the Soviet belief that a nuclear war could be fought and won, the supporters cite a Central Intelligence Agency report, released last July, that estimated that under highly favorable circumstances over 80 percent of the Soviet population might survive a major nuclear attack.

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Aides to Mr. Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, also suggest that a wide disparity in Soviet and American civil defenses could put Washington at a disadvantage in a serious political crisis. They argue that if the Soviet Union, in the midst of a crisis, were to begin evacuating its cities, the United States would be exposed to a subtle form of "nuclear blackmail."

Bardyl R. Tirana, the Pentagon's civil defense chief and a major architect of the new program, also contends that evacuations provide the "easiest and cheapest" solution to the nuclear defense problem. He concedes that evacuations from large cities would pose difficulties but argues that they can be dealt with by "educating" the public.

He also notes that under the new plan, the United States would still spend proportionately less on civil defense than several smaller countries in West Europe, including Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

The Opponents' Case

Critics of the plan use an array of arguments to suggest that an expanded civil defense effort is undesirable and also probably unworkable.

They maintain that the extent of Soviet preparations has been exaggerated and that whatever steps Moscow took to provide protection, millions of Russians would still perish in a nuclear attack.

Opponents also point to the recent C.I.A. study to bolster their case, referring to the agency's conclusion that the Russian program, while large, was unlikely to "embolden" the Soviet leadership to risk a nuclear war.

Critics, including Senator John Culver, Democrat of Iowa, also argue that any effort to take civil defense seriously could undermine the deterrent effect of nuclear arms. By countering the destructive power of these weapons, Senator Culver and others warn, civil defense could make nuclear war a more realistic option for Soviet and American leaders.

The potential effectiveness of large-scale evacuations from cities is also

questioned. An expert on civil defense, Leon-Gougeon of the Washington-based Advanced International Studies Institute, said last week that an evacuation plan would not "impress" Moscow unless it were coupled with a \$3 billion-a-year program for building new shelters and protecting key military installations.

Other critics assert that little thought has been given to how the massive congestion created by urban evacuations would be handled and how Americans fleeing from cities would be housed and fed in the countryside. On the one hand, they argue that if little is done to protect evacuees, many would soon perish from nuclear fallout and disease after an attack. On the other hand, they say that programs to provide for their needs would require billions of additional dollars.

The Outlook

Although Mr. Carter has approved a program to upgrade civil defenses, he has not yet determined how much money he wants to devote to it. White House officials say that financing will be approved on an annual basis and that the Administration will thus have to seek Congressional support for each added increment to the program. Accordingly, both Mr. Carter and Congress will have a number of opportunities to reassess the new policy.

Officials are agreed that important questions bearing on future Congressional and White House action are whether Washington soon achieves a strategic arms accord with Moscow and whether it is then approved by the Senate. If an agreement is obtained in the next six months, which is considered likely, and it is approved, much of the wind could go out of the civil defense sail.

Another question is the degree of cooperation the Administration would get from state and local leaders. At present, civil defense programs are financed with Federal and local funds under an arrangement that few local leaders have found attractive. Future local support for civil defense will depend on how far the existing funding system is altered.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-38THE WASHINGTON POST
6 December 1978

Pentagon Official Due to Be Chief Of Senate Foreign Relations Staff

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who is expected to assume the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the new Congress, has selected William Bader, a Pentagon official, to be the committee's staff director, informed sources report.

Bader, 47, is deputy director of the office of planning for the secretary of defense. He has been responsible for coordinating defense intelligence operations.

Bader served on the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee from 1966 to 1969. His appointment is not likely to be announced until Church has been formally installed as chairman in January.

Bader would succeed Norvill Jones, who is reported to be taking a job in private industry.

Staff members on Foreign Relations report directly to individual senators who, in effect, named them to their positions, so the staff director is less powerful than on many other committees. But as the chairman's

right-hand man, he can still have substantial influence. Informed sources speculated that Bader could play an important role in the Senate debate on a new strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT) with the Soviet Union. As chairman of the committee, Church is expected to be the SALT floor leader.

Bader, with a doctorate from Princeton, is a former foreign service officer and official of the Ford Foundation. He worked for Sen. Church on the staff of the select committee that investigated the Central Intelligence Agency.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE D-7

WASHINGTON STAR
3 DECEMBER 1978

A veteran's view

What hinders CIA from doing its job?

By Jack Maury

A wise veteran of White House councils has said that the greatest danger to peace in our time could be an ill-informed American president.

Small wonder, then, that the president reportedly has expressed concern over CIA performance with regard to the potentially explosive situation in Iran. But it is difficult to see how any intelligence service could function effectively in the face of the coincidence of circumstances which have conspired over the past several years to disrupt and demoralize the agency.

The roots of many of today's problems lie at the door of agency management. The peremptory dismissal of hundreds of skilled and experienced officers have profoundly affected morale, resulting in the voluntary retirement of hundreds of others.

CIA, and indeed our entire national security apparatus, is victim of the theology, prevalent in parts of the present administration, which holds that official secrecy, like military strength, is, by definition, immoral or sinister. The resulting restraints and inhibitions have seriously eroded intelligence initiative. This unilateral disarmament in the midst of intense intelligence warfare with foreign adversaries has had little effect in reassuring the agency's domestic critics, and even less in encouraging reciprocal restraint on the part of the KGB. It has, however, resulted in considerable disenchantment among friendly foreign intelligence services whose valuable collaboration with us in the past had been based on the belief that CIA was ready and able to take the lead in providing the Free World with protection against surprise and subversion.

But perhaps as damaging to the long-term effectiveness of our intelligence services as any of the above has been the irresponsible zeal of the American media in exposing the secrets, attacking the purposes and dis-

torting the facts regarding our intelligence activities.

This is not to suggest that there is anything unhealthy in the adversary attitude of the media toward any government agency which operates clandestinely. Nor is it surprising that the media have not yet recovered from the euphoria — indeed the arrogance — of their success in vitally affecting the conduct and outcome of a major war and contributing to the downfall of two presidents. But just as the press has been so effective in dramatizing events in Indochina and uncovering mischief in the White House, so should its own performance be subject to scrutiny. The corruptive effects of power are not limited to government alone.

Among recurring, seriously misleading themes appearing in the news or editorial pages of influential publications have been the following:

- CIA is a sort of "rogue elephant," operating beyond the control of president or Congress. In fact, as both the Church and Pike committees concluded, CIA, in the words of the Pike report, "has been highly responsive to the instructions of the president and assistant to the president for national security affairs." And the agency has always reported to Congress precisely in accordance with procedures laid down by the Congress itself.

- CIA was a witting accomplice in the Watergate burglary. In fact, as the Rockefeller Commission concluded, CIA had no reason to know that the assistance it lent Howard Hunt (documentation, camera, recorder) would be used for improper purposes. Moreover CIA Director Helms refused to allow agency operations in Mexico to be used as a pretext to obstruct post-Watergate investigations.

- CIA has been involved in illegal drug traffic. In fact, as John Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, stated in response to a congressional inquiry, CIA has been the bureau's "strongest partner" in uncovering foreign sources of illegal narcotics.

In addition, there have been numerous false or misleading individual news items. A few examples:

- A front-page item appearing in the New York Times in 1969 alleging that there had been "at least one confirmed battle death in Laos — when an American CIA agent was killed by gunfire at an advanced post." As a subsequent embassy investigation made clear, the "CIA agent" turned out to be a five-day old premature baby of the family of an employee of Air America, the CIA-controlled contract air carrier. The story was especially mischievous because of the strict U.S. policy, in line with the Geneva accords to which the U.S. was a party, against any combat involvement by U.S. personnel in Laos.

- Washington Post item in 1976 by a member of the Post editorial staff describing the so-called Penkovskiy Papers as "precisely the 'coarse fraud, a mixture of provocative invention and anti-Soviet slander' that the Soviet authorities . . . claimed it was at the time."

In fact, having been the CIA officer in charge of the Penkovskiy operation, I have assured the Post, as their senior editors were assured when they originally serialized the Papers, that virtually every word in them attributed to Penkovskiy was his own.

- Washington Star headline in 1976: "CIA Goal: Drug, Not Kill, Anderson." In fact, the story said only that the White House had consulted a "former CIA physician" about drug-ging Jack Anderson "to discredit him."

- A number of press stories alleging CIA introduction of swine flu virus into Cuba. Although flatly and publicly denied by the agency in both press releases and assurances to congressional committees, most of these allegations have never been retracted.

Quite as damaging as some of the false and misleading stories have been disclosures of sensitive operational information. It is difficult to see how the public interest is served by revelations which destroy the fruits of important, dangerous and expensive intelligence undertakings, strain diplomatic relations or embarrass individuals, organizations or foreign governments who have provided the agency with valuable assistance. Who is served by publication of details of the efforts of the Glomar Explorer to salvage wreckage of a Soviet submarine? As Eric Sevareid, commenting some time ago on press stories of the interception of foreign communications and of submarine reconnaissance in foreign waters, asks: "Were these two stories information that people had a right to know and benefitted by knowing? Only a rather exotic cult of editorial thinkers would say yes."

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The media have been ever ready to make instant celebrities of those former CIA employees who, for whatever motives, choose to violate their solemn secrecy commitments, sabotage sensitive and important operations and jeopardize the careers and personal safety of former colleagues by "telling all." Typical among these has been the recent idol of the talk shows and book reviews, John Stockwell. The mindless zeal with which some of the media have accepted uncritically his unsubstantiated allegations would befit the accolades heaped upon the pronouncements of Fidel Castro by Radio Havana. Lost in the avalanche of publicity is the fact that while still in the agency he failed to present his complaints to the inspector general or other senior officials, or to report them to the appropriate oversight committees of the Congress; and that some of his allegations are outright falsehoods, such as the especially serious claim that "... the CIA's recent record includes the assassination of Patrice Lumumba; Ngo Dinh Diem, the South Vietnamese President; Rafael Trujillo Monila, the Dominican Republic president; Gen. Rene Schneider, the commander of the Chilean Army."

(The "tell all" fraternity is not limited to junior or middle-grade officers who were probably ideologically or emotionally unfit for the demands of the intelligence business in the first place. It includes, at least in some degree, a former director, William Colby, who defends his record of going beyond the traditional bounds of security on the ground that only in this way could the agency's reputation be cleared and its critics reassured.

(Among Colby's bitterest critics have been some former members of the high priesthood of secrecy, the counter-intelligence clique. Perpetrators and victims of the myth of the omnipotent KGB, their basic assumption is not only that all of our security agencies are penetrated (probably true, at least to some degree), but that most of what we take to be

reliable intelligence is being fed to us by Soviet deception artists. It is ironic that some of these self-proclaimed guardians of the agency's security conscience should, in an apparent effort to settle old scores and cover past fiascos, now turn up in the ranks of the "kiss and tell" brotherhood along with the likes of Messrs. Marchetti, Agee, Snepp, Stockwell. See, for example, *Legend: The World of Lee Harvey Oswald*, by Edward Jay Epstein.)

There is also the problem of news selection and news suppression. A case in point is the coverage of hearings on CIA and the media at the beginning of this year by a subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Although several former CIA officials testified there had been no significant cases where news disseminated to foreign audiences by CIA had contaminated stories destined for American readers, I noted that despite lengthy investigations by other congressional committees and numerous cries of alarm by editors and commentators, not one significant case of such contamination had been identified. Typical headlines the next day, however, was this in *The Washington Star*, "U.S. Media Took Stories Planted by CIA as Genuine".

There was also my own testimony that while there was little evidence of CIA corrupting the American media, there was good reason to believe that the KGB had been quite active in this regard. I cited a top secret manual entitled "The Practice of Recruiting Americans in the U.S.A. and Third Countries" published by the First Chief Directorate of the KGB and listing, in order of priority, 12 categories of recruitment targets. The first was government employees with access to classified information. The second was members of the media. I referred to evidence that Soviet efforts in this regard had been quite successful.

On the use of journalists in the collection of intelligence, Eugene Patterson, president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, warned that CIA use of even foreign journalists "could lead to the death of our American Dream." However, neither he nor any media representatives cited a case where a CIA connection had either contaminated news disseminated in the U.S. or interfered with the obligations of an American journalist to his publisher or his public. Nor did anyone explain how the American Dream would be placed in mortal jeopardy by CIA recruitment of a *Tass* correspondent.

Over a dozen reporters were² present during the hearings. They provided extensive coverage of the testimony of media representatives, but no testimony critical of the media, or challenging allegations of CIA corruption of the media, or of KGB penetration of the media.

This is a sorry record. It brings to mind the words of Mr. Jefferson when, in 1807, he wrote to his friend John Norvell of Kentucky:

"Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vessel."

But the purpose of recounting this record here is not to suggest a solution to the problem of irresponsible journalism. Rather, it is to identify a source of disturbing disarray in our first line of defense and to warn those concerned about the effectiveness of the CIA of the future not to be misled by media-created myths regarding the CIA of the past. These myths have already generated public and political pressures for cures worse than the disease, or legislative restrictions and public exposures which would damage the agency's effectiveness even more than it has been damaged already.

But these is one measure which might do much to restore the effectiveness of all our intelligence services — the passage of legislation providing meaningful protection for sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Our basic espionage law is woefully inadequate. In order to convict under it, the government must prove that the disclosure of classified information was done with "intent, or reason to believe" that it was "to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation." Thus if even the most sensitive information, such as the identity of agents or the details of intelligence collection techniques, are revealed publicly, conviction is often impossible unless the defendant is caught *in flagrante* with a foreign agent. It is ironic that we have laws providing prison sentences for revelation of information on such matters as crop statistics, bank loans, Internal Revenue data, Selective Service records, export controls, patents, relief rolls, and even insecticide formulas; but intelligence employees can, with impunity, violate their sworn commitments, betray their organization and destroy the careers and jeopardize the lives of former colleagues by "telling all." They can destroy the effectiveness of valuable and costly technical collection systems which have been years in the making. And in doing all this they can be assured of fame and fortune.

If these instant celebrities crave future adventure and reward they can develop, and some undoubtedly have developed, mutually profitable relationships with foreign intelligence services. Their appeal as tar-

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gets for recruitment stems not only from their knowledge of our own intelligence operations; with their ready access to the media and lecture halls, they are ideally situated "agents of influence." In this capacity they are uniquely qualified to serve what a former Soviet intelligence officer has described as one of the KGB's highest priority objectives, "to put out the eyes of our enemy by discrediting and disrupting his intelligence service."

All this is not to suggest anything as drastic as the British Official Secrets Act, or the espionage laws of most other democratic countries. All that is proposed is a bill which would cover only information specifically designated by the director of Central Intelligence or the heads of the other intelligence agencies as relating to intelligence, "sources and methods"

—the identities of agents or the details of technical collection systems. It would have no applications to other categories of classified material. And it would be binding only on those individuals who, by virtue of employment with an intelligence agency, voluntarily assumed the obligation to protect source and method information.

In considering such legislation, it may be appropriate to recall the comment of Gen. Washington who, just over 200 years ago, wrote in a letter to Col. Elias Dayton: "The necessity for procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged — all that remains for me to add is that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises of the kind and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned."

Jack Maury, who recently retired as an assistant secretary of defense, served 28 years in the CIA, including eight years as chief of Soviet operations and five years in charge of CIA relations with Congress.

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DCI IN THE NEWS

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14 December 1978

Joseph Kraft

Changing the President's Men

As the Carter administration nears the end of its second year, Washington is alive with rumors of heads about to roll. Not without reason.

Experience has reshaped the president's concept of government. To bring practice into harmony with his revised views, changes need to be made in the president's office and at the Cabinet and subcabinet levels.

Carter came to Washington with the horrors of the Nixon-Haldeman White House fresh in his mind. To ensure against secret, unaccountable and illegal rule by the insiders, he insisted on two principles.

First, he vested in the department and agency heads maximum authority, especially in the matter of picking their own staffs. Second, he put together a lean White House staff, short on the capacity to coordinate issues that engaged the interest of several departments.

That approach has, predictably, failed in several respects. The administration has been notable for a lack of high-level coordination. On the political side, the president has already shaken up the White House. Jerry Rafshoon and Anne Wexler have been added to the staff with visibly good results.

But the current drive to impose tight budgetary constraints on the departments and agencies has disclosed weakness at the top of the Office of Management and Budget. If he is truly serious about holding down inflation, the president will want a weightier figure at the head of OMB than the present director, James McIntyre.

Relations between the National Security Council staff under Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Departments of State and Defense are currently being studied at OMB. Presumably there will emerge some curb on the NSC's itch for advocacy as against coordination of differing departmental views. Perhaps Brzezinski will even be obliged to put high on his staff somebody with competence to blend economic and energy questions into security issues.

Several Cabinet officers get very high grades for instinctive responsiveness to the needs of the White House. Included in that list are Secretaries Cyrus Vance of State, Harold Brown of Defense, Cecil Andrus of Interior and Bob Bergland of Agriculture.

Several others—including Michael Blumenthal at Treasury, Joseph Califano at HEW and Patricia Harris at HUD—have shown more independence. But events have tended to prove Blumenthal right in his differences with the White House—notably on the

issue of supporting the dollar. Califano and Harris, apart from being able, have support from liberal and black constituencies the White House would not readily antagonize at this time.

In some cases there is a tension between individual qualities and institutional requirements. Attorney General Griffin Bell has superb political instincts, but he seems not to like Washington or the Justice Department all that much. Moreover, the need for an attorney general without personal political ties to the president is now underlined by the case of Bert Lance, the president's friend and former director of OMB, who is the focus of an Atlanta investigation that has already seen the president's brother, Billy, take the Fifth Amendment.

James Schlesinger—and I say this as a friend and admirer—is more noted for rugged intellectual honesty and critical acumen than the political agility needed to bring warring agencies into a new department at a time when energy is a hot, partisan issue. Juanita Kreps lacks the pushiness to bring the Department of Commerce to the fore in the matter of coordinating trade and investment policies.

Ray Marshall at Labor may not have the stature to bargain effectively with the likes of George Meany of the AFL-CIO and Frank Fitzsimmons of the Teamsters. Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, seems to think the problems of the agency are matters of image rather than—as is the case—performance.

At the subcabinet level, the administration would like to get more managerial ability. The post of undersecretary of agriculture is vacant, and Sidney Harman is leaving the No. 2 job in Commerce—under his own steam and not, as asserted by some White House aides, under pressure. Apparently pressure is being put on Undersecretary of Labor Bob Brown, Deputy Secretary of Transportation Alan Butchman and Undersecretary of Interior James Joseph.

On the whole, the administration will probably err on the side of making too few rather than too many changes. Certainly there is no need to caution against surgery.

But the tone is important—especially at a time when government in general is under fire. It would be a sign that the Georgia mafia had grown up to their jobs if they could achieve the necessary firing with something like the graciousness Carter himself shows in his personal dealings.

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ON PAGE 16

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

18 December 1978

Washington Whispers

Groping for ways to deal with the Iran crisis, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski is calling in more outside experts. Not only is former Under Secretary of State George Ball sitting in on Iran policy talks, but also Richard Helms, former CIA director and ambassador to Iran, is being consulted.

Reports are flying that CIA chief Stansfield Turner will be moved to another job because of intelligence foulups—possibly to replace Alexander Haig as head of NATO. Turner's successor? John DeButts, retiring head of American Telephone & Telegraph, is said to be a top candidate.

THE WASHINGTON POST

10 December 1978

Article appeared
on page C-6

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The Human Element in Intelligence Gathering

Rep. Samuel A. Stratton (D-N.Y.) in his letter to The Post ("America's Spy Gap," Dec. 1) expresses his concern that our intelligence collection efforts are now almost exclusively technical, and that we have cut off classic, person-to-person human intelligence collection operations. I can assure you that this is not the case, and that CIA's recent reorganization and reductions in the Operations Directorate in no way downgrade the continuing and vital importance of what Mr. Stratton rightly calls "that ancient art."

When I reported to Congress and to the agency on the need and rationale for reductions in the Operations Directorate, I said: "We need the capabilities of this directorate as much today as ever. Although new technical means of collection permit us to extend our collection efforts, they only complement; they do not supersede human collectors. Only human collectors can gain access to motives, to intentions, to thoughts and plans. They will always be vital to our country's security." I said then that there would be no meaningful reduction in overseas strength or activities, and that my aims were to ensure operational efficiency and full utilization of talent. At the time it was almost universally perceived within the agency that to further these aims, and to provide for the continuing hiring and training of new operational personnel, an overstuffed Operations Directorate had to be pared down and streamlined.

I share Rep. Stratton's concern that the United States has the best and most effective intelligence information possible. To ensure this, we must attract and retain the best possible intelligence officers, support them in their professional tasks, and see that they have the understanding and appreciation of their employers, the American people. Human intelligence collection is an inexact science and relies heavily on the courage and ingenuity of our operations officers. Give them a climate of public opinion that is supportive, within rules that are sensible and not unduly restrictive, and they will continue to provide the irreplaceable element of human intelligence in our collection program.

STANSFIELD TURNER
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-23NEW YORK TIMES
13 DECEMBER 1978

Letters

C.I.A.: 'Irreplaceable' Officers

To the Editor:

In his Nov. 30 letter, "America's Spy Gap," Representative Samuel S. Stratton expresses his concern that our intelligence collection efforts are now almost exclusively technical and that we have cut off classic, person-to-person intelligence collection operations. I can assure you that this is not the case, and that the C.I.A.'s recent reorganization and reductions in the Operations Directorate in no way downgrade the continuing and vital importance of what Mr. Stratton rightly calls "that ancient art."

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I share Mr. Stratton's concern that the U.S. have the best and most effective intelligence information possible. To insure this, we must attract and retain the best possible intelligence officers, support them in their tasks and see that they have the understanding and appreciation of their employers, the American people. Human intelligence collection is an inexact science and relies heavily on the courage and ingenuity of our operations officers. Give them a climate of public opinion which is supportive within rules that are sensible and not unduly restrictive, and they will continue to provide the irreplaceable element of human intelligence in our collection program.

STANSFIELD TURNER

Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, Dec. 6, 1978

Letters to the editor

The CIA's skipper and sinking morale

I read with great interest and approval your editorial entitled, "An intelligence failure?" (Nov. 28). To find such an understanding piece in the press these days is difficult. However, there are two points I wish to make, based on my 30 years of service with CIA.

First, you said that "policy more frequently shapes intelligence — or its interpretation." While this may have been true of some foreign services in World War II and thereafter, the CIA had a remarkable record over the years of not allowing its intelligence memoranda and estimates to be shaped or flawed by policy considerations. This was pointedly shown in the CIA substantive intelligence production on Vietnam, published in *The Pentagon Papers*, and other examples are readily available.

To my certain knowledge, during the period, from the late 1940s through the mid-70s, any effort to force estimates to conform to policy would have resulted in a mass resignation of the estimative staff.

Despite the heavy attacks on the CIA during the last three years, its substantive production capability has remained unshaken until now. It retained its equilibrium in this field far beyond what one might expect in view of the troubles to which it has been exposed. Only under the current director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, has serious smoke, if not fire, appeared throughout the intelligence community, suggesting that there may be some "tailoring" of his substantive intelligence product to suit policy predilections. This is a matter of grave concern to us all.

Second, the current key to the whole question is a point on which your editorial was silent. Having largely weathered the storm of the attacks and investigations of the last few years, the CIA and the intelligence community were not prepared to absorb the attack from within which came from the mistakes and faulty leadership of Admiral Turner.

One major item to stress is that CIA's heart has always been its "people." Turner, throughout his career, has shown no ability to deal with people, and he has a dismal reputation for administration of his subordinates. He is not "people" oriented. His senior officers, past and present, will tell you this. Individuals, as such, mean nothing to him. As a result, CIA morale has dropped to an unbelievably low level — as low as I have known it in more than 30 years. This is true not only on the substantive side of the agency but even more so on the clandestine collection side.

President Carter's statement that "there is now a stability in the CIA," made during his August visit to the agency's Langley headquarters, is indeed wide of the mark. He has been badly misled on this point. Turner's disclaimers of low morale and his pious statements of support for human collection (i.e., espionage) as set forth in his interview in *The Star* (Nov. 27), are self-serving and far from the facts. Actually, his appreciation and support of vital clandestine collection efforts render only lip service to activities on which he has at most a minimal grasp.

As one congressman has just written, Turner has "no significant experience in or understanding of intelligence." (It is not unworthy of note that *The Star's* Nov. 27 "close-up" of "Sturdy Stan" appeared in your Portfolio section with other "amusements.")

The admiral shrugs off criticism of these shortcomings as the product of dissident "old boys" who have been long gone from the business and who are unhappy at the cutback of covert action operations. Nothing could be further from the truth. Many of the "old boys" whom Turner criticized in his interview with *The Star* have been retired, with all their years of experience,



ADMIRAL TURNER

for five years or less; many have given their whole adult lives to intelligence. While a few are bothered to some extent by the restrictions on clandestine intelligence and covert activities, they are unanimously disturbed by the negative influence on the end product — finished intelligence.

If these "old boys" were polled, those who are upset by the current cutback of covert action operations would be found to be an infinitesimal fraction of the whole, for most of them were collection-oriented officers with a general dislike, if not disapproval, of covert action.

For Turner to raise this point in his *Star* interview may be popular with the general public, but it is, in effect, a red herring and inaccurate. It serves only to increase his already sizable credibility gap among his own personnel, and loses whatever support he might have among CIA alumni.

The damage done by Turner's tenure can only be repaired by his removal, a solution devoutly desired by almost all senior policy officials of the administration (despite their public denials), by the CIA, and by the intelligence community as a whole.

Walter Pforzheimer,

Former legislative counsel, CIA

Washington, D.C.

14 DECEMBER 1978

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-18

Letters to the editor

Regarding President Carter's criticism of the quality of the American intelligence service's forecasts of foreign political developments, such as the present turmoil in Iran, he seems to forget that it is no secret that members of the American intelligence community are going through hell in order to serve their country in spite of libertarian members of Congress, disenchanted former employees (aided by a few vultures in the news media), and those who would do violence to our form of government.

The president also seems to forget that he appointed the CIA's present director who, in a naive and showboat manner, fired over 800 employees in the fall of 1977. Experienced people in the intelligence community criticized this action because the director was putting too much emphasis on technical collection of data and not enough on people-fashioned spying. This was denied by Admiral Turner. I believe that he is living to regret that massacre of CIA employees.

As one American, I believe that Admiral Turner has done his damage and should resign. If not, the president should ask for his resignation. To have Admiral Turner continue as CIA director is a disservice to the country. We don't need a Bert Lance-type in the intelligence community.

James T. Hammett
Arlington, Va.

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FBI AND DDCI

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THE WASHINGTON POST
12 December 1978

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on page A-13

FBI Chief Backs Death Penalty For Presidential Assassinations

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

FBI Director William H. Webster said yesterday that he supports capital punishment as the maximum penalty for presidential assassinations, but agreed that Congress might have to redraft current law to withstand court challenge.

"I think it would be perceived as a deterrent," Webster said of the death penalty during testimony before the House Assassinations Committee. "I don't have any problems with capital punishment on the assassination of a president."

The FBI director made his remarks under questioning by Rep. Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.). While federal assassination laws passed in the wake of President Kennedy's murder provide for the death penalty, Dodd said court rulings in recent years might make it unconstitutional.

In particular, Dodd cited a 1977 decision of the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals which held invalid the federal death penalty statute to which the assassination laws are tied.

"It certainly raises serious questions as to whether a court could impose that punishment," Dodd said.

FBI Director Webster and CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci appeared before the committee to review the government's capacity to deal with political assassinations in light of the 1963 murder of President Kennedy and the 1968 killing of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.

Webster said the FBI's current investigation into the killing of Rep. Leo J. Ryan (D-Calif.) last month in Guyana offers a good illustration of how the bureau's "major case plan" works in such cases. He said he has been getting oral and written reports each

day from a network of government command posts, including three set up by the FBI—in Dover, Del.; Charleston, S.C., and San Francisco.

"Depending on the seriousness and complexity of the case, our response could vary," Webster said. "But whatever the extent of our investigation, it will be as thorough and well-ordered as we are capable of making it."

The FBI has identified the nine gunmen who allegedly killed Ryan and four others after a visit to the Peoples Temple camp in Jonestown, Guyana, and eight of them are dead, Webster said. The ninth is in custody in Guyana. Asked what the FBI could do in response to reports that cult members might try to assassinate political leaders, the FBI chief said: "The only way to deal with that particular type of alleged hit list would be to declare martial law. I don't think that would be acceptable."

In the event of a presidential assassination, Webster said the FBI would work with the Secret Service to "freeze the scene" immediately. The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology would arrange for an autopsy. The FBI would take custody of all physical evidence obtained.

CIA deputy director Carlucci said that "by far the most important thing CIA can do in the sordid business of assassinations is to help prevent them." He said he could not go into details, but he assured the committee that "there are public figures alive in this world today who have CIA to thank for it."

Carlucci said he could not conceive of the CIA's failing to provide the FBI with all the information it might have, bearing on a future presidential assassination, but Rep. Floyd Fithian (D-Ind.) still had his doubts. He said the CIA would have said the same thing before Kennedy's assassination.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-4WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
12 DECEMBER 1978

FBI's Webster, Sensitive to Warrants, Expects Justice Policy Soon on Media

By Jeremiah O'Leary

Washington Star Staff Writer

FBI Director William Webster says he is sensitive about the use of search warrants for obtaining information from the news media and that he expects the Justice Department to make some announcements soon about the relationship between the government and the media.

Without indicating what the Justice Department intends to say, Webster, testifying before the House Assassinations Committee, said the FBI welcomes voluntary agreements with the press about the use of media-made photos, tapes and

other information regarding crimes such as the murder of a president or public official.

Asked by Chairman Louis Stokes, D-Ohio, if he thought it advisable for the FBI to make arrangements with the press for such evidence in assassinations, Webster said that would be useful.

The committee, winding up its public hearings on the assassinations of President John Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., today continues to explore what the investigative agencies can do to improve their performance in the event of assassinations of national importance.

THE PANEL HEARD from Webster and Deputy CIA Director Frank Carlucci yesterday and was to receive testimony from Stuart Knight, chief of the Secret Service, and Deputy Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti today.

The committee plans to meet on Dec. 22 to vote on its findings about the two assassinations. Stokes said the final report of the two-year investigation will be released on Dec. 31.

Webster also testified that he did not believe Congress should legislate a new uniform Federal Homicide Act giving the FBI broader jurisdiction than it has. He told Rep. Richardson Preyer, D-N.C., that such a law could reach "down farther and farther" into local police work and cast the FBI into an unwanted role as a national police force.

Webster also said an investigative body like the Warren Commission has value when there has been no trial, as in the case of Lee Harvey Oswald, the slain assassin of Kennedy, so that the public can see that justice is being done.

The FBI director said he tended not to favor creation of a special prosecutor unless there is reason to believe the Justice Department is implicated in a crime.

Webster outlined how the FBI would operate in the event of another presidential assassination and said the process is being tested in the probe of the Jonestown murder of Rep. Leo J. Ryan. The plan involves the use of a command center in Washington and others at the scene, such as the teams now functioning in Guyana and San Francisco.

CARLUCCI SAID the CIA, in case of another presidential assassination, would institute a worldwide intelligence alert because the "murder of a president may have serious implications for the national security well beyond the tragedy of the act itself."

After the first alert, Carlucci said there were certain things the CIA would do automatically: checking its files for any possible foreign connections with the assassin and approaching the security organizations in countries where the CIA might have connections to ask for assistance.

The CIA was involved in a supporting role during the investigation of President Kennedy's death, he said. But in the event of the assassination of a major domestic figure, such as King, the CIA likely would not be involved in any material degree.

"I believe we should not try today to structure tomorrow's investigation," Carlucci said. "I feel our representative society must trust our elected officials to exercise the best judgment of the moment."

COMMITTEE MEMBERS asked Carlucci and Webster whether there was any special legislation they would recommend as a result of the panel's probe.

Both said they believe the FBI and CIA have all the legal and investigative tools they need.

When it was pointed out that the CIA had not told the Warren Commission all it knew about the attempts to kill Fidel Castro, Carlucci assured the committee:

"It's inconceivable that events like that could repeat themselves. The president and seven committees of Congress would now know about any covert actions. There are orders throughout the CIA to report any impropriety. The CIA today is not the CIA of before. There are checks and balances now."

THE WASHINGTON POST
14 December 1978Article appeared
on page A-16

Indicted Ex-Official of FBI Says Trial Data Withheld

Associated Press

A former FBI official has complained that the government has not furnished documents he needs for his trial on charges of violating civil rights while searching for radical bombers.

Former assistant director Edward S. Miller had asked for all documents in the possession of, among others, the FBI, CIA and National Security Agency which show that members of the Weatherman Underground Organization had connection with foreign countries.

Miller, who is scheduled to be tried next month along with former acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray III and former associate director W. Mark Felt, said he had received some documents.

But, he complained, many had been so heavily censored "as to render them incoherent" and not in compliance with a court order that they be made available to the defense.

Gray, Felt and Miller are charged with conspiring to violate the rights

of citizens—relatives of Weatherman fugitives. Conviction carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a fine of \$10,000.

Miller's list of requests included "the so-called Cathy Boudin letters from Moscow," which he said are "believed to be about 100 letters written by Boudin, a known Weatherman fugitive, from Moscow in the early 1970s and obtained by the CIA."

Boudin has been much-sought since she went underground in 1970 after being named in a number of cases stemming from antiwar activities. The government never acknowledged that it knew her whereabouts.

Meanwhile, the Justice Department asked the federal court here to prohibit any party in the case from disclosing classified documents. It said that the defendants "shall have full access to all classified national security documents," but that any decision on admitting classified documents into evidence should wait until the trial begins.

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ON PAGE A-20

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
14 DECEMBER 1978

Prosecutors Ask 'Gag' Order in FBI 'Black Bag' Case

By Allan Frank

Washington Star Staff Writer

Prosecutors in the "FBI black bag case" have asked U.S. District Judge William B. Bryant to issue a protective order prohibiting defense attorneys and their clients from making "unauthorized disclosure or dissemination of classified national security documents."

At the same time yesterday Thomas A. Kennelly, attorney for Edward S. Miller, the former assistant FBI director for domestic intelligence who is one of the three high-ranking former bureau officials facing trial, filed a motion asking for disclosure of documents relating to government knowledge about contacts by the radical Weather Underground with foreigners.

Miller, former acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III and former Acting Associate Director W. Mark Felt are scheduled to be tried Jan. 22. They are charged with conspiracy for alleged violations of the rights of Weatherman relatives who were subjected to illegal break-ins, mail opening and wire taps by FBI agents during 1972 and 1973.

KENNELLY SAID that although the court in August ordered prosecutors to turn over documents relating to foreign contacts by Weatherman members, the prosecution has failed to do so or has produced documents so heavily edited that they have lost their meanings.

Among the documents the defense wants are:

- A report prepared by the FBI's Chicago office about Weatherman contacts with "foreign governments or agents."

- Electronic surveillance information of Weatherman member William Ayres, which the defense contends will show "contact with the government of North Vietnam."

- Files held by the U.S. government containing Royal Canadian Mounted Police records.

- Files about communications between the Weatherman Underground, the Students for a Democratic Society, the "Venceremos Brigade" (a radical group which went to Cuba) and the Cuban Mission to the United Nations.

- About 100 letters obtained by the CIA which the defense believes were written by Weather Underground fugitive Cathy Boudin from Moscow during the early 1970s.

IN A LETTER Sept. 29 to defense attorneys, chief prosecutor Barnett D. Skolnik said the documents could not be released because their disclosure would reveal "sources and methods" of foreign intelligence operations.

Skolnik added: "That, as you and your clients are, of course, well aware, is understandably viewed by the international intelligence community as a problem with a capital P."

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18 December 1978

World

Self-Paralyzing Policy

History students for years to come may well read about the U.S.-Iranian relationship of the '60s and '70s as the case study of a policy that paralyzed itself. "The Iran dilemma" may even creep into the lexicon of political scientists who, with the benefit of hindsight, conduct post-mortems on the agony that the Carter Administration is now experiencing.

The dilemma is this: on the one hand, U.S. policy of all-out support for the Shah has discouraged both contact with and knowledge of the Shah's opposition. On the other hand, the nature of his opposition—which is deep rooted, widespread and home grown—has precluded U.S. intervention on his behalf.

There are other, exacerbating dimensions to the problem. Indeed, there are exquisite ironies. The Shah is very much a creation of the U.S. He regained the Peacock Throne 25 years ago as a result of the bold but covert exercise of American power (a CIA-engineered counter-coup against leftist Premier Mohammed Mossadegh). But two things make such intervention impossible now: that he is threatened again.

First, the Shah is no longer a boy-king. He is a proud and imperious monarch of 59 who expects to be both addressed and treated as His Imperial Majesty. He takes orders from no one: not the U.S. ambassador, not the U.S. President. That rules out Washington's ability to tell him what he must do to survive, even if the U.S. had known what to tell him early enough.

Second, the American taste for intervention in foreign lands has been dulled by the experience of Viet Nam. More specifically, the CIA's dagger has been blunted, its cloak ripped away by the scandals and investigations, the reorganizations and the firings of the '70s. The agency has felt it had to lie low, especially on its old Persian stomping ground, since "Iran" and CIA "dirty tricks" are almost synonymous to many ears.

Still the questions linger. Why does there appear to have been so little thought given even to contingency planning? One well-informed U.S. Government source says that as far as he knows there has been no paper that went through normal Government clearance procedures addressing the question of what to do if the Shah should fall. How can this be?

Part of the answer is that only in recent weeks has Washington taken seriously the possibility of the Shah's falling. It has long been a basic tenet of American policy that the Shah must be strong; the wishful thinking of policymakers contaminated the judgment of those who collected and analyzed intelligence. American officials tended to rely on Iranian intelligence, which in turn tended to tell His Imperial Majesty what he wanted to hear.

Once it became clear to all the world that the Shah was in deep trouble, why did the foreign policy and na-

tional security bureaucracies not then start grinding out options for what to do if he should fall?

The answer, once again, is that the rigid imperatives of policy got in the way of bold, forward-looking thinking. "There was a fear around here of self-fulfilling prophecies," says one official privy to the discussions. "There was also a sense that the people upstairs didn't want to be told what to do 'if.' They wanted to be told 'if' wasn't going to happen, and they wanted us to concentrate on making sure it didn't happen." Or as another official puts it, "The support-the-Shah-to-the-hilt policy limited discussion of other options."

Limited though the discussion may have been, the option of sending in U.S. troops has been considered in the Government—but not favorably. There are contingency planners on both sides of the Potomac River who would have dearly loved to design an American military intervention to prop up the Shah or seize the Iranian oilfields, but they lacked the pretext that they would be protecting Iran from outside interference. "Hell," says one military official, "we would have been the outside interference."

SHAHROOH NATAHI



Mob carrying Mossadegh portrait in Tehran (March 1953)

Could not the U.S. send in troops with the explicitly limited, and therefore non-provocative, mission of protecting the Strait of Hormuz from any Soviet or radical Arab attempt to exploit the chaos?

When faced with that question, a U.S. official replies, "Think about it for a minute. Those troops would be stationed on Iranian soil. They might very well find themselves confronted with Iranian mobs shouting, 'Yankee, go home.' Either they would have to go home or they would be embroiled in a civil war—probably on the losing side."

No one doubts that outside forces, inimical to the Shah and the U.S. alike, have been stirring the broth in Iran. But they neither cooked the broth nor lit the fire under it. True, the KGB has a big station in Tehran. True, some Iranian leftists have been trained by the Palestinians. But the inescapable fact is that Communist and Arab agitation do not begin to explain the extent of opposition to the Shah, and therefore do not begin to justify a superpower confrontation.

The dilemma in Iran has been illustrated in numerous conversations with supporters of the Shah, both in the Government and out. A theme in such conversations goes like this: "There is no alternative to the Shah." All right, fine. But what if, even though there is no alternative to the Shah, there should be no Shah tomorrow? Or next week? Then what? Such questions usually elicit a stubborn repetition of the statement: "There is no alternative to the Shah." That argument, which is beginning to sound like a slogan, really means: There is no acceptable alternative to the Shah. To say that there is no alternative at all is illogical, and unworthy of the men who reiterate it so dogmatically. But it is that dogma—"There is no alternative to the Shah"—that has dictated policy and discouraged options for many, many years.

—Strobe Talbott

Article appeared
on page C-7

10 December 1978

Joseph Kraft

The Shah as Bellwether

When Louis XVI went to the guillotine, every monarch in Europe felt the back of his neck. So it is with the troubles now besetting the shah of Iran.

All the other leaders in the Middle East are watching to see what happens. Since they affect the world balance of power, Iran has become the center of a full-fledged international crisis—a first, and so far not altogether reassuring, test of the Carter administration's capacity to perform under pressure.

By itself, Iran is important enough. It supplies about 20 percent of the oil shipped to Europe, Japan, the United States and the other major consuming countries. It occupies a strategic bit of real estate due south of the Soviet Union and adjacent to two countries—Afghanistan and Pakistan—that are prime candidates for Soviet troublemaking.

Since the British withdrawal from the area in 1971, moreover, the shah's forces have been the principal source of security for the whole Persian Gulf. Weakening in Iran has a direct bearing on the world's leading oil exporter—Saudi Arabia. As the secretary of energy, James Schlesinger, said in a notable speech in London last week: "The disruptions in Iran's oil fields are vivid reminders of the fragility of the production and logistical system on which the health of the industrial world depends."

All the moderate leaders in the Middle East, furthermore, regard the shah as a bellwether. I saw Egyptian President Anwar Sadat last month just after I had seen the shah. Sadat pointed out to me that he and the shah were born in the same year, graduated from military school in the same year, and had close personal relations.

"He was so sharp," Sadat kept saying. "How could it happen to him?" Worry about that question and its implications for him is undoubtedly one of the main reasons for Sadat's slowdown in the peace negotiations with Israel.

In this country, the Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence organizations were clearly surprised by the sudden decline of the shah's authority. As usual in such cases, the intelligence failure was set within a larger intellectual blind spot, which affected business, the media and the universities as well as govern-

ment. Except for a tiny handful, notably Harvard professor Michael Fisher, almost no Americans perceived the formidable political impact of religion in Iran.

But even when the dangers became clear, the Carter administration failed to act effectively because of a deficient organization reflecting a poor overall sense of strategy. The basic fact is that this administration has had no high-level official paying systematic attention to Iran and the other countries of the Persian Gulf. The highest official who cares a lot about Iran in the State Department is Henry Precht, a desk officer who has to report through four layers of officials, primarily involved in Arab-Israeli

business, before reaching the secretary of state. His opposite number in the Pentagon is Robert Murray, who also has to report through four layers of officials before getting to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. The White House man on Iran is a Navy captain, Gary Sick, who reports through four bosses before reaching the president.

The CIA, which has traditionally carried the ball for Iran in U.S. government councils, has almost no clout as a policy-making institution. The ambassador in Tehran, William Sullivan, has little standing at the State Department because of the role he played in pursuing the Johnson-Nixon line in Vietnam. Hence, the almost unprecedented overruling of his insistence that the dependents of American servicemen remain in the country.

One result was the extraordinary statement by the president Thursday that the shah might fall. That comment drew a furious reaction from Tehran and excited something like panic among the rulers of the oil states in the Arabian peninsula. It was made off the wall and appalled most government officials who finally prevailed upon the White House to issue a formal claim that the president had been misunderstood.

Another example has been the free field accorded the shah's great enemy, Ayatollah Khomeini. He has been in exile in Paris, issuing ever stronger calls for murderous action against the regime over this weekend of holy days.

A little discreet muffling by the French during this critical time could have helped the shah enormously. But neither the president nor his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, nor Secretary of State Cyrus Vance applied any pressure. So the French gave Khomeini maximum access to the world's best net of communications.

The designation of former Undersecretary of State George Ball to head an Iran task force is an acknowledgment that something went wrong. It would be a gain for everybody if the president and his men could come to understand that the most serious difficulty was not an intelligence failure in the middle ranks, but the wrong strategic priorities at the very top.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 5THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 December 1978

Did turmoil in Iran catch US policymakers unaware?

By Daniel Southard
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The turmoil in Iran is proving to be a divisive and politically explosive issue for President Carter, splitting the American foreign policy establishment as few other issues have done in recent memory.

Within the administration, there is a debate over the role the United States should play in attempting to "stabilize" the Iranian situation. The Central Intelligence Agency, rightly or wrongly, is being assigned most of the blame for not perceiving sooner how dangerous the situation was likely to grow.

Outside the administration, many conservatives already act as though Iran was "lost" to the US. They tend to place the blame for the troubles of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi on President Carter's human-rights policy and what they consider to be a lack of consistency on the part of Mr. Carter in supporting the Shah. They have found an articulate spokesman in former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who has grown increasingly open in his criticism of the Carter administration recently.

Soviet intervention?

What makes the Iran issue especially sensitive is the widespread perception that the Soviet Union has been making piecemeal gains throughout the world over the past few years. As the conservatives see it, any weakening of American support for the Shah amounts to an invitation to the Soviets to intervene in Iran. And the overthrow of the Shah, now considered conceivable by most observers and probably by many others, would inevitably add up in this view to another gain for the Soviets.

Much of the most recent criticism of President Carter's approach to Iran was triggered by remarks which he made at a Dec. 7 breakfast meeting with reporters at the White House. Although the fact had been acknowledged for some time in private assessments by the administration, Mr. Carter acknowledged

for the first time in public that he was uncertain as to whether the Shah would survive the current turmoil. The President said little that was new about the situation, but his tone was decidedly cooler on the subject of the Shah than it had been on many occasions in the past when he heaped the highest praise on the Iranian leader.

A mistake, say critics

Critics were quick to point to the President's remarks as a major blunder, contending that he was undercutting the Shah and, in effect, encouraging the monarch's opponents. The President himself obviously was concerned over the effect his remarks might have had, and the White House issued statements deploring the way in which they had been "misinterpreted" by the press.

According to some Carter administration officials, the conservatives are "getting their story out" on Iran now because a careful examination of the recent history of American-Iranian relations would show the Nixon administration was more responsible for what is happening at the moment in Iran than is the Carter administration.

One official said that by giving the Shah unqualified American support and by promising him everything he wanted in the way of American weaponry, President Nixon and then Secretary of State Kissinger contributed to the Shah's sense of "omnipotence."

Intelligence failure

Other sources say an American intelligence failure in Iran was in the making years before the Carter administration came to power. According to some experts, the US cut off contact with opposition elements in Iran in deference to the Shah in the mid-1960s. It depended on Iranian intelligence for its information on the opposition, and when the rioting began, it became immediately apparent that the Americans, like the Shah himself, had greatly underestimated the enormous dissatisfaction as well as the strength of the religious elements that now are arrayed against him.

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INTERNATIONAL

IF THE SHAH FALLS

The upheaval in Iran took Washington by surprise, so much so that President Carter rebuked the Central Intelligence Agency for failing to warn him. Last week, the Administration acted to upgrade its analysis of the Iranian crisis. Former Under Secretary of State George Ball was appointed a temporary consultant to the National Security Council. His assignment: to produce a report on the future of the Persian Gulf, including Iran. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter explained that Ball will be "at some remove from the daily business, so he has the time for a long-range look."

The long-range outlook is far from encouraging to the Administration, which so far has supported the Shah because it could see no viable alternative. But as President Carter himself hinted last week, it now appears that the days of absolute rule by the Shah are gone for good. Viable or not, there are alternatives. The most likely ones:

■ **A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY.** The U.S. and Iran's military leaders would prefer an arrangement in which the Shah reigns but does not rule. To bring that about, Iran would need a civilian coalition government headed by someone like pro-Western former Prime Minister Ali Amini or Karim Sanjabi, leader of the relatively moderate National Front, who was released from a Teheran jail last week. So far, however, no one has been able to form a Cabinet that would agree to serve a constitutional monarchy. "Under existing conditions," Sanjabi told **NEWSWEEK**, "I am not willing to take part in any government of national union."

■ **A REGENCY.** The next most likely step would be for the Shah to abdicate in favor of Crown Prince Reza, 18. At least until Reza turns 21, the country would be run by a regency council.

"Assuming the worst, we're trying to work the regency angle, provided that the opposition can overcome its scruples," a high U.S. official said last week. To date, those scruples seem nearly insuperable.

■ **A REPUBLIC.** If the monarchy collapses entirely, a republican government could be formed by Amini, Sanjabi or some other relatively moderate politician. But such a regime would have to placate both the military and



Bernard Gidycz—Newsweek

Ball: A long-range look

the militant Muslim leaders. It also would need the active cooperation of Iran's Western-trained technocrats, and thus far the middle-class elite has shown little taste for the rough and tumble of politics.

■ **AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC.** Should the moderates fail, the fanatical followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini might try to form a government based on fundamentalist Muslim principles.



AP

Shah and airmen: End of an era?

The result would be an end to modernization—and, quite possibly, a convulsive backlash from the army and the moderates.

■ **MILITARY RULE.** "In this part of the world, the only real political party wears uniforms," a veteran Western ambassador said last week. "If the Shah goes, you can bet that he will be replaced by some sort of military regime." Initially, the ruling junta would probably be led by Gen. Gholam Reza Azhari, the head of the current caretaker government. If the disorders continue, younger officers could be inspired to seize power. They might well set up a Libyan-style "people's republic" dedicated to social welfare at home and nonalignment—or even an outright anti-Western stance—in foreign policy. If anything like that comes to pass, the political and economic balance of the Mideast would be upset, and the U.S. would be left yearning for the "good old days" of the Shah's autocratic rule.

—FAY WILLEY with LOREN JENKINS in Teheran and LARS-ERIK NELSON in Washington

9 DECEMBER 1978

U.S. Envoy in Iran Opposed Decision to Aid Dependents' Departures

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 8 — The White House decision to allow American military and civilian dependents to fly out of Iran at Government expense went against recommendations of the United States Ambassador in Teheran, Administration officials said today.

The decision was made Wednesday night at a staff meeting headed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, and was supported in the meeting by George W. Ball, the former Under Secretary of State, who was appointed Monday to run an interagency study on Iran.

The limited evacuation was recommended as a response to what was seen as a deteriorating situation in Iran, which has been torn by strikes and street violence.

William H. Sullivan, the Ambassador in Teheran, had recommended a "business-as-usual" policy for the 40,000 Americans still in Iran, the officials said. They added that the Ambassador strongly opposed any move that would appear to indicate a lack of confidence in the Government of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi, especially just before the Moslem high holidays that occur Sunday and Monday.

Originated in State Department

Through Jody Powell, the President's press secretary, Mr. Brzezinski said the limited evacuation proposal had originated in the State Department and was raised in the meeting of the Standing Consultative Committee, assembled from the National Security Council, the Defense and State Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency to deal with emergencies.

Another Administration official said that Mr. Ball, now a New York investment banker, had pushed the evacuation proposal through in the meeting. "Ball can be credited with deciding that the Sullivan position was untenable," the official said.

Commenting through Mr. Powell, Mr.

Brzezinski said this assertion was "wrong and incredibly naive." But other officials acknowledged that since Monday Mr. Ball had assumed a central role in shaping the Administration's policy on Iran, largely because senior officials normally responsible for Iran affairs were preoccupied with other matters.

They pointed out that Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and his chief aides for Near Eastern affairs have been almost totally involved in preparing for Mr. Vance's trip, beginning tonight, to London, Cairo and Jerusalem for further Middle East peace talks. Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher had to fly to Brussels Wednesday to attend ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in place of Mr. Vance.

Supporters of Iran in the Administration and Iranian diplomats said they were shocked by the evacuation decision, announced as it was yesterday, when President Carter made remarks apparently questioning the Shah's ability to weather the crisis.

Asked yesterday at a breakfast meeting with reporters whether the Shah could survive in office, Mr. Carter replied: "I don't know. I hope so. This is something that is in the hands of the people of Iran."

Mr. Powell said today this was a spontaneous remark and was definitely not influenced by Mr. Ball. But the White House acknowledged the equivocal nature of the President's remarks by issuing a further statement read by Mr. Powell saying that Mr. Carter was concerned that "erroneous interpretations" had been made.

Clarification for Iranian

Later Mr. Powell said Mr. Brzezinski had telephoned a similar clarification to Iran's Ambassador to the United States, Ardeshir Zahedi, who is in Teheran.

Mr. Powell added: "Any suggestion that the U.S. is changing its policy toward the Shah is erroneous." He also directed reporters to a statement issued at the State Department by Hodding Carter 3d, the department's spokesman, who said the President's comments "do not indicate any change in U.S. policy toward and our support of the Shah." The spokesman added that paying for dependents' departures from Iran on commercial flights "is not an evacuation."

Pentagon officials said, however, that the Defense Department was working on contingency plans for flying out all the remaining Americans in Iran. About 5,000 have left in the last two months.

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Time to Send a Public Message

Few Americans know Iran better than former CIA Director Richard Helms, a friend of the Shah's for 20 years and U.S. Ambassador to Tehran between 1973 and 1976. In an interview with TIME, Washington Contributing Editor Hugh Sidey, Helms makes the traditional case for toughness. Sidey's report:

The world of Richard Helms has been a long struggle against the marauding Russian bear. That is why Helms speaks so strongly about the grim outlook in Iran. Says he: "We ought to go to our NATO allies and make certain that we are all together, and then we ought to sit down with the Russians and make it plain to them that having the Persian Gulf under the control of Communists is simply not acceptable to us."

If there is a ring to that which takes one back to the old days when life on this globe was a series of crises strung together with pauses while the Soviets looked for another opening, that is just the way Helms meant it to sound.

Helms feels that the problem in Iran dwarfs almost every other foreign policy consideration of the moment for the Western world, including the final agreement on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Iran is "dangerous." His view: this is oil, the free world's lifeblood. This could sweep the entire Middle East into chaos. This could lead to serious confrontation between the superpowers.

In Helms' opinion, there is no viable alternative for the Shah, and, thus, the U.S. should do everything in its power to sustain him. Although Helms points no public fingers at past failures that produced the current upheaval, it is obvious that he finds Washington's response lethargic and incomprehending. Not only would he get tough with the Russians, he would also be firm with the British, French, and Germans, who have an immense stake in Middle East oil. The Israelis, too, have a huge interest in Iran and her oil; surely, they could find a way to help.

"The Shah needs every ounce of our moral and political support right now," continues Helms. It is safe to say that Helms was depressed last week when at this delicate time, President Carter chose first to give the world another lecture on human rights and then later, at a breakfast with reporters, suggested that the Shah might fall. "We ought to keep quiet and go to work where it matters," Helms insists. If the U.S. is not now heavily involved in a detailed re-evaluation of all the forces at play in Iran, it should be, he says. "This talk about there being no evidence of the Soviet involvement is nonsense," he adds. "The KGB is there. We ought to beef up the CIA."

Helms believes that for too long America has heard only of the Shah's repressions and his violations of human rights. The difficulty of governing Iran was never understood in the U.S.; nor, for that matter, was the Shah's loyalty to the U.S. Helms remembers that during the oil embargo of 1973, the Shah sent his emissaries to Egypt and Saudi Arabia to plead for a quick end. He kept Israel supplied with oil at that time. Once he secretly sent a tanker out to refuel an American carrier task force running low on oil in the Indian Ocean. In the closing days of the Viet Nam War, at U.S. request, he instantly dispatched a squadron of F-5s to Saigon. His planes and ships have patrolled the Strait of Hormuz for years, watching over the tankers headed west.

There were many failures over time that caused the Shah his problems today, admits Helms. Our own curtailment of the CIA has not helped. Even before the CIA's operations were cut back, the agency did not have enough Farsi-speaking agents. And, maybe, muses Helms, the Shah, for many reasons, including U.S. pressure to liberalize, did it too fast when at last he moved.

When he was in the spy business, Helms learned early not to look back. That is his idea now. He believes the U.S. should pull all the backstage levers it can, should let the world know that Iran is critical to our interests, should send the Shah a public message that the U.S. still cares, and that it still knows a few tricks in the big power game. It has always been Helms' view—one his detractors call simplistic—that we are only as helpless as we think we are.



Former CIA Chief Richard Helms

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ON PAGE A-11NEW YORK TIMES
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WEST IS NOW UNEASY ABOUT ARMS IN IRAN

U.S. and British Fear Soviet Could Gain Access to Sophisticated Weapons in 'Worst Case'

By DREW MIDDLETON

Anxiety is developing in the Defense Department and in the American arms industry over the security of the advanced weapons that the United States has sold to Iran. The concern is shared by officials in Britain, which has also delivered advanced weapons to Iran.

If the turbulence in Iran worsens, officials and arms makers fear that military security there might relax to the point where Soviet agents could obtain classified information on weapons systems or possibly even commandeer some of the more advanced weapons.

Responsible officers believe that contingency plans exist for evacuating sensitive American matériel in "the worst possible case," a takeover of the Iranian Government by local Communists backed by the Soviet Union.

Intelligence Aides Less Optimistic

But the intelligence community is less comfortable with contingency plans. They do not fear immediate Communist rule in Iran, but rather a period of political turbulence in which Soviet penetration of the Iranian armed forces would go unchecked.

According to qualified sources, the F-14 Tomcat fighter, with its Phoenix missile and weapons-control system would be the greatest prize the Russians could win. It would be a coup equal, one source said, to the arrival in Japan in September 1976, of a Soviet MIG-25 interceptor flown by a defecting pilot. That aircraft was dissected by American and Japanese experts and a great deal learned about the plane and about Russian design and construction methods.

The Grumman Aerospace Corporation sold 80 F-14's to Iran to offset Soviet MIG-25's, which, until the F-14's arrived, had flown frequent reconnaissance flights over the country.

The F-14, widely regarded as one of the world's most advanced planes, carries four Phoenix missiles, at a cost of about \$250,000 per missile. The weapons-control system for the Phoenix is the highly advanced Hughes AN/AWG-9 system. Although neither the United States Navy nor Grumman has said so publicly, it is known that the Phoenix, using this system, has engaged moving targets at distances well 200 miles — at least before the F-14 could be "seen" by enemy radar.

The consensus of United States and NATO weapons experts is that the Soviet Union has no air-to-air missile comparable in performance to the Phoenix and no weapons-control system as advanced as the Hughes system. Soviet access to the F-14's command-and-control system would also be highly important. From its workings, Soviet intelligence could deduce American techniques for communication and control in tactical air combat.

The Iranian inventory also includes the Maverick and Condor air-to-surface missiles, which are remotely guided weapons of high accuracy; the Tow and Dragon anti-tank missile systems, and the Hawk surface-to-air missile. Qualified sources report that the Russians have comparable weapons in place or in production, but they point out that inspection of the American arms might allow them short cuts in production methods.

The British have sold 760 Chieftain tanks to Iran, and 1,300 improved Chieftains are on order. The Chieftain is a 52-ton tank armed primarily with a 120-millimeter gun. The improved Chieftain will use new armor developed in Britain, which is also being fitted on the American MX-80 tank, but, according to American experts, the Chieftain's principal interest to the Soviet Union would be its range-finder, accurate at a range exceeding 8,000 yards with a high-explosive shell and its stabilizer.

The British also have delivered Rapier and Seacat surface-to-air missile systems to Iran.

Vietnam on People's Minds

When the Communists took South Vietnam in 1975, a vast amount of American ground and air matériel came into the hands of the victorious northerners, much of which is now being used against Cambodia. But few items in the South Vietnamese inventory approached the F-14, the Phoenix and the Maverick weapon systems in sophistication.

The Iranian Government understands the value to the Russians of the advanced weapons it has; and while it is in power, the Pentagon's anxiety will be muted. But if "the worst possible case" developed, there would be strong pressure in the Pentagon to remove key arms from Iran to friendly neighboring countries, such as Saudi Arabia.

The F-14's, with their Phoenix missiles, could fly out; the Mavericks could be carried out on transport planes, the command-and-control systems dismantled and their computers, radar installations and communications shipped out of the country. But officials admit that they do not know whether, in a rapidly deteriorating political situation, these plans could or would be put into practice.

Iranian Military in Isfahan Stages Daylong Pro-Shah Demonstration

U.S. Embassy Is Bolstered

By NICHOLAS GAGE

Special to The New York Times

TEHERAN, Iran, Dec. 13 — The staff of the United States Embassy here has been bolstered by dozens of specialists flown in to back an effort to help the Shah against a growing challenge to his rule, according to embassy officials. The ostensible purpose of the influx is to provide regular staff members with help to cope with an increased workload arising from the crisis. But the influx is also intended to strengthen American efforts to support Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi and his Government at a time of danger to the monarchy.

[In Paris, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini said in a warning clearly aimed at President Carter that the United States and other countries would be deprived of Iranian oil if the opposition gained power. Page A8.]

Half of Dependents Evacuated

Asked about the new arrivals in Teheran, an embassy spokesman referred all questions to State Department headquarters. [Officials in Washington confirmed that the embassy staff in Teheran had been bolstered. But they denied that any of the new members were military or internal security specialists.]

Until recently, the nonmilitary regular American staff in Teheran totaled 184, with 289 dependents. At least half the dependents have been evacuated. More are planning to leave in the next several days.

The new arrivals, according to the embassy sources, include a number of Central Intelligence Agency specialists on Iran, in addition to diplomats and military personnel. Some have served in Iran before and have been sent back because of their experience.

President Carter was disappointed by

the failure of the Americans here, particularly the C.I.A. staff officers, to foresee the violence and extent of feeling against the Shah.

According to the sources, the new staff members are highly trained specialists and are working in all main sections in the embassy, including the intelligence, political and military sections.

Some are security experts who are helping to arrange the transfer of classified documents and records out of the embassy, in central Teheran, to secret storage areas in the event demonstrators happen to invade the embassy or set it on fire.

During riots here on Nov. 4, demonstrators managed to set part of the British Embassy on fire and some records were destroyed. In attacks on Iranian Government offices, demonstrators got hold of sensitive documents and used them for propaganda purposes.

Marchers Got Severe Warning

According to the embassy sources, the biggest group among the new arrivals is made up of military and internal security experts. They reportedly include specialists on crowd control and riots, who are to advise Iranian commanders how to handle mass demonstrations. The riot-control tactics for Iranian troops have thus far been limited to firing into the air and then into the crowds.

The American Embassy persuaded the Shah to permit the vast demonstrations on Sunday and Monday during Shiite Moslem holidays.

Initially, the Shah's military Government prohibited any processions during the two days of observances, saying any attempts to march would be crushed "mercilessly."

Three days before the marches began, the Government changed its stand and announced that processions would be allowed. This represented a more subtle

and sophisticated policy than the Shah had been using. While allowing the demonstrators the right to march, which they might have done anyway, the decision placed responsibility for any bloodshed on the march leaders.

Additions to Staff Confirmed

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 — Administration officials confirmed today that the staff of the United States Embassy in Teheran had been bolstered in recent days. But the officials denied that the new arrivals were military or internal security experts.

They said that the increase was primarily the result of a State Department

decision to build up consular and political sections in the embassy. The recent increase in numbers of Americans seeking to leave Iran, they said, had made extra consular officers necessary. New political officers were assigned to Teheran to meet Washington's demands for more information on the crisis.

The officials said that none of the new embassy staff members were engaged in offering assistance to the Iranian military in riot control. According to one official, a decision was made last month by the Administration not to offer support to the Iranian Government in that area.

Officials refused to say whether any of the new arrivals were engaged in transferring sensitive documents out of the embassy to safer locations.

Article appeared
on page A-18

14 December 1978

Several of Shah's F5s Sabotaged, Apparently by Iranian Military Personnel

By George C. Willson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Several American-supplied F5 fighter planes have been sabotaged during the uprisings in Iran, apparently by Iranian military personnel, Carter administration officials said yesterday.

This first reported act of sabotage from within the military is being portrayed as an isolated incident by administration officials rather than a sign that the shah of Iran's vital support from his officers and troops is unraveling.

Sources said that between seven and 20 F5s at an Iranian air base they did not identify had their internal wiring slashed by saboteurs last week. Since the base was heavily protected against outside demonstrators, the sabotage must have been done by Iranian military personnel inside, these sources said.

Despite the sabotage of the F5s, administration officials said yesterday that they have no intention of trying to remove sophisticated American weaponry from Iran.

They said each F14 fighter plane, probably the most sophisticated weapon the shah has bought from the United States, is guarded night and day by an Iranian trooper.

Also, administration officials said, the Pentagon's concern is focused not on whether American-supplied weaponry will be destroyed but whether the Soviets obtain secret technology. There is no evidence that the latter is happening, officials said.

Besides worrying about the Soviets obtaining advanced weaponry, administration "worst case" scenarios also address the possibility of some of the extensive and sophisticated U.S. intelligence gathering equipment in Iran being compromised.

So far, officials have confirmed only that some dependents of U.S. intelligence specialists have left Iran. It is standard procedure to draft plans for removing sensitive U.S. intelligence eavesdropping gear, as was the case during the end of the Vietnam war.

The Pentagon is participating in the general Carter administration review of how the U.S. government could improve its intelligence-gathering effort in Iran, especially in regard to the shah's opponents.

One official said current administration efforts to help bring peace to Iran are handicapped by U.S. officials' not knowing the influential opposition leaders.

The shah in the past not only suppressed opponents of his regime but also protested to the State Department whenever he learned that Central Intelligence Agency officers were

talking with them. This, according to intelligence officers who worked in Iran, made the United States overly dependent on SAVAK, the shah's own intelligence organization.

One administration official said that what is happening in Iran today "is a real revolution" where it is always "hard to find leaders" because the ebb and flow of events is not controlled by any one group of dissidents.

In a change from past U.S. policy, government officials today are making a concerted effort to establish a dialogue with those who appear to be leading the fight against the shah. The idea is to find a formula for restoring order in Iran.

As part of this effort, U.S. officials have drawn up a list of Iranian generals who would be acceptable to the known opposition and the shah if they were named to a Regency Council be-

ing discussed as a partial substitute to one-man rule in Iran.

While these diplomatic efforts are progressing behind the scenes, President Carter is taking the position publicly that he expects the shah to survive his present troubles rather than be deposed.

Pentagon officials said yesterday that they have not stopped deliveries of additional U.S. weaponry to the shah, partly because there are few big items in the pipeline.

They also said that the shah has not cancelled his plan to buy the sophisticated AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft from the United States. He might decide to cancel AWACS if the current crisis continues, they added.

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REVIEW PANEL

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ON PAGE A-12

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
12 DECEMBER 1978

Outside Panel Picked to Review CIA Estimates

United Press International

In an effort to improve analyses and forecasts, CIA Director Stansfield Turner has recruited an independent three-man review panel with broad authority to criticize U.S. intelligence estimates.

A senior intelligence official said the panel will have the authority to criticize any estimate it chooses and as severely as it thinks appropriate.

Disclosure of the move comes at a time when President Carter has made clear both privately and publicly that he is dissatisfied with the quality of intelligence reaching him.

The outside critics — who will join the CIA for a two-year hitch — are Professor Klaus Knorr of Princeton University, Ambassador William Leonhart and Gen. Bruce Palmer, retired Army vice chief of staff.

Knorr is to join the CIA Jan. 1. Leonhart and Palmer arrived earlier this year.

The panel will be able to draw on the help of some 30 other academics around the country who are on an "availability list." The other outsiders have agreed to be consultants to the CIA approximately one day a week as needed.

A major source of dissatisfaction at the White House was the CIA's difficulty in predicting the course of unrest in Iran.

One draft of an estimate, the official said, contained the assessment the shah was likely to ride out the mounting criticisms without major threat to his power. This conclusion turned out to be wrong.

The draft estimate was leaked to the media, and seems to have prompted some of Carter's criticism. Actually, the official said, a distorted view of the secret report was published. He said the estimate was severely criticized within the CIA and was never approved or forwarded to the White House. When events outpaced the analysis, the estimate was formally killed.

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BALTIMORE SUN
12 DECEMBER 1978

Foreign-crises panel set up by CIA chief

By CHARLES W. CORDRY

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Adm. Stansfield Turner, the director of central intelligence, has established a top-level panel to help improve the assessment of foreign crises, which President Carter found deficient in the Iranian and other recent cases.

Disclosing this development yesterday, a top intelligence official said "predicting political upheavals [like that in Iran] is the hardest part of intelligence work."

The Central Intelligence Agency has been portrayed—wrongly, the official implied—as envisioning no worrisome threats to the shah of Iran at about the time rioting broke out in September.

The official conceded yesterday, however, that intelligence agencies "did not appreciate the extent of what the religious cry could bring" in Iran, although he said it was known from January onward that unrest was spreading.

The unrest traced to reaction of ultra-conservative Shia Muslims to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's liberalizing moves, and then spread to leftists with en-

tirely opposite motives.

In an attempt to improve the gathering and analyzing of information on political crises abroad, Admiral Turner has named a career diplomat, a retired general and a professor to what is known so far only as "the review panel."

The appointees are Ambassador William Leonhart, who has had a 30-year career in the Foreign Service throughout the world and most recently had served as deputy commandant for international affairs at the National War College; Gen. Bruce Palmer, who was the Army vice chief of staff from 1968 to 1973 and has served lately as a defense analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank here, and Klaus E. Knorr, a Princeton University economics professor as well as director of the university's Center for International Studies, and a prolific writer on politico-military issues.

Mr. Leonhart has been at the CIA since July, General Palmer arrived last month, and Mr. Knorr will join the group in January.

The panel's charter is still being written, but the top official said its main task will be to survey continuously the collection and analysis of political intelligence and run up warning signals when some sensitive area is getting too little attention. Iran presumably would have been flagged early on, had the panel been in operation as Admiral Turner intends for it to be in the future.

The top intelligence official indicated he believes the review panel can remain independent and avoid becoming immersed in the system it is to monitor.

The three-man operation is not a direct result of Mr. Carter's annoyance over political intelligence in the Iranian crisis, but it takes on greater importance because of presidential concern. In a memorandum to Admiral Turner, Cyrus R. Vance, the Secretary of State, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's assistant for national security, the President said he was dissatisfied with the "quality" of foreign political intelligence provided him.

When the fact of the President's dissatisfaction was unearthed, it was quickly reported that Senate Intelligence Committee sources had a CIA report indicating, on the eve of rioting, that the shah did not face major threats. One report said the CIA draft did not see Iran as being in a revolutionary "or even pre-revolutionary" situation.

The top official who discussed this yesterday cannot be quoted by name, but clearly his position is not meant to be inimical to Admiral Turner's interests.

He said the document in the hands of Senate aides was three or four months old when it was obtained last summer and was by no means a finished "national intelligence estimate" because it did not bear Admiral Turner's signature.

He said the central intelligence director had in fact twice returned the report to its authors for revision and then had simply killed it when it was overtaken by the September events in Iran.

From that explanation, it would appear that there was no up-to-date CIA estimate available to the President at the time the riots started.

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ON PAGE 2

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 December 1978

CIA sets up panel to judge its estimates

Washington

In an effort to improve analyses and forecasts, the Central Intelligence Agency has recruited an independent three-man board to criticize US intelligence estimates. A senior intelligence officer said the board will have authority to criticize any estimate it chooses and as severely as it thinks appropriate.

The announcement comes at a time when President Carter has been critical, both publicly and privately, of the quality of the intelligence reaching him. A major source of Mr. Carter's dissatisfaction was the CIA's difficulty in predicting the current unrest in Iran.

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ACADEMIC GUIDELINES

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Dear Stansfield Turner:

WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE this opportunity to clarify our position on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and respond to some of the important issues you raise in your letter to The Daily dated November 14, 1978.

As you point out in your letter, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) reported that a broad range of factors has shaped the CIA, including the course of international events, pressures from other government agencies, and its own internal norms. This is an obvious assessment with which surely no one could differ. But it does not bring to light the essence of our basic difference: that the CIA is out of control.

To understand this basic conclusion, it is helpful to look back on some of these factors which have, over the course of the CIA's 31-year history, shaped this government agency which has always been, and remains, a threat to the ideal of democracy.

The CIA was established in 1947, under the National Security Act, when the Cold War was building and many in this country perceived World War II as a very real possibility. United States policy makers needed accurate intelligence on and objective analysis of events outside of the country. The CIA was created to provide that service.

According to the Senate Select Committee's final report: "There is no substantial evidence that Congress intended by passage of the National Security Act of 1947 to authorize covert action by the CIA or that Congress even anticipated that the CIA would engage in such activities."

Again, according to the Committee's report, the director of central intelligence (DCI) approved all covert action projects on his own authority between 1949 and 1952. From that point to the mid-1950s, there was only minimal restrictions placed on the DCI — the DCI coordinated approval of covert action projects with a subcommittee of the National Security Council.

What is most important about this virtually unfettered period in the CIA's history is the attitude which pervaded the agency and the tone, if not the general demeanor, it set for all further CIA covert activities. This attitude about, and rationale for, covert activities was described in the introduction of a top secret report on CIA covert activities prepared for President Eisenhower. The report stated:

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means, and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, longstanding American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

IT WAS THIS "fundamentally repugnant philosophy" in the CIA which gave rise to the secret 25-year, \$25 million effort by the agency to learn how to control the human mind. Under the project names of BLUEBIRD, ARTICHOKE, MKULTRA, and MKDELTA, the CIA essayed to develop, according to a January 25, 1952 CIA memorandum, "any method by which we can get information from a person against his will and without his knowledge."

These experiments, often carried out on unwitting subjects in hospitals, mental institutions, and prisons, were performed after the international standard for medical experimentation on humans had been set at the Nuremberg trials for Nazi war criminals. It said that medical experiments should be for the good of mankind and that a person must give full and informed consent before being

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used as a subject.

Despite the apparent immensity of the program, it was just part of the abuses perpetrated by the CIA since its inception. In Western Europe after World War II the CIA, in an effort to keep France and Italy from going communist, recruited underworld figures to squash labor strikes.

But these seem like minor infractions when compared to the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, the coup which brought Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to power, the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala, and the overthrow of President Salvador Allende in Chile. These are just a few of the numerous guerrilla warfare expeditions the CIA has carried out around the world.

The CIA has also funneled a great deal of energy and money into a mammoth propaganda program to sway world opinion in favor of United States foreign policy.

In some cases, the CIA used, and continues to use, American university and college professors to write propaganda. This brings the discussion to CIA activities within the United States and particularly on university campuses. Today, the CIA is using several hundred academics — professors, administrators, and graduate students involved in teaching — to covertly recruit students on campus.

The domestic spying operation, which the CIA has no charter to perform, can only be mentioned in passing, along with the other covert operations mentioned hence.

The list of abuses is long and still largely unknown, due to the agency's obsession with secrecy in the name of national security.

You state in your letter, Mr. Turner, that "rather than being out of control as (we) allege, the United States intelligence community, and specifically the CIA, are under the tightest internal and external controls of their history."

The question here is, whose control. Yes, President Nixon did give the word to eliminate President Allende. But the justification that "we were only following orders" sounds all too terribly familiar. No President of the United States should be able to use such a destructive tool as the CIA. It was never intended and should not be.

Mr. Turner, the point which you seem to be missing is that regardless of where, for example, the order to eliminate President Allende came, it was wrong — morally and unequivocally wrong. It was not in keeping with American foreign policy objectives — at least what most Americans believe is the essence of American foreign policy.

Do you sincerely believe that, if in 1970, a plebiscite were held, Americans, by a simple majority, would have voted to order the CIA to overthrow the President of Chile? Do you even believe that if the question were put to Congress that it would have voted to order the CIA to overthrow Salvador Allende?

The facts speak for themselves. The conclusion is simple and yet of the utmost importance: the CIA must be disbanded.

To simply reorganize or pass new legislation would not be sufficient. It would leave in place the mechanism and the temptation to again abuse the human rights of all individuals for the sake of national security.

Clearly policy makers have a need for intelligence and objective analysis. We would like to see a new intelligence agency which would only perform the function originally intended for the CIA. But we see no need whatsoever for that organization to keep any secrets. An intelligence agency such as this, with a citizens review board without allegiance to any one branch of the government would benefit everyone and truly make the world safer for democratic choice and not the democracy which the CIA envisions.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **3**THE MICHIGAN DAILY
10 December 1978

Turner and the CIA fight back

Universities move to block covert activities on campus

By René Becker

WHEN THE Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner invited University President Robben Fleming, along with as yet an undisclosed number of other college presidents, to come to CIA headquarters last June, he had one goal in mind—stop the University from adopting guidelines which would restrict the Agency's covert activities on campus.

The University of Michigan is just one of more than 40 colleges which have either adopted or are considering guidelines that would prohibit government intelligence agencies such as the CIA from using professors, administrators, or anyone else as a covert agent on campus.

The June meeting at the Agency headquarters in Langley, Virginia, which Fleming was unable to attend due to a conflict in his schedule, was the second in a series of three day-long seminars wherein the "common interests" of the CIA and academics were discussed.

It is generally believed the purpose of these seminars is to protect what is perhaps the CIA's most sensitive domestic program—the recruitment of foreign nationals on American college campuses for the Agency's clandestine service.

In a heavily CIA-censored section of the final report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, the Agency admitted to "using several hundred American academics (administrators, faculty members, and graduate students engaged in teaching), who in addition to providing leads and sometimes making introductions for intelligence purposes, occasionally write books and other material to be used for propaganda purpose abroad."

The report went on to state that these academics are located on more than 100 American colleges, universities, and related institutes and that generally no one, besides the individuals involved, is aware that a CIA link exists.

Of particular interest to the CIA was, according to the report, obtaining leads on "political foreign intelligent sources, especially those from communist countries." The Committee noted that American academics provide "valuable assistance" in making those contacts.

The Intelligence Committee's report sparked two reactions. In addition to the thousands of requests for personal files under the newly expanded Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the CIA received requests for all files within the Agency indexed under the titles of more than 80 colleges. Also, a number of universities began to discuss adopting guidelines which would prevent the type of covert activities outlined in the Senate report.

The trendsetter in this case was Harvard University. In May, 1977, Harvard became the first American university to adopt guidelines.

As with Harvard, the key to all guidelines either adopted or considered, is the prohibition of covert recruiting—an activity the University of Michigan Civil Liberties Board has called "a particularly pernicious practice."

The CIA's covert recruitment program came to light through one of those thousands of FOIA requests submitted after the Senate Select Committee hearings.

Gary Weissman was a student at the University of Wisconsin in the late 1950s. He served as president of the Wisconsin Student Association in 1959 and after graduation was mildly active in the anti-Vietnam war movement.

Weissman learned recently that he was the subject of a five-year CIA investigation to determine his eligibility for the Agency's clandestine service. The Agency considered using Weissman as a covert CIA agent at the Seventh World Youth Festival in Vienna in 1959.

The most noteworthy aspect of this investigation is the fact that Weissman never applied for CIA employment and that he was not aware that he was being investigated. Weissman was never contacted by the CIA.

BUT AS THE CIA released more and more documents, the revelations became more and more spectacular. As a result of an FOIA request by Nathan Gardels, a University of California graduate student in political science, the CIA released documents which proved that former UC Vice-President Earl Bolton served a tour of duty with the CIA when he was an administrator at the university system.

The documents revealed that Bolton advised the CIA on student unrest, recruiting UC students, academic cover for professors doing research for the CIA, and improving the Agency's public image on campus.

Despite these revelations, the CIA would not release any evidence which confirmed the much touted theory that the CIA used its campus contacts to recruit foreign nationals for its clandestine service.

The schools with large foreign student enrollments, where it would

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seem obvious that such recruiting takes place, were informed by the CIA when they received the replies to their FIOA requests that additional records, which, if they exist, would be responsive to the initial request, were classified.

The CIA further stipulated: "by this answer, we are neither denying nor confirming that any such additional records exist." This was the response to a request made for the CIA files on the University of Michigan, which has the fifth highest enrollment of foreign students in the country.

A similar response was made to several other universities including Columbia, Ohio State, Fairleigh Dickenson, and the University of California system. Each one of the filing groups at these various institutions have initiated lawsuits against the CIA questioning the Agency's refusal to either confirm nor deny that additional documents exist.

Gardels was the first to file, and as a result, his suit has become the test case upon which the precedent will be set. The Gardels suit, as well as the others, with the exception of the Columbia Spectator, a student-operated newspaper, are being handled by the American Civil Liberties Union.

The lawsuits, the flood of FOIA requests by colleges and universities, the likelihood of more lawsuits, and the growing number of schools adopting guidelines has caused a sharp reaction in the CIA.

The CIA appears to have launched a major offensive to combat moves to restrict its activities on college campuses in this country. Spearheading that offensive has been Director Turner himself.

Turner has been, by far, the most visible director of the CIA. Since assuming his current position a little more than 18 months ago, he has made a variety of public appearances before business groups, the press, and college audiences. In an address last April to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Turner declared that the last decade has witnessed a revolution in intelligence gathering that means "greater openness and maximum disclosure."

He said "no agency" can survive without public support. "So today we're being more open. We're making more speeches, participating in more symposiums and publishing more and hoping to tell Americans what we do."

Also that month, Turner gave a speech at the University of Kentucky. There he said it was important for the intelligence community to maintain "warm and traditional ties that have existed with the academic community for many years." He said "public criticism" has strained these ties in recent years, but added that he was "dedicated to trying to rebuild them in every way possible."

Events which occurred between the time that speech was given and now, however, indicate Turner has been less than successful in his attempt to "rebuild" ties with the academic community. The major point of contention is guidelines which would restrict CIA activities on campus.

One month after his speech at the University of Kentucky, Turner wrote in a letter to Harvard President Derek Bok: "I simply cannot lend my affirmative support to, or consider this Agency bound by any confidential association that an academic has with us is so inherently suspect as to require it to be publicly acknowledged and made subject to scrutiny, as your letter puts it, and deprives academics of all freedom of choice in relation to involvement in intelligence activities."

In July, Turner again focused his attention on the University of Michigan. In another letter to Fleming, Turner took the opportunity to state his opposition to the Harvard and, more specifically, the proposed Michigan guidelines.

In well couched terms, however, Turner admits that the CIA uses campus contacts to "spot" likely candidates for Agency employment. "Beyond steps designed to identify individuals of possible interest to us," the CIA does not generally "pursue personnel inquiries" without informing the individual involved, wrote Turner. He wrote that although he "sympathizes with the University's concern over how foreign students may be compromised," Turner could not see why foreign students could not be afforded the same freedom to decide their future that American students enjoy.

Another point which keeps cropping up in all of Turner's rejoinders to the guidelines is that universities and colleges are being unfair to the CIA by not granting it the same rights any corporation has to recruit on campus. Turner has stated repeatedly that he sees no difference between the way many corporations recruit and the manner in which the CIA recruits on college campuses.

On September 8, 1978 another response to CIA activities on campus came from University of Michigan political science professor Michael Oksenberg. In an affidavit submitted in response to the Gardels lawsuit, Oksenberg, currently on indefinite leave from the University to hold a post on the National Security Council, where he is consulted as a China expert, confessed to having "the same kind of

professional association with CIA personnel as well as State and Defense department officials that I had with my university colleagues.

Oksenberg stated he decided to go on the record and "publicly acknowledge" his relationship with the Agency because he said he felt the disclosure of names of others could ruin relations between the CIA and academia—a relation he said is beneficial to everyone.

Turner made clear, once and for all on October 22, his stand on university guidelines which inhibit CIA activities on campus. Turner appeared on CBS' Face the Nation. The question and answers went as follows:

Q: "Don't you think you should abide by Harvard's rules?"

Turner: "If I were required to abide by the rule of every corporation, every academic institution in this country, I it would be impossible to do the required job for our country."

Q: "So the answer is no?"

Turner: "The answer is no, absolutely no."

Q: "You're insisting on the right to subvert their rules?"

Turner: "No, I'm not subverting their rules. I am carrying out the legal responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Harvard does not have a legal authority over us."

The reason Turner is so adamantly opposed to the Harvard guidelines or those of any other university, according to Gardels, is that guidelines could lead to legislation—rules that Turner could not ignore.

Gardels said that once the universities have guidelines there is a base from which to move toward legislation. By confronting the situation at the university level the CIA is trying to "head off" any legislation which could effectively end CIA covert activity on campus.

THE MICHIGAN DAILY
4 December 1978

Letters to the Daily

Turner: the CIA is not out of control

To the Daily:

In your 24 October 1978 editorial, "The CIA on Campus," you contend that "no one seems to have authority over the CIA," that the CIA has "too long been permitted to continue their surreptitious activities outside the sphere of civilian control" and "that the agency has gotten out of control is apparent." This assertion is incorrect both historically and as regards CIA activities today.

The Senate Select Committee chaired by Senator Church stated in Book I of its final report, "The CIA has come to be viewed as an unfettered monolith, defining and determining its activities independent of other elements of government and of the direction of American foreign policy. This is a distortion. During its twenty-nine year history, the Agency has been shaped by the course of international events, by pressures from other government agencies, and by its own internal norms. An exhaustive history of the CIA would demand an equally exhaustive history of American foreign policy, the role of Congress and the Executive, the other components on the Intelligence Community, and an examination of the interaction among all these forces."

Although never released to the public, the report of the House Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) was reported in Village Voice to have arrived at even more categorical conclusion concerning the control of the CIA: "All evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for Security Affairs."

After the first session of the 96th Congress came to a close,

Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, reported to the Senate that, "There is no question that a number of abuses of power, mistakes in judgment, and failures by the intelligence agencies have harmed the United States. In almost every instance, the abuses that have been revealed were a result of direction from above, including Presidents and Secretaries of State. Further, in almost every instance, some members of both Houses of Congress assigned the duty of oversight were knowledgeable about these activities."

Today, the President's Executive Order 12036, signed January 24, 1978 (copy enclosed) lays out specific directions for carrying out intelligence activities, restrictions on those activities, and creates several new mechanisms for oversight.

In the Executive Branch, the new Intelligence Oversight Board, composed of three distinguished civilians from outside the government, are directed to investigate all allegations of illegal or improper intelligence activity. Anyone may communicate directly with that Board. Their findings go directly to the President.

In the Legislative Branch, a select committee on intelligence exists in both the Senate and the House. They are kept fully informed of intelligence activities and, in turn, exercise genuine control over all such activities. There is no question in my mind or in the mind of anyone in the Intelligence Community that we are held accountable for what we do.

There two Congressional committees are now in the process of drafting charters which will

codify in federal law the various restrictions and limitations as well as the missions of the Intelligence Community. I fully and actively support that endeavor.

Consequently, rather than being out of control as you allege, the United States Intelligence Community, and specifically the CIA, are under the tightest internal and external controls of their history.

Further, you find my refusal to comply with Harvard's faculty guidelines peremptory and outrageous. In fact, it is neither. The CIA and Harvard have been engaged in a productive dialogue for over a year. During that time the majority of our differences have been reconciled. There remain but three points of differences:

1. The Harvard guidelines require that relationships between Harvard faculty members and the CIA be reported to the Harvard administration.

CIA has no objection to this requirement but believes it is the prerogative of the faculty member to reveal those relationships which are external to his faculty responsibilities, not the CIA. CIA considers all such relationships private and personal. The faculty member may deal with them in any way he chooses.

2. That only relationships with intelligence agencies are required to be so revealed.

While the guidelines you propose in your subsequent editorial, "The University Guidelines" on 29 October 1978, recognizes the diverse opportunities for conflict of interest which are present on all campuses, e.g., consulting arrangements with businesses, private publication opportunities, part-time jobs, etc., Harvard's guidelines do not. It seems naive to me to assume that only a

relationship with an intelligence agency has the potential for conflict or for infringing on academic or personal freedom. Additionally, this requirement infers that all other relationships are preferable to one with the U.S. Government. This is neither sound logic nor realistic. If this guideline were extended to cover all business or professional relationships external to the faculty member's university responsibilities, CIA would have no objection.

3. The CIA should not establish any confidential relationship with faculty members for the possible purpose of assessing or contacting foreign students.

Again, in light of the thousands of confidential recommendations prepared annually by faculty members for students applying to businesses, graduate schools, and other government agencies, a guideline prohibiting the same kind of recommendation to the Intelligence Community is inconsistent with recognized and accepted faculty practice. No student at a university is totally free of confidential appraisal in one form or another; none of us is either in school or at work. If a particular student's qualifications result in a specific work or study proposal by a business, another university, or a government agency, and the student is not interested, the student is free to decline the proposal. It is difficult to see how this abridges anyone's freedom.

I am enclosing a copy of the CIA's internal regulation governing our relationship with academic institutions and a statement I made at the University of Kentucky which describes those relationships and the oversight process in greater detail.

—Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence

THE MICHIGAN DAILY
5 December 1978

TO BE PRESENTED TO FACULTY FOR VOTE SACUA drafts 'U' intelligence agency guidelines

By LEONARD BERNSTEIN

The University's attempt to formulate policy covering its relationship with domestic and foreign intelligence agencies faces crucial test at this month's Faculty Senate Assembly meeting on Dec. 18.

The Senate Advisory Committee for University Affairs (SACUA) yesterday placed the most recent draft of the controversial guidelines, formulated last week by the Civil Liberties Board (CLB), on the agenda for the faculty body's next monthly meeting.

THE LATEST CLB draft, which will be brought before the Assembly for discussion and a vote without appraisal from SACUA, represents the culmination of a year's discussion on the issue from faculty, administration, and student sources.

The latest draft, dated Nov. 29, differs somewhat in principle and language from the Sept. 27 draft the CLB had presented to SACUA. According to SACUA Chairman Shaw Livermore, those differences represent responses by the CLB to suggestions made by University Vice-President for Academic Affairs Harold Shapiro.

The most significant changes involved the attempts to apply specific rules governing activities by intelligence agencies as opposed to other organizations.

THE CURRENT DRAFT states "no member of the University community should assist any person or organization, including intelligence agencies, in obtaining the involuntary services of another member of the University community." The Sept. 27 draft of this resolution applied only to intelligence agencies.

But the CLB retained language singling out intelligence agencies in the principle regarding recruitment at the University:

The guidelines still state: "No member of the University community should give the name of another member of the University community to any intelligence agency for the purpose of possible recruitment by the intelligence agency without the express prior consent of that individual."

THE BOARD ADDED the phrase "unless required to do so by law or subpoena" at the end of this clause.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has long objected to University attempts to use specific rules with recruitment by intelligence agencies. In a July 17 of this year letter to University President Robben Fleming, CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner wrote: "It does seem to me both inequitable and a potential disservice to the country to apply to inquiries from this Agency rules of procedure that do not apply to other applicants for personnel information or recommendations."

But SACUA member Margaret Leary, who also sits on the Civil Liberties Board, explained the decision to retain the original wording of this clause was due to "the superior secret investigative machinery that intelligence agencies have."

THE TWO OTHER resolves of the current document state members of the University should not:

- "lend their names and positions to gain public acceptance for material they know to be misleading or untrue," or
- "use their academic role as a ruse for obtaining information for intelligence agencies."

The guidelines also state that "adjudication of alleged violations will be the responsibility of University bodies and officials and governed by existing

rules and regulations."

The Dec. 18 meeting will mark the second time the Faculty Senate Assembly has reviewed a policy proposal on intelligence agencies in the last year. The 70 member group rejected a proposal last May because of numerous objections by faculty members. The guidelines were sent back to the CLB for reworking at that time.

OBSERVERS WERE unable to predict the chances of the current document receiving approval by the Assembly this time. However, most seemed optimistic that, after discussions of wording and content, a vote would be taken on the principles in the document.

SACUA member Jesse Gordon, and professor of Social Work and Psychology, said he was "rather strongly" in favor of the document, though he did want to suggest some changes. Gordon agreed with opponents that the guidelines are an encroachment of academic freedom, but he said he thought they are "an appropriate one."

"Academic freedoms can only cover honorable activities," he said.

BUT ENGINEERING Prof. Arch Naylor, another SACUA member, said he would probably vote against the guidelines when the Assembly meets.

Naylor stressed that he had not thoroughly read the present draft and that "there certainly have been modifications in the direction I would like to see it modified," but maintained that "I'll have to be convinced we really need such a document."

NAYLOR ALSO said he was unsure the guidelines would be effective and that he was apprehensive about "rules on things faculty are not allowed to do" which include "an implied punishment mechanism."

Should the guidelines be approved by the Assembly, they must then be recommended to the Regents by the administration. The Regents must then approve the guidelines for them to become University policy.

SACUA Chairman and history Prof. Shaw Livermore, who has acted as intermediary between the CLB and the administration, for much of the discussion on the guidelines, was optimistic about the possibility of such a recommendation.

"I think they (the chances) are good," he said.

THE PHOENIX
SAN FRANCISCO STATE
7 December 1978

Memo indicates past CIA-SF State ties

by Glenn Ow

While the U.S. government seeks to improve monitoring of foreign agent activity, documents indicate at least one of its own intelligence agencies operated on the SF State campus in the past.

The CIA helped a Hungarian defector obtain a teaching position at SF State eight years ago.

(As Received)

In 1970, Janos Radvanyi, who had defected from Hungary three years earlier, was hired as a part-time lecturer in the History Department.

DeVere Pentony, dean of the School of Behavioral and Social Sciences, had first approached the International Relations Department to see if it would consider accepting Radvanyi.

"I do recall hearing that the CIA was interested in finding a spot for him (Radvanyi) and that they may have been quite open about it," said Pentony, but they never talked to me." Pentony could not remember who referred Radvanyi to him.

Marshall Windmiller, professor of International Relations, lodged a protest with then-Department Chairman David Marvin, citing the possible CIA link.

Such a link, Windmiller argued, conflicted with the ideal of academic freedom.

"I have no way of knowing if the CIA was involved," Marvin has since said. "The protest was made, however, and he did not teach for us."

A CIA memo written in 1974 indicates a link existed. The memo describes a confrontation between a CIA agent and Windmiller on Feb. 14, 1974.

Except for Windmiller, all names, including the agent's and defector's, were eliminated from the copy of the memo which Windmiller obtained. However, Windmiller says the agent was Jim Hudson, a former International Relations student, and Radvanyi was the defector referred to in their conversation.

Following are excerpts from that memo:

"Windmiller immediately posed a question which I was not prepared for. He asked if I were the CIA agent who was present on the SF State campus a few years ago trying to get 'that defector' a job as a faculty member. I said that I was, for this was common knowledge among the International Relations professors ...

"Windmiller continued his 'diatribe,' denouncing my 'furtive' attempts to get _____ placed on campus. To this charge I explained that the Agency had brought the matter to the attention of the appropriate college officials."

Who those college officials were has never been established.

History Department Chairman Eldon Modisette said he was not aware of any CIA connection.

"I don't think I ever heard of one," Modisette said. "We probably hired him because he had an expertise that was attractive. Back in 1971 we had a larger graduate program and could accommodate someone with a special area of knowledge."

Radvanyi taught a graduate proseminar in the Spring semester of 1971 with the understanding that the position would be only for that semester, according to Modisette.

Radvanyi joined the History Department at Mississippi State University in the fall of that year, and is now a full-time faculty member.

Reached at his home in Starkville, Miss., Radvanyi denied ever having contact with the CIA:

"I've had no involvement with the CIA. There was no 007 involved," he said.

Dale Peterson, CIA spokesman in Washington, had no comment on the matter except to point out that the CIA is "responsible for helping defectors resettle."

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MISCELLANEOUS

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
15 DECEMBER 1978

Bell Seeks Advice On Revising FOI Act

By a Washington Star Staff Writer

Attorney General Griffin Bell has initiated a comprehensive review of the Freedom of Information Act with a view to recommending legislative changes.

In a letter yesterday to the heads of all federal departments and agencies, Bell invited their suggestions about ways to change the law so as to achieve a "better reconciliation" between the public's right to information and the need to protect legitimate government activities such as law enforcement.

He also asked federal officials in each agency and department to estimate the direct and indirect costs of administering the act during the past 12 months.

Bell said recommendations of private citizens, lawyers, the news media and other interested groups are welcome and should be addressed to the Office of Information Law and Policy, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530.

Federal law enforcement officials repeatedly have asserted that the Freedom of Information Act, coupled with the Privacy Act, was eroding their investigative capabilities, imposing financial and administrative burdens and inhibiting their ability to obtain intelligence and evidence.

THE WASHINGTON POST
15 December 1978

Article appeared
on page A-1

U.S. Study Eyes Better Ties With Oil-Rich Mexico

By J. P. Smith

Washington Post Staff Writer

A National Security Council draft study describes Mexico as "the most promising new source" of oil in the 1980s and suggests that the president consider a serious upgrading in that country's priority among U.S. foreign policy interests.

The memorandum, designated as Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 41, says the United States could view Mexico as a world-scale partner and accord it significant concessions on winter export of farm products as well as quotas for legal immigration of workers to the United States. A copy of the draft was obtained yesterday by The Washington Post.

Yet another option outlined in the draft would be for Washington to maintain its traditional view of Mexico as an "emerging power" in the Third World.

Last week President Carter said PRM-41 could serve as the basis for his impending negotiations in February in Mexico City with President Jose Lopez Portillo.

"For the United States, Mexico represents a major new energy source, presently outside OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]. Mexico could fill 30 percent of U.S. import needs by the mid-1980s, thus enhancing security of supply, and more than compensating for the decline of Venezuelan and Canadian supplies," the draft study asserts.

More important, however, the outcome of PRM-41 (as the classified study is known within the foreign policy bureaucracy) could shape a new generation of U.S.-Mexican relations.

A draft of the Mexico PRM sets forth these possible results that could come from a redirection of Washington's policy toward Mexico:

- It could provide an alternative to increased dependence on Arab oil and access to some of what the CIA estimates could be as much as 10 million barrels of Mexican oil production a day by 1990.

- It could result in a sanctioned program for Mexican aliens now immigrating illegally to the United States at the rate of hundreds of thousands a year, a proposal that many U.S. labor leaders view as nothing short of chilling.

- It could result in lowering tariff and other trade barriers to Mexican exports such as vegetables and textiles that are vigorously opposed by politically powerful U.S. business interests.

- And it could result in the creation of a special negotiator for Mexican affairs reporting directly to the president or Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, that at the least would touch off regional political jealousies.

At the same time the United States could do nothing about any of these and, as a draft of the PRM says, "follow general U.S. foreign policy directions without according Mexico special or preferential status."

Carter has yet to make a choice, though senior administration officials say he has taken a keen personal interest in PRM-41.

Last week at a breakfast meeting with reporters in the White House's State Dining Room, Carter said, "I consider our relationships with Mexico to be as important as any other that we have, and my relationship with President Lopez Portillo has been very good."

Washington observers are long accustomed to Carter's effusive good will and praise about any country or head of state. What is different about Mexico, however, is that senior administration officials say in private that by all indications Carter attaches a high priority to Mexico's emerging oil prowess and to turning around the suspicions and ill will that have marked relations between the two countries over the last 40 years. (Carter, one also is reminded, has been taking private Spanish lessons since moving into the White House.)

Elsewhere in the administration the Mexico PRM has been the focus of Cabinet-level haggling, and the bureaucratic territorial battles that mark any potential major foreign policy switch.

Energy Secretary James R. Schlesinger Jr. was reproved in a sharply worded letter last Nov. 8, from National Security Council head Zbigniew Brzezinski last month for trying to end-run the council's PRM process by going directly to the president or negotiating directly with Mexico's national oil company.

And within the State Department, there has been cordial competition between Latin American policymakers who favor an open-handed approach towards Mexico, and State's energy experts who favored a hard-nosed posture until recently on energy negotia-

tions with Mexico.

The Labor and Justice Departments, which both have an institutional interest in stemming the flow of Mexican illegal aliens into the U.S. labor market, were briefly at odds with a State Department-favored proposal for an official U.S. program to allow Mexicans to immigrate to the United States.

While the details have yet to be worked out, and the final PRM-41 document has not gone to the president, the outlines of the administration's options were agreed upon at a Cabinet-level meeting last week held in the Situation Room in the basement of the White House's West Wing.

The PRM begins with a statement that Mexico is emerging as "an economic power of strategic value to the United States," adding that Mexico clearly could produce as much oil as Saudi Arabia, the world's leading exporter, does today.

It goes on to say that there are four major issues that need to be addressed: energy, trade, migration, and relations affecting the communities strung along both sides of the 1,930-mile U.S.-Mexico border.

Among the obstacles to improving relations between the two countries, the PRM notes, is that "important elements in both societies regard the other with suspicion and even fear." These include Mexican fears that the United States will exploit its resources, especially oil and gas, and U.S. fears that illegal Mexican immigration will swell domestic labor markets as the economy appears headed toward a slowdown.

The PRM says that "influence, leverage, and bargaining potential—once overwhelmingly in favor of the United States—are shifting somewhat in Mexico's direction."

As for the goal of U.S.-Mexican relations, the draft PRM says the United States should press for "a stable, humane, and cooperative Mexico."

It is Mexico's growing oil power, however, that is at the heart of the policy evaluation. The first priority of Carter's February visit to Mexico will be to unsnarl embarrassing loose ends from a natural gas sale, approved by Mexican President Lopez Portillo, that was killed last year by Energy Secretary Schlesinger.

If the United States adopts a posture essentially treating Mexico as "an emerging power," the draft PRM says that U.S. interest in Mexican oil and gas would be seen "in global

CONTINUED

rather than U.S. security terms," a position which Schlesinger has continued to argue privately.

If the United States adopts a posture treating Mexico as "a partner" sharing advantages equally, the PRM suggests that a North American community, including Canada, could eventually evolve. This also would imply increased Mexican energy production, without any loss of Mexico's national sovereignty.

The rationale for a carefully stitched Mexico policy, the draft PRM says, is that "while there is little danger that—unless we attempt to seal the border—Mexico will become overtly hostile, the cumulative impact of unmanaged tension could end the conditions that have enabled the United States to discount Mexico's nearness" in favor of some other part of the world community.

The PRM argues in part for completing the natural gas negotiations aborted last year, saying that "this now appears reasonable on opportunity cost grounds, and would reinforce higher Mexican oil production and exports."

Schlesinger has continued to express private reservations about sign-

ing the gas deal, which would increase domestic gas supplies by about 4 percent. If the United States buys Mexican gas, Schlesinger argues, gas from the proposed Alaskan gas pipeline through Canada would become less competitive and could threaten completion of the pipeline.

One set of estimates, offered outside of the PRM, projects that the cost of Mexican gas would be about \$4.20 per thousand cubic feet by 1983, while Alaskan gas would cost from \$1.50 to \$2 more. Last year, however, Schlesinger moved to kill the gas deal because the Mexicans' price—which would have been indexed to oil product prices—was higher than what the administration would give the domestic industry.

Carter has said that he wants to try to resolve the gas impasse, although the draft PRM suggests that one option would be to forgo negotiations with Mexico on gas.

As for the long term, the draft PRM says that "trade-offs such as barter agreements or explicit concessions in other areas would be very difficult to negotiate and implement." So far, however, this has been the path Mexico has followed with other nations.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER
8 November 1979

Mary
Strassmeyer

CLOAK AND DAGGER STUFF ...
Adm. Stansfield Turner, ~~CIA director~~, slipped into town very quietly yesterday to talk to a high-powered group at the Union Club. He slipped out just as quietly.

EXCERPTED

ST. PAUL DISPATCH (MINN)
7 November 1979

Taking yet another slap at the CIA

When Emma Lazarus wrote "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free," she could hardly have been thinking of foreign spies, political defectors and the CIA. But foreign agents and defectors have become among the more noteworthy of "immigrants" to the United States in recent years, and Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman, D-N.Y., said they have been getting altogether too special treatment; she wants them brought in through regular channels like any of the other homeless and tempest-toss'd who enter the golden door.

Holtzman's proposal, embodied in a bill, has all the earmarks of another gratuitous slap at the CIA at a time when picking on that agency carries so much political chic. For years it has been customary for the CIA to bring into the United States persons who are either political defectors or foreign agents (it is not always obvious which they might be with-

out going through the immigration routine.

The reasons are obvious. Secrecy is often of the essence as the CIA attempts to determine the exact status and role of the "immigrants," as it seeks useful intelligence from them, and to protect them from possible reprisals. In other words, it is a matter of the national interest. Obviously, bringing such persons in through the routine of immigration procedures would make a shambles of security. The potential harm to the national interest, as well as the threat to the personal safety of the persons being brought in, should not need pointing out.

It is hard to believe Holtzman does not know and understand this. She must know, too, that her bill has little chance of passage. And doubtless she also knows that another rap at the CIA is always good for a little publicity.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 550THE NATION
1 December 1979

Naming Names

You've all heard the story (true) about the Englishman who was prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act for writing the name of a British spy in the sand as the tide was coming in. A law of similarly draconian implications has been proposed on this side of the water by Representative Edward Boland (D., Massachusetts). Representative Boland's bill, known as the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, would impose penalties of varying severity on intelligence personnel and private citizens who reveal the identity of undercover agents of the Central Intelligence Agency, depending on whether the individual who publishes the information had "authorized access" to the information or obtained it from non-classified sources.

The bill would thus not only throttle potential whistleblowers inside the C.I.A., it would also affect journalists, authors and scholars who write about it. Representative Boland admits that his bill is "controversial," since it "could subject a private citizen to criminal prosecution for disclosing unclassified information obtained from unclassified sources." Precisely the point, we would think. We are revealing no secrets when we identify the bill's immediate target as publications such as *Covert Action Bulletin*, a Washington newsletter that prints names of C.I.A. agents obtained by assiduous combing of Foreign Service personnel lists and other public sources. How can the Government punish someone who reveals information deduced from unclassified sources? Well, says Boland lamely, "the unauthorized disclosure of the name of an undercover agent is no less damaging to the national security and no more beneficial to the public because it was disclosed by a private citizen instead of a C.I.A. employee."

We would argue that—freedom of the press aside—such reporting performs a service; it tells the C.I.A. which of its agents are most likely to be "blown," enabling it to take appropriate measures and even clear out nonproductive sources. Boland's bill makes the dubious assumption that American investigative reporters are more effective and accurate than foreign counterintelligence operatives—which, given the modest resources allocated to investigative reporting by American newspapers, will come as a surprise to media critics.

The hard case of publishing names of C.I.A. operatives notwithstanding, the badness of this law is, of course, its wider applicability. If such a law had been in effect in the days of Watergate, could Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein have been prosecuted for revealing Howard Hunt's C.I.A. ties? Boland's bill, which is backed by thirteen fellow members of the House Intelligence Committee, is dubious because of the narrowness of its aim and the potential breadth of its effects.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 6THE DAILY PRINCETONIAN
12 NOVEMBER 1979

Princeton in the CIA's service

By JOHN CAVANAGH GS, SALLY FRANK '80, and LAURIE KIRBY GS

There is nothing covert about the CIA employment interviews taking place today in Clio Hall. But that should not deceive any of us about the nature of the CIA's activities.

As citizens of the United States, we need to be aware of the actions the CIA carries out in our name. As Princeton students and faculty, we must understand the history of covert CIA intrusions into our campus, activity which is still permitted by the university today.

From Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954) and the Congo (1960), to Chile (1973) and Angola (1975), the CIA has made it its business to overthrow governments and to install (or attempt to install) dictatorial regimes sympathetic to United States business and military interests.

These interventions are not merely the dark underside of American foreign policy. Rather, they reflect the mainstream of establishment through from World War II to the present, a consensus which has been nourished in respectable institutions such as this university. Not coincidentally, there is also a long and multi-faceted tradition of Princeton in the CIA's service.

Breeding ground

From Allen W. Dulles '14 (later a Princeton trustee), who was the CIA's first director, to William E. Colby '40, who played a key role in the CIA's secret war in Laos, in the 1973 "destabilization" of democratic government in Chile, and in the Phoenix program of torture and murder in Vietnam, and who was CIA director from 1973 to 1975, Princeton has been a particularly fertile breeding ground for the agency, right up to the present Deputy Director, Frank J. Carlucci '52.

CIA recruitment at Princeton has benefited from the active participation of university officials. Former Career Services director Newell Brown admitted in 1976 to *The Daily Princetonian*, "We are aware of the kinds of people the CIA looks for and when we run into the type we tell them to send a resume."

But not all CIA recruiting at Princeton has been conducted through Career Services. An article in the *Trenton Times* of February 12, 1975, reported the story of a Princeton senior summoned in the late 1960's to meet with the dean of students, at that time the university's chief disciplinarian. However, Dean William D'O. Lippincott '41 had other things than discipline on his mind:

"I understand you've been interviewing with the CIA," the dean said. The senior found the question perplexing. It was true that he had applied for a job at the intelligence agency, but officials there had insisted on complete confidentiality. How had the dean of students found out?

"The answer was soon forthcoming. 'You see,' the student, recalls Lippincott saying, 'I'm with the agency. And I thought we might have a talk — confidential, of course — about its work.'"

A spy in our midst

The CIA announced last year that it will continue the secret recruiting of foreign students at American universities. Such students have been used to report on the political activities of their compatriots. These reports are often communicated to secret police agencies abroad with potentially dangerous consequences for the students and their families.

Foreign students' fears about CIA spying are not merely conjectural. In May 1967, the Woodrow Wilson School was forced to admit that several students had been working covertly for the CIA while participating in the school's summer program abroad. Embarrassed WWS officials responded by issuing a ban on "any covert intelligence activity while the student is enrolled in school" (*The Washington Post*, May 4, 1967). The policy apparently applies, however, only to WWS graduate students, not to its undergraduates or professors.

According to Dean of the College Joan Girgus (*The Daily Princetonian*, October 24, 1978), Princeton University has no specific prohibition against the covert recruitment of foreign students. In contrast, Harvard President Derek C. Bok has taken a firm public stand against covert CIA activity on his campus, charging it threatens "the integrity and independence of the academic community."

Princeton professors have been involved with the CIA in many different capacities. Former history professor Joseph Strayer, for example, took a year's leave of absence from Princeton to work at CIA

CONTINUED

headquarters in Maclean, Virginia, and also worked there several summers.

Paul Sigmund, professor of politics, cofounded (in 1958) and served as Executive Officer of the CIA-funded Independent Research Service, which compiled political dossiers on participants in World Youth Festivals. Since the other cofounder, Gloria Steinem, admitted in *The New York Times* (February 21, 1967) that "the CIA has been a major source of funds" for the organization, it is highly unlikely that Sigmund was unaware of the CIA connection.

A dark area of CIA involvement at Princeton is that of covert research. In 1977 it was revealed that Princeton professors had participated in MK-ULTRA, a secret CIA program in mind control through hallucinogenic drugs. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has refused to make public the results of its investigation into CIA university research, however, stating that the CIA considered educational activities "perhaps its most sensitive domestic area."

In its thirty-two-year history, the CIA has exhibited a consistent pattern of participation in coups, assassinations, torture-training, and subversion of people's fundamental right to self-determination. Although this history is too long and extensive to review here, two examples of CIA activities should illuminate the nature of the Agency's means and ends.

On September 11, 1973, democracy in Chile was overthrown in a bloody military coup. The military junta which then seized power has since suppressed all democratic freedoms, murdered approximately 30,000 of its own citizens, and jailed and tortured tens of thousands more.

This coup followed a CIA campaign to "destabilize" the elected government. According to the 1975 staff report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Covert U.S. involvement in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973 was extensive and continuous. . . . It financed activities covering a broad spectrum, from simple propaganda manipulation of the press to large-scale support for Chilean political parties . . . to direct attempts to foment a military camp."

But no rebirth from the ashes

"Operation Phoenix" in Vietnam, the brainchild of William E. Colby '40, displays another of the CIA's specialties: assassination. While statistics on the numbers detained, killed, and "rallied" to the Saigon government under Phoenix vary from source to source, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dennis Doolin admitted that at least 26,369 South Vietnamese civilians were killed through the operation while it was under direct American control (January 1968 through August 1972).

Torture was the standard operating procedure of Phoenix. "Everybody who was there accepted torture as routine," said Robert F. Gould, Colby's legal advisor in Saigon. "I never knew an individual to be detained as a 'Viet Cong' suspect who ever lived through an interrogation," testified K. Barton Osborn, a former agent handler for Phoenix.

The CIA has also been actively infringing human rights at home — for example, in the MK-Chaos program which involved keeping secret files on thousands of U.S. citizens "suspected" of political activity. Deputy Director Carlucci said in a seminar at Princeton last Friday (November 9, 1979) that the program had been "pared back" since its notorious heyday in the '60s — but not stopped.

In light of the CIA's record both at home and abroad, a number of questions can be raised about present CIA campus activity:

First, in November, 1978, it was revealed that Barnaby C. Keeny, who was president of Brown University from 1955 to 1966, had worked for the CIA during the entire time he was president. The Princeton University community has the right to demand of President Bowen that he state, for the record, whether he, or anyone in his administration, does now or has ever worked for the CIA.

Second, the only rule at Princeton concerning CIA intelligence operations is that faculty so engaged should tell their department chairman. Moreover, the Princeton rules for secret research are so loose as to permit the MK-ULTRA experiments to take place today. We should ask whether faculty work with a covert organization does not undermine the very principles of academic openness which Princeton purports to hold sacred.

Finally, both graduate and undergraduate students, should look carefully at this organization, which has consistently and willfully broken the laws of the United States and has committed countless crimes against humanity, in violation of international law. We should ask whether we want to participate, individually or as members of an institution, in providing a forum for the marketing of the CIA.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 36U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
10 DECEMBER 1979

America: World's No. 1 Spy Target

In unprecedented numbers agents are infiltrating the U.S.—disguised as diplomats, students, even refugees. Can battered counterespionage agencies cope?

An army of foreign agents, engaged in clandestine operation on an unparalleled scale, has turned the U.S. into the world's prime target of international spying.

U.S. counterintelligence officials face not only a wide-ranging espionage offensive by the Soviet Union and other unfriendly powers, but embarrassing and at times lethal spying operations by friendly nations and even allies.

Sensitive political considerations and the sheer numbers of foreign agents pose growing challenges for an American intelligence community still grappling to regain its own equilibrium after four years of scandal and controversy.

Accentuated by a rash of recent incidents involving the Soviet KGB, the espionage threat from hostile governments is today being compounded by a stepped-up assault on American secrets by China, Vietnam and Eastern Europe.

"Never," says an authoritative intelligence source, "have we had foreign operatives coming into this country in such numbers. It's a totally new phenomenon."

The principal target of agents from Communist nations has been classified information of a political nature. But the emphasis lately has shifted to secrets of the U.S. military-scientific establishment—especially its increasingly sophisticated satellite technology and communications systems.

In a major espionage coup, Moscow obtained a classified manual exposing details of the top-secret KH-11 reconnais-

sance satellite last year from William P. Kampiles, a low-level watch officer at the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in Langley, Va. In an earlier episode, the KGB successfully penetrated TRW Systems Group, Inc., a California defense contractor, obtaining secrets involving U.S. communications processes. Christopher John Boyce, a former TRW employe, and as-

sociate Andrew Daulton Lee both were convicted of working with the Russians.

Industrial Secrets—High-Priority Targets

Soviet-bloc agents are also concentrating increasingly on the theft of industrial secrets. Recent advances in computers, lasers, microelectronics and production techniques—areas where Communist economies lag far behind the West—are particularly valuable.

In one recent case, an American worker was offered \$200,000 by a Rumanian intelligence officer anxious to obtain a company's plans for a patented glassmaking process. An Eastern European defector has told the Federal Bureau of Investigation that his espionage agency devoted an entire year to the theft of codes used to gain access to a sophisticated computer "brain" in the United States. American intelligence officers also know of KGB efforts to find firms near bankruptcy that could be recruited into spy work.

There is mounting evidence, too, that even some of this country's closest friends have not been above the practice of espionage, intimidation and assassination while operating with a virtually free hand in the United States. The most recent example: Allegations that Israel spied on former U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young's meeting with a Palestine Liberation Organization envoy.

Such developments have ignited a controversy within the government over how best to combat the threat of foreign espionage. Moreover, the growing dangers of clandestine efforts directed from abroad are beginning to overshadow Washington's fears of giving this country's own intelligence agencies too much power. A drive to impose tight legal restraints on the FBI and the CIA is running out of steam.

What is causing the greatest concern among officials is an undeniable rise in what the FBI considers the most serious spy activity in the U.S.—that of the Russian KGB network

CONTINUED

and its Eastern European surrogates.

A phenomenal growth has been detected in the cadre of Russia's KGB officers residing in the United States. More than 500 have been identified at official missions in Washington, D.C., New York and San Francisco, twice the figure of 10 years ago.

Even that is only part of the picture. The FBI says that it cannot possibly monitor all 65,000 Soviet-bloc nationals entering the country each year. The exact number of spies hidden in the group is unknown, but Director William H. Webster has claimed: "You may be sure the number is greater than the number of [FBI agents] assigned to foreign counterintelligence work."

How Détente Promotes Espionage

A prime reason for the influx of spies is the thaw in relations with Moscow during the past decade. From only 800 officials based in the U.S. in 1966, the Eastern-bloc presence has mushroomed to more than 1,900, ostensibly to staff an expanded diplomatic and trade effort. About 40 percent are considered full-time espionage operatives.

About 20,000 Soviet sailors come ashore each year as a consequence of the opening of 40 U.S. ports to Eastern-bloc merchant vessels in 1972. More than 30,000 Russian scientists and other visitors entered the U.S. in official delegations last year—with the KGB believed to be heavily represented. As one U.S. expert put it: "Détente does not serve the purposes of American intelligence agencies."

A claim by Arkady N. Shevchenko, Moscow's top U.N. diplomat who defected to the U.S. last year, that half of Russia's 300-member delegation at the U.N. are spies came as no surprise to American counterintelligence. Soviet officials prowl the halls of the world forum, avidly picking up bulletins, reports and political gossip.

In 1978, Valdik A. Enger and Rudolf P. Chernyayev, both Soviet U.N. employees, were convicted of espionage. A third official, Vladimir P. Zinyakin, was forced to leave the U.S. in the same affair. A year earlier, Yevgeny P. Karpov was recalled from his U.N. post after Ivan Rogalsky, a Soviet citizen who had been residing in the U.S., was arrested for spying.



Defector Arkady Shevchenko, once a top Russian diplomat, claims United Nations headquarters (left) is haven for Soviet KGB agents.



Sarkis O. Paskalian, another émigré living in New York, confessed in 1975 to obtaining a classified Pentagon report for the KGB. Named as co-conspirators were three Soviet U.N. officials, who subsequently left the country.

Capitol Hill is now another high-priority open target for foreign agents. Suspected KGB officers, posing as diplomats or journalists, routinely visit

congressional offices, attend public hearings and solicit reports—especially those dealing with military hardware and planning. In the recent controversy over a Russian brigade near Havana, the Russians asked numerous questions about Cuba. Congress was deluged with KGB agents late last year when political normalization with China was in the wind.

A major reason for increasing Soviet-bloc spying activity on Capitol Hill: The rise in classified information handled by congressional committees. Selected panels, such as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, receive copies of the CIA's national-intelligence digest that is prepared for the President. At least one listening device, a remote-controlled microphone, was discovered in a hearing room that is regularly used for closed-door meetings.


Experts view physical security as secondary to the recruitment of staffers on Capitol Hill. At least three serious efforts are known to American counterintelligence.

Perhaps the most bizarre case involved James Frederick Sattler, a U.S. citizen who sought a staff position with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. An FBI background check sent up red flags, and in 1976 he voluntarily registered with the government as an agent of East Germany. Over the years, he acknowledged, he had received \$15,000 and an East German medal for documents he had procured as a foreign-policy analyst in Washington.

Eastern European officials often have an easier time in Congress than those from Russia. To quote one top Senate official: "Some of our people who would never go to lunch with someone from the Russian Embassy would talk openly with a Rumanian, because they're our friends."

The establishment of full diplomatic ties with the world's

CONTINUED



Ex-Envoy Orlando Letelier



Manuel Contreras Sepulveda

After the 1976 car-bombing assassination of Letelier, Chilean spy chief Contreras was charged with directing the conspiracy.

other Communist giant, China, has introduced a new dimension into American efforts to counter "hostile" intelligence activities. Handicapped for more than 20 years by a lack of official representation in the U.S., China since 1971 has opened a permanent U.N. mission in New York as well as diplomatic establishments in Washington, Houston and San Francisco. Intelligence officers already have been detected within China's official contingent.

As with Moscow, the numbers are significant. After opening its liaison office in Washington in 1973 with a mere 10 officials, Peking is now planning a full embassy staff of 400. The FBI's Webster already is sounding the alarm about strains this influx is placing on his bureau.

Apart from the increase in China's official representatives, American counterintelligence officials are concerned about the rising number of Chinese students. Some 700 to 1,000 are expected in American universities this year, most in departments specializing in science and technology.

Because of its backward economic condition, Peking is thought to place heavy emphasis on industrial espionage. Suspected Chinese agents, for example, are known to be active in heavily ethnic areas of West Coast cities. A prime target area: The so-called Silicone Valley in California, a concentration of think tanks and defense contractors in the San Francisco vicinity. "Out there, the Chinese are talent spotters, looking for that guy they can use in the future," a knowledgeable expert explains.

American officials say the Chinese expend a great deal of energy probing what the U.S. knows about the Soviet Union. No scrap of information is considered too trivial by the Chinese when it comes to their archadversary. Long before the U.S. gave its approval for Moscow to engage in massive wheat purchases this year, the Chinese were busily collecting information about the deal. One persistent query: What price were the Russians willing to pay?

Refugee Flood Poses New Threat

Another component in the "hostile" espionage campaign is the flood of exiles and refugees reaching American soil. One recent spy prosecution resulted in the conviction of a Vietnamese expatriate, David Truong, together with Ronald Humphrey, a U.S. Information Agency official recruited to steal classified documents. The chief envoy of Commu-

nist Vietnam at the U.N., Dinh Ba Thi, who controlled this espionage operation, was expelled.

American officials believe that Vietnamese agents are planted among the flood of boat people arriving in the U.S. from Southeast Asia. There are also reports of espionage activities among other refugee groups.

Miami police say that Cuba's intelligence agency—DCI—is active in the South Florida exile community of nearly 750,000 Latins. The FBI reportedly has discovered Soviet agents among Jewish émigrés leaving Russia. Several have been "doubled," or persuaded to work as counterspies.

Although American counterespionage agencies concentrate on the Communist-bloc threats, they also are concerned about the wide-ranging operations of intelligence agencies of friendly nations.

A Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee chaired by Senator George McGovern (D-S.D.) reports evidence of brutality and even political murder by agents of authoritarian regimes such as Chile, and Iran under the Shah.

One active espionage agency that McGovern's panel and other U.S. officials have been reluctant to discuss, at least publicly: Israel's Mossad. A former U.S. official recalls that Israel's spies once obtained secret American reports on Arab military strengths. During the 1970s, FBI agents received much of their information on possible Arab terrorists from Israel's officials based in New York. Some U.S. intelligence agencies suspect Mossad was behind the disappearance of bomb-grade uranium from an Apollo, Pa., nuclear facility during the 1960s. Israel denies any role in that incident, which remains unsolved.

American agents speak of Mossad with awe, and its network of contacts within the official circles of Washington is unsurpassed. Mused one counterintelligence expert: "They have no need for blackmail or bribery to get what they want. Over a cup of coffee or a steak dinner, God knows what is passed to them."

If caution has characterized Israel's operations here, officials who have seen the McGovern panel's report say it outlines a far different pattern of behavior on the part of other allies or neutralist powers such as Yugoslavia.

Dragista Kashikovich, a Serbian émigré editor known for his denunciations of the Tito regime in Belgrade, was shot to death in Chicago two years ago. Senate probers found that the CIA may have had indications he was a target of Yugoslavia's secret service, the UID. But no conclusive link could be uncovered, and the case remains unsolved.

The McGovern study claims that Savak, the Shah's secret police, once plotted the assassination of Nasser Afshar, an American of Iranian origin who infuriated the monarch with his vocal criticisms. Partly because the potential assassin got cold feet, the plot was aborted.

In 1976, former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier was killed in a Washington car bombing, leading to the indictment early this year of Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, a former head of Chile's DINA agency.

According to the McGovern study, the main goal of allies seems to be to control their own nationals living in this country. Often foreign agents simply monitor students or dissidents living in the U.S., taking photographs and keeping track of their movements. McGovern's report claims Taiwan enlisted four prominent Sino-American professors to observe Nationalist Chinese students. The study said that Iran's Savak also maintained an extensive network of informers on American campuses.

At times, the U.S. stumbles across Western European intelligence services. One case involved a NATO country that had planted illegal listening devices throughout a diplomat-

ic mission in New York. "It was too confidential to surface it," a former U.S. agent recalls. "It was operating for a certain duration; then it ended. We never let on."

Kid-Glove Treatment for "Friendly" Spies

What are counterintelligence agencies doing about spying activities in this country by friendly countries?

Critics allege that the FBI and CIA ignore allied spy services of friendly nations, because of concern about political or operational repercussions in their countries. In cases involving intelligence activities by nations such as Israel, they claim, the American government is loath to crack down for fear of jeopardizing cooperation arrangements. Israel is a valuable source of Mideast intelligence, while Iran allowed the U.S. to operate vital electronic-monitoring stations near the Soviet border until early this year. McGovern's subcommittee notes that on frequent occasions the Shah conveyed warnings that any crackdown on Savak operations could lead to reprisals against CIA activities in Iran.

In September, Assistant Atty. Gen. Philip B. Heymann rejected a Republican congressman's appeal for an investigation into whether Israel's Mossad used illegal electronic surveillance in the Andrew Young-Palestine Liberation Organization affair. He explained that there were "no specific facts" of Israeli wrongdoing to warrant such a probe.

American intelligence experts chafe under the accusation that certain foreign agents are allowed to run roughshod on U.S. territory. Raymond Wannall, former chief of FBI intelligence operations, who retired in 1976, claims transgressions of friendly nations are punished in a different way. "If there is a violation of law, we wouldn't ignore it. We made cases on some of our best friends. But in those cases the State Department would just ask them to leave. It's all handled very quietly, with no announcement made."

A different array of problems is undercutting FBI efforts to deal with the KGB and other hostile services. These efforts are especially handicapped by breaches of security that have become commonplace among Americans in sensitive government agencies.

Kampiles, the CIA watch officer who sold a stolen KH-11 satellite manual to the Russians, possessed a top-secret clearance at the time he smuggled the document from the agency's headquarters. Eugene Lee Madsen, a Pentagon security official with a high security clearance, was arrested last August after he walked out of the building with classified military documents tucked into his pants.

At the top of U.S. security worries, however, is the extraordinary prospect of Soviet penetration at the highest levels of Washington's own spy apparatus. "Moles" buried deep in the CIA and FBI have become a source of continuing fascinated speculation in Washington, despite disclaimers by authoritative intelligence figures.

One case study comes from William Sullivan, the late chief of FBI counterintelligence, in a book published posthumously. He claims that a major FBI effort against the KGB came apart because of a security leak that was never found. "At the time I left the FBI in 1971," Sullivan asserts, "the Russians still had a man in our New York office and none of us knew who he was."

Precise figures on money and manpower assigned by the FBI to combatting foreign spies are classified, but one former bureau official says that historically about 22 percent of all special agents are on the counterintelligence staff—or about 1,670 today. Frequently, it takes 10 men to shadow a single KGB officer, making it impossible to fully cover every potential agent. In 1977, Enger and Chernyayev—the two Soviet U.N. employees—were arrested after an investigation employing dozens of agents, aerial reconnaissance and closed-circuit television.

How Past Scandals Hamper Spy Chasers

More difficult to measure are the handicaps imposed on U.S. counterintelligence activities by the battering taken by the CIA and FBI in the past five years. A frequently mentioned example is the CIA's counterintelligence unit, which critics considered a lair of almost obsessive anti-Soviet zeal when it was headed by James Angleton. Angleton left in 1974, but even those who disagreed with his approach worry about what has happened to his antispy bureau.

"Counterintelligence is like good health care," says one retired CIA official, who is no friend of Angleton's. "There are lots of germs around."

"On the other hand, you can become a hypochondriac. But right now I'd have to say the place is in a shambles."

At the FBI, once a treasure trove of detailed and even trivial data on alleged subversives, extensive files no longer are maintained. An FBI official recently testified that under current policy the bureau could not read and collect material published by avowedly violent domestic groups with suspected foreign ties.

Since 1976, when Atty. Gen. Edward Levi issued executive guidelines for counterintelligence operations, most wiretaps on foreign nationals have involved judicial warrants. Such surveillance on U.S. citizens has been virtually nonexistent, authorities say.


While counterespionage officials disagree on the pros and cons of these new rules, they are nearly unanimous about the damaging effect of the Freedom of Information Act. They complain of a deep

reluctance by Western European intelligence services to cooperate with their American counterparts for fear the names of informants or sensitive espionage techniques might eventually be disclosed as a result of this law.

The threat posed by foreign operatives now is giving rise to concern about the effectiveness of this country's counter-spy organizations and the danger of weakening them further. Still, any drive to revitalize American counterintelligence faces formidable roadblocks. One of the chief problems—a lack of trained, experienced agents—cannot be solved overnight even with unlimited funds.

While no one is predicting a return to the days of unrestrained intelligence agencies, the tide has turned against further curbs. Years of preoccupation with abuses of civil rights by the FBI and CIA are giving way to a new concern with the threat posed by foreign spies in the U.S.—and the need to combat them with effective domestic agencies. □

The foregoing article was reported and written by Associate Editor Robert Dudley.



Congress is major target of KGB, which seeks to penetrate secret hearings on sensitive issues.

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ON PAGE A-7

THE WASHINGTON POST
4 December 1979

CIA May Have Tested Biological Warfare in New York in '50s, Church Says

The Central Intelligence Agency may have been involved in "open air" biological warfare tests in streets and tunnels in the New York City area in 1955 and 1956, according to an analysis of CIA records released yesterday by the Church of Scientology.

The four-month analysis suggests that the CIA purchased supplies for experiments that included the dissemination of unknown substances from aerosol devices mounted in suitcases and in the exhaust of a specially modified 1953 Mercury, according to the church's report.

The church's analysts said they examined about 600 pages of CIA financial records that were part of the agency's MK-ULTRA mind control experiments. The documents have been made public by the CIA during the last 2½ years.

The Scientologists' report is to be made public today. Copies of the report were sent to congressional Intelligence and Armed Services committees as well as to the CIA and the Army, a church spokesman said.

The Scientologists said analysts had pieced together scattered bits of information they found in the heavily censored CIA documents. They said they believe the biological warfare experiment was code-named "Operation Big City," and that details of the operation have either been destroyed by the CIA or are still shielded by a top-secret classification.

The CIA has never acknowledged any involvement with open air tests of biological agents. Much of the intelligence agency's biological testing during the 1950s was conducted for the agency by the Army.

Previously released documents and congressional hearings showed the Army's "Special Operations Division" at Fort Detrick, Md., carried out a series of tests between 1949 and 1968, apparently designed to gauge the vulnerability of American metropolitan areas to possible Soviet chemical and bacteriological warfare.

Early this year, a San Francisco

lawyer released Army documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act describing a 1950 test in which a bacteria cloud sprayed from a ship off the Golden Gate wafted inland to cover the entire bay area.

"We feel that the public has a right to know of every incident where U.S. citizens may have been the target of chemical and/or biological warfare testing," said Church of Scientology spokesman Brian Anderson.

From the 75 pages of receipts, church investigators concluded:

"Equipped with test animals, the CIA-Army team experimented with a variety of devices capable of disseminating a powder or gas into the air under covert conditions. Battery driven 'dusters' were installed in suit-

cases that had been soundproofed to muffle the noise. Similar devices were also constructed to sample the air to determine the effectiveness of the test. Personnel were protected with, at least, nasal filter pads.

"The primary test occurred Feb. 11-15, 1956, in the New York City area when a 1953 Mercury with tail pipes extending an extra 18 inches traveled only 80 miles but covered four turnpikes and tunnels. When the test car returned it was washed to handle 'contamination' and washed again a few days later."

A church spokesman said, "We would like to know, and are sure the people of New York would like to know, what the Army-CIA used in 'Operation Big City.'"

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ON PAGE G-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
2 December 1979

VIP

The-Mysterious Connections of John Ellsworth

By Maxine Cheshire

IT WAS AT a White House Christmas party in 1977 that First Lady Rosalynn Carter, standing beside the holly-decked mantle in the State Dining Room, was first introduced to a 300-pound, self-proclaimed Santa Claus named John Ellsworth.

Ellsworth—felon, forger and government informer on friends and foes alike—bears little resemblance to St. Nicholas.

But his con-man's eyes can be very merry and his expansive girth can shake like a bowlful of jelly when he tells you—as he first told Mrs. Carter—of his love for the little children of the world and this idea he had for circling the globe, dispensing the good things of life to deprived youngsters.

With that spiel, Ellsworth ensnared Mrs. Carter and later her son Chip into lending respectability to the International Children's Appeal, a questionable charity scheme that one participant has since described as "the scam of the century."

Who is John Ellsworth and how has he managed to cause so much trouble for so many people—including the Carters—and still ride around Manhattan in a chauffeured baby-blue, Lincoln limousine, seeming to have no troubles of his own?

Ellsworth, a high school drop-out, has told people he once drove a taxi. Using the name John James he toured

with the Rolling Stones and appeared on camera in the film "Gimme Shelter."

Ellsworth says he got close to "Candidate Carter" in 1976 by going down to Plains with a camera crew to make a documentary movie for a "black union" he represented at the time. Plans to show the film on television never worked out, he says.

He got close to Rosalynn Carter with a similar ploy, he says. He got permission from the White House to do a documentary movie on the annual Christmas party for diplomats' children.

It was at that party that he first told her about the ICA. He promised to use it to raise money for her favorite charity, the "Cities in Schools" program which operates out of the Executive Office Building. ICA raised \$7,500 for "Cities in Schools" through one Isaac Hayes concert at Constitution Hall and in total, Ellsworth says, contributed between \$60,000 and \$70,000 to the project.

In exchange, Ellsworth got prestige money can't buy. He had business cards printed for ICA with Chip Carter's name on them, even though the president's son wasn't working for ICA. He was working for "Cities in Schools."

Ellsworth and a girlfriend attended the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty signing at the White House in March, an honor that greatly impressed those of his partners looking to continue expanding their operations in the Middle East.

These days, no one at the White House will answer any questions about Ellsworth or ICA or even return phone calls if they are told he is the subject of inquiry.

John Ellsworth and a group of other "independent businessmen" had formed an organization called the International Children's Appeal in New York, according to an ICA brochure, to "provide the fund-raising mechanisms" for agencies all over the world which wanted to support the United Nations International Year of the Child.

What Ellsworth didn't tell Mrs. Carter was that the "independent businessmen" associated with him included a number of organized crime figures who had one plan to solicit "donations" from top labor leaders and keep a percentage for themselves,

and another plan for ICA to sell toys manufactured by a New York factory that a law enforcement source says is a front for loan-sharking and narcotics operations.

The "independent businessmen" also included: • One partner who was a friend of PLO leader Yasser Arafat and had plans for taking over all hashish growing and trafficking out of Lebanon.

• One partner who had a scheme to kidnap the shah of Iran and use the ransom money to arm certain Third World countries.

• One partner with alleged American CIA connections who actually dealt in arms, with a "catalog" that included a "laser gun that can cut a tree in half."

• Partners who were drilling for oil in Ghana, building a hotel in Cairo and claiming Anwar Sadat's son-in-law as a co-investor, negotiating contracts to split \$2-million fees 50-50 with Muhammad Ali for a series of personal appearances in various Middle Eastern countries.

• Partners who were planning to use Carter administration contacts to produce a \$10-million television series about a presidential assistant who drops out and becomes a hitch-hiker.

Millions, possibly even billions, could have been made on the International Children's Appeal. One former associate of Ellsworth's claims that one deal alone was expected to bring \$400 million and "four of us were going to each take out \$10 million apiece as our share."

Ellsworth admits to having personally "blown \$2.8 million" on high-living since he started ICA. And he helped one of his partners wire-transfer another \$1.2 million to banks in Beirut.

"But it was our own money, made on legitimate business deals," he says. "It wasn't taxpayers' money and it wasn't the public's money. So whose business is it?"

John Ellsworth—whose alias in police files around the country include John Jaymes, Clifford J. Ellsworth and Thomas Fiorella—did not drop down the White House chimney three Christmases ago.

So how did he get there?

John Ellsworth and his activities for the past 11 years are well known to at least a half dozen U.S. government agencies, including the Secret Service.

By Ellsworth's own account, at least one member of President Carter's personal bodyguard recognized Ellsworth on sight as someone who had once been "reimbursed" \$2,500 by the

Secret Service for "cooperating" in a counterfeiting investigation.

The agent expressed "surprise" at seeing Ellsworth socializing with the Carters, Ellsworth says, but did nothing more than caution him to "behave like a good citizen."

John Ellsworth does not like the word "informant." He prefers to describe himself as someone who has "cooperated" in the past with government investigators. He said he has "cooperated" at one time or another with the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Organized Crime Strike Force in the Eastern District of New York.

A DEA spokesman refuses to confirm or deny reports that Ellsworth has a DEA informant's file number. But the spokesman, Ted Swift, says there is "not a scintilla of truth" in a claim made by Ellsworth to a reporter recently that the ICA was actually a worldwide narcotics investigation "front" that had taken him and the government "five years to put together" and is still "ongoing."

The DEA did not alert the White House that Ellsworth might become an embarrassment to the Carters, Swift says, "because we didn't know anything about what he was doing."

But somebody in the government must have known and why they did not warn the White House remains a mystery.

The government has been making a lot of cases against Ellsworth's former friends and associates. Sixteen of them were indicted in New York in April on conspiracy charges involving marijuana, cocaine and hashish.

Another four have been arrested on extortion charges. One was "Joey the Priest" Calder of Brooklyn who is a business associate of known organized crime figures.

Ellsworth, who talked with a reporter for eight hours recently, confirmed that he had signed letters of agreement with "Joey the Priest" that would have given him and "his people" a cut from two different deals with ICA involving labor union donations and toys.

"Joey owns a part of this toy company," Ellsworth says. "I meet with him in a Chinese restaurant on 86th Street and he brings his lawyer and he says he can give us a monopoly on selling these stuffed toys to all the street festivals the church runs in New York. He was in the seminary, you know, that's how he got his name, and he brings me this real priest who guarantees the deal."

The charges against "Joey the Priest" last week involved topless bars and had nothing to do with Ellsworth or the ICA that Ellsworth admits knowing anything about.

Two other Brooklyn mobsters, James Eppolito and his son Jimmy, were shot to death in early October.

Some law enforcement sources have blamed the killings on the fact that the younger Eppolito's involvement with Ellsworth and ICA were attracting too much attention.

Young Eppolito, who had his picture taken here with Rosalynn Carter in April, at a luncheon for "Cities in Schools," was in charge of lining up "contributions" from labor leaders in the AFL-CIO and the teamsters and elsewhere, Ellsworth says.

Ellsworth claims to have had a telephone call after the killings, telling him not to get "too curious" and instructing him to "take care of" Jimmy Eppolito's widow financially.

Ellsworth laughs when told that many of his former employees at ICA are convinced that he himself is in no danger because it is widely believed in certain criminal circles that he "works for the CIA."

"Keep saying that," he says. It's true that he "once took a fall" for the agency, he claims, and they "owe" him. He won't tell the whole story, just dropping the facts that it involved a Russian spy ship that sailed into Galveston to pick up \$8-million worth of meat which Ellsworth was supposed to be selling to the Greek government and never did.

Ellsworth also claims to have tipped the CIA to the fact that their station chief was going to be assassinated in Athens six months before it happened.

He also claims to have assisted the Secret Service in preventing an assassination attempt against a former prime minister of Turkey at a New York hotel.

A lot of what Ellsworth says about himself is substantiated by reliable government sources and the rest can neither be proved nor disproved. When he came before a federal judge in Brooklyn in 1976 on a charge he later beat, "one or more government agencies" wrote letters in his behalf, saying that he had been of value to them in the past and would be again. The agencies are not identified in court records.

Three former employees of ICA claim Ellsworth bragged he caused Studio 54 its troubles with the federal government. Ellsworth had gotten into a fight with one of the disco's owners, Steve Rubell, when ICA took the place over for a Halloween fund-raiser in 1978.

Ellsworth just smiles and says things about "the wheel coming around" and "all of us getting what's coming to us."

But he still has connections.

Sitting in the Madison Avenue office of one of his lawyers two weeks ago, Ellsworth dialed from memory a lot of his contacts in government, the Secret Service and the Justice Department, talking to them while a reporter listened.

"Can you still dial into that government computer bank, John?" the lawyer asked, explaining to the reporter: "God! How I wish I had been in the collections business when he had that code and access. I mean to tell you this guy could find out anything about anybody from that computer."

Ellsworth explains that he no longer has direct computer access. "There were too many abuses," he says. "The wrong kind of people were using it."

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ON PAGE 2

BALTIMORE SUN
28 NOVEMBER 1979

Evidence doesn't confirm nuclear test in Atlantic

Washington (AP)—Carter administration officials say they are increasingly doubtful that there was a clandestine nuclear test in the South Atlantic September 22.

The officials, asking that they not be named, said it is unlikely that a special scientific panel convened by the administration will be able to conclusively explain what caused a flash detected by a reconnaissance satellite on that date. The flash was similar to that created by detonation of a nuclear device.

At the time the flash was publicly disclosed in late October, officials said it closely resembled a low-yield nuclear test.

But since then, despite a worldwide search, no corroborating evidence has been found to indicate a nuclear explosion occurred, they said.

The latest blow to the nuclear explosion theory was delivered late last week at the New Zealand Institute of Nuclear Sciences. Scientists there had previously announced the detection of radioactive fallout they believed might have come from a late September blast in the South Atlantic.

But on Friday, the institute said, "New measurements . . . do not confirm our earlier results." The institute said its final conclusion was that the fallout does not contain certain isotopes that would have been present in a September 22 blast sample.

"There is no evidence of fresh radioac-

tive fallout during the past three months," the institute said.

Officials said there had been "absolutely nothing" besides the initial reports from New Zealand to corroborate a nuclear test. No seismographic or radioactive evidence has turned up.

Nor have American intelligence agencies come up with any leads. "I find that very significant. If a country like South Africa had set off a test, dozens of people would know about it, or at least about a part of it. But there's been nothing," one official said.

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SPIES -- THE WORLD OVER

Approved For Release 2009/04/27 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 68NEWSWEEK
10 DECEMBER 1979**SOUTH AFRICA'S
YOUNG SPYMASTER**

Mendrik van den Bergh was the archetypal spymaster. The grim, steel-spectacled general founded South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS), and his unquestioned authority over security operations made him one of the most powerful men in the country. But van den Bergh, 64, was forced to resign because of his part in South Africa's information scandal, and it took Prime Minister Pieter Botha nearly a year to find a successor. The choice was surprising: a 31-year-old political-science professor

with no known experience in intelligence.

In one sense, Botha's choice of Lukas Barnard, an outsider untainted by last year's influence-buying scandal, is reminiscent of President Carter's appointment of an outsider to polish up the tarnished image of the CIA. The similarities between Barnard and Stanfield Turner end there. Unlike the moderate Turner, Barnard is a wrathful fundamentalist and passionate believer in the righteous use of force. His writing is peppered with biblical allusions to "the sword of God," and he strongly favors the use of *swaardmagsansie*—the sword-power sanction. Barnard believes South Africa should develop a nuclear weapon—and make it known to the world as a deterrent.

Like Botha, Barnard believes that South Africa should create "a self-sustaining community of states in southern Africa—with white and black governments—as a regional bastion of power against the Communists' path toward world domination." As director of the Department of National Security, the new name for BOSS, he will help plan an activist foreign policy—including possible military intervention in Zimbabwe Rhodesia if leftists seize power there.

Barnard grew up in the

hard, thornbush country of Southwest Africa, now known as Namibia. The son of an educational administrator, he studied at the University of the Orange Free State in Bloemfontein, where he still resides as dean of the faculty of political science. He encountered there the religious idea of a "Christian state" that still dominates his personal philosophy. "The government receives the sword from the hand of God to guarantee interstate stability and provide justice in a crooked and twisted generation," Barnard wrote in one of his essays.

HANDY SCAPEGOAT: Barnard is not all bullets and bombast. While he bluntly advocates a "mailed fist" approach to South Africa's problems with terrorism, he also

cautions politicians that the final solution cannot be a military one. "A well-motivated and progressive society is definitely the most effective counter to terrorism," he argues. But his Old Testament beliefs and his outspoken views on nuclear weapons make him the perfect executor of an increasingly aggressive foreign policy—as well as a handy scapegoat in the event that such a policy should backfire.

Barnard: Botha's sword



CHRYSS GALASSI with
PETER YOUNGHUSBAND
in Cape Town

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ON PAGE A-17

NEW YORK TIMES
3 DECEMBER 1979

Head of Blunt Spy Ring Named by London Paper

LONDON, Dec. 2 (UPI) — The spymaster who controlled one of the most effective Soviet espionage rings in Britain probably operated in the United States too, The Observer said today.

The Sunday newspaper identified the spymaster as Ernst Henry, a German Communist now living and working in Moscow as an author. It said he ran a British spy ring that betrayed top secrets to the Soviet Union and was believed to have followed one of his British agents to Washington.

The article followed a series the newspaper published last month on Soviet espionage. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher subsequently disclosed that Sir Anthony Blunt, who served for years as art adviser to Buckingham Palace, had been a Soviet spy. He was deprived of his knighthood after Mrs. Thatcher's report to Parliament.

Mr. Blunt was one of many spies recruited from high-level circles in Britain before World War II who infiltrated the British Foreign Office and the secret service. After his unmasking last month, Mr. Blunt said he never knew the name of his spymaster, but The Observer said its research disclosed that Mr. Henry was the man to whom Blunt betrayed secrets.

"The man is a former member of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party who came to Britain in the mid-1930's," The Observer said. "Now aged 72 or 73, he lives in Moscow under the name of Semyon Nikolayevich Rostovsky, but is better known as Ernst Henry, the author of occasional articles in Izvestia and the Literary Gazette."

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ON PAGE A-27

THE WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1979

R. Emmett Tyrrell Jr.

So Civil, for a Spy

Why did he not shoot himself? Of course, he is an eminent art historian, and so there are aesthetic considerations. Colors might clash, and then once the trigger is pulled one has absolutely no control over the patterns those colors might leave on carpet and wall. Still, modern science has provided us with an amplitude of civilized instruments for one's happy dispatch. There are pills and potions, and there remains the old heave-ho into the Thames, pockets filled with lead, "Das Kapital" strapped to the waist.

Apparently England's Mr. Anthony Blunt will take no such course of action. Blunt, knighted in 1956 and stripped of his knighthood last month, was on Nov. 15 exposed as the "fourth man" in the Burgess-Maclean-Philby spy ring. He had been a renowned member of the English establishment, the queen's own art curator, a Cambridge graduate who for 40 years enjoyed all the benefits and confidence of English society. Now he admits to having made "an appalling mistake," to wit: he became a Soviet spy. In the '30s he was a Soviet "talent scout" at Cambridge. During the war, he sedulously carried classified documents from his lofty position in Britain's counterintelligence agency, MI5, to the progressives over at the Soviet Embassy. And in 1951 he was back in contact with the Soviets, apparently assisting his friend Guy Burgess in absconding to Mother Russia. Now, does he feel any shame? After dishonoring friends in the highest realms of English life and betraying his country to one of the most barbarous regimes of the century, is he remorseful? Not at all.

On Nov. 20 he held a "news conference" in the comfortable surroundings of the board room of the London Times. There, with four carefully selected journalists and before reparing to a lovely lunch of smoked trout, veal, cheese, fruit salad and wine, Blunt deigned to answer questions. He also brought a carefully worded apology. It

was a very civilized affair. Through it all no trace of shame was detectable—not even remorse. Rather, this honorary fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, explained his years of treason augustly and sanctimoniously, somewhat as though he were explaining a life devoted to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals or to the promotion of vegetarianism and all the arcane uplift that goes with it.

"In the mid-1930s it seemed to me and to many of my contemporaries that the Communist Party and Russia constituted the only firm bulwark against fascism," asserts Blunt, a man whose life and work had revealed so little interest in politics that his closest friends doubted he had any politics whatever. How did he come to such a carefully calculated political position? And his perception of the Soviets as the staunch bulwark against fascism—was it wobbled by the Hitler-Stalin pact, the purge trials or Orwell's reports on the Spanish Civil War? Apparently not; he served his Soviet friends loyally throughout the war.

"This was a case of political conscience against loyalty to country. I chose conscience. . . . I could not denounce my friends," declares the high-minded Blunt. But, of course, in betraying his country he betrayed any friend living there who felt loyalty to its government and to its ideals. Who were his friends? One was Burgess, his fellow traitor. Blunt describes him as "one of the most remarkable, most brilliant and, making a distinction, one of the most intelligent people I have ever known." London's Spectator puts it differently: "Burgess was a drunken rake, a homosexual with a voracious appetite for the gutter."

Some will find Blunt's words very reassuring. No one was killed during the war as a result of his services to the Soviets, he has said. Well, Blunt has been described as one of England's greatest scholars; he ought to know. When it comes to indiscretions of the sort committed by Blunt on behalf of progress and enlightenment, there is an entire subculture of civilized people on both sides of the Atlan-

tic willing to let bygones be bygones.

The self-righteousness of Blunt's apologia, his imperturbable hauteur—those who know and love the Hiss saga are familiar with the phenomenon. Nor should we be surprised that various of his sleek and well-born friends are tearfully extending their condolences. Soon he will be back in their elegant dining rooms. There will, lamentably, be difficult moments. Does one mention Mrs. Thatcher? Is Solzhenitsyn a sore subject? Should one put in a good word for socialist realism?

Yet there is something troubling about this case. Here is a man who devoted his whole life to the singularly elevated subject of beauty. Nevertheless, he betrayed his country and his culture, as Malcolm Muggeridge observes, "to help advance the power and influence of the most ruthless, Philistine and materialistic autocracy the world has ever known." It is as though a lover of antique furniture fell in love with a termite. What is there in Blunt's life that will explain his "appalling mistake"?

The writer is editor-in-chief of The American Spectator.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E-1

WASHINGTON STAR
2 DECEMBER 1979

Five hands in the game of betrayal

By R.T. Crowley

Mr. Crowley recently retired as a senior official of the CIA.

"... after the third man, the fourth man, after the fourth man, the fifth man, always beside you ..."

Cyril Connolly, 1951

The events leading to the 1951 flight to the Soviet Union by the British Foreign Office officials, Burgess and MacLean, make an unlikely tale. Its improbability makes it unsuitable as fiction and almost unacceptable as fact.

The public's awareness of a still deeper complexity began four years and four months later, on October 25, 1955, when Lt. Col. Marcus Lipton rose in Commons and put a startling question to Anthony Eden: "... Has the prime minister made up his mind to cover up, at all costs, the dubious 'third man' activities of Mr. Harold Philby? ..."

Philby, an ascending star in MI6, had been the linkman between the British Service, the FBI and the embryonic CIA during his assignment to Washington (1949-1951).

Lipton had to wait until November 7 for Harold Macmillan, then foreign secretary, to reply for the government: "... I have no reason to conclude that Mr. Philby has, at any time, betrayed the interests of this country ..."

Philby, meanwhile, called a press conference at his mother's London flat and in a most disingenuous way suggested that Lipton probably would not chance the consequences of repeating the accusation without the protection of Parliamentary immunity. He went on to confess that the last time he had spoken to a Communist, "... knowing he was a Communist ...," was in 1934.

Philby was seen as a good-tempered martyr whose reputation had been maliciously impaired. He succeeded in conveying the notion that his sense of duty and obligation under the Official Secrets Act denied him the freedom to act in his own defense.

Eight years later, on January 23, 1963, Philby vanished from Beirut where, a month earlier, he had admitted (to Nicholas Eliot of MI6) his role as a Soviet agent.

On July 1, 1963, Edward Heath told Commons: "... [we now know] as a result of an admission by Mr. Philby himself that he worked for the Soviet authorities before 1946 and that in 1951 he, in fact, warned MacLean through Burgess that the security services were about to take action against him ..."

A somewhat older Marcus Lipton asked: "... does the statement mean that Mr. Philby was, in fact, the 'third man' ...?"

Mr. Heath replied "Yes, sir."

In the 12 years between the Burgess (first man) - MacLean (second man) escape and Philby's final retreat to Moscow, it was generally assumed that the "third man" had warned the two other spies that they or at least MacLean had come under suspicion of MI5. Although Philby's warning to Burgess was timely and urgent, he could not have known from his remote post in Washington exactly when the security service would move.

On Friday, May 25, 1951, (MacLean's 38th birthday), Herbert Morrison, then foreign secretary, finally gave authorization to MI5 to interrogate MacLean at 11 a.m. on the following Monday. The interrogation was to be conducted by William James Skardon, who had gained public recognition as "the man who broke Klaus Fuchs."

By mid-day on the 25th, Burgess learned from someone that time was running out. That evening he met with MacLean and had a light meal at Beacon Shaw, Tatsfield, MacLean's home, where he was introduced to Mrs. MacLean as "Roger Styles," a Foreign Office colleague. That night the two men boarded the channel ship Falaise at Southampton and began the first evasion on their passage to Moscow.

Named by Israelis

The "someone" who had provided the spies with such an immediate report of the precise terms of Morrison's decision had gained the confidence at a very high level in the Foreign Office or the security service. To the MI5 officers who bore the private outrage and public scorn, it was evident that there was still another numbered man.

In the 1977 book *The Armies of Ignorance*, author W.R. Corson, in describing intelligence successes based on U.S.-Israeli cooperation, wrote:

"... Those in OSO, most notably James Angleton, were pleased to have the Israeli relationship to themselves. And over time, not only during the Truman years, the relationship produced some remarkable results and intelligence coups. One in particular is worth mentioning briefly. It involves the identification and subsequent manipulation of three British intelligence officials who were Soviet spies. Donald MacLean ... Guy Burgess ... and Harold Adrian Russell Philby ... As a result of the American-Israeli secret intelligence connection, each of these three spies was identified, MacLean's identification leading to Burgess, thence to Philby's ... The subsequent manipulation, which included providing them with intelligence information to mislead the Soviets, makes the overall operation a classic case ..."

"Identification" could have occurred as the result of any number of chance circumstances. "Manipulation," in this context, conveys the unambiguous use of an agent — perhaps still another numbered man.

In this case it is "Basil" who, as the fifth man, played a critical role in 1948-49. "Basil" was uniquely qualified to influence and report on the activities of Donald MacLean. They shared a commonality of interests, friends and advantages. More importantly, they were active Soviet agents committed to strengthening the USSR by weakening the United States. The main area of collaboration was in reporting to the Soviets the day-to-day progress of the US-UK Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. MacLean as a non-scientist looked to "Basil," a distinguished physicist, for technical advice.

Soviets Slip Up

At the end of World War II, both the U.S. and British security elements became aware of the loss of important, highly classified information from the British Embassy in Washington. Intensive investigations were underway when the Soviet consulate in New York provided a clue in the form of poor radio communications security. The

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lapse led to the decrypting of messages to Moscow which named "Homer" as the British Embassy spy.

Surveillance of "Basil" disclosed his association with MacLean in nocturnal homosexual adventures. "Basil" was then approached separately and persuaded to accept recruitment by the U.S. rather than exposure and arrest as a Soviet agent. "Basil" acquiesced, identified MacLean as "Homer" and for some time following, acted as a link between MacLean and the Soviets in New York and Washington.

Two years following the public appearance of Burgess and MacLean in Moscow, the "someone" who had warned Burgess of the Morrison decision to allow MI5 to interrogate MacLean voluntarily approached the British security authorities and confessed his role. In exchange for a full disclosure of his work on behalf of the Soviets, he was not subjected to prosecution. He, too, had worked in the wartime MI5 and, by reason of his "old boy" status and social prominence, retained close and continuing contact with seniors in the Foreign Office and the security service. He is "Maurice," the fourth man.

In *The Fourth Man* — the new book which caused the public unmasking of art expert Anthony Blunt as Maurice last month — author Anthony Boyle succeeds in presenting an engaging version of this bizarre story based on some new evidence. In the introduction, he acknowledges the contributions by the FBI and CIA in releasing documents under the Freedom of Information Act. Boyle also acknowledges the "personal guidance of former members of the American intelligence community which led [him] to the independent discovery of Basil and Maurice." Although these unnamed Britons spied for the Soviet Union, both confessed: "Basil when cornered in Washington and Maurice many years later in London." Both men were pardoned and received the assurance of governmental protection. To name them now, according to Boyle, would give rise to gray-mail proceedings based on extra-legal considerations involving U.S. and UK national security.

Litvinov's Insight

Boyle attributes the idea of attempting to subvert middle- and upper-class intellectuals to Maxim Litvinov, one-time Soviet envoy to London, who, among Russians, had an unusual understanding of English class structure and the peculiar role of mutual trust which bound the establishment.

Alexander Orlov, the dean of pre-World War II intelligence defectors, saw the plan develop differently:

"... Chiefs of the NKVD hit upon an idea which solved this most difficult problem [i.e., the penetration of and promotion within the British establishment] as if by magic. One of the chiefs approached the problem not only as an intelligence man but as a sociologist as well. . . .

"Accordingly, in the early 1930s, the NKVD residenturas concentrated their energy on the recruitment of young men of influential families. The political climate of that period was very favorable for such an undertaking, and the . . . idea of joining a 'secret society' held a strong appeal for the young people who dreamed of a better world and of heroic deeds. . . .

"What they wanted was a purpose in life, and it seemed to them that they had found it. By their mental makeup and outlook they reminded one very much of the young Russian Decembrists of the past century. They brought into the Soviet intelli-

gence the true fervor of new converts and the idealism which their intelligence chiefs had lost long ago. . . ."

Burgess went to Eton, MacLean to Gresham's and Philby to Westminster school, each in turn considered a natural forcing house for sons of the ruling class. At Cambridge, new boys allied themselves with one of the prevailing three major sects: The Dandy/Aesthetes, the Rogue/Rebels or the Hearties. Burgess, MacLean and Philby — a homosexual, a bisexual and a heterosexual afflicted with satyriasis — seem an odd troika for recruitment by the Soviets.

Disgusted With Russia

While still at university each openly professed the conviction that communism was the only recipe for a stable and just world. Later, each aligned himself with the right wing and gave voice in support of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco. Each visited the Soviet Union and all three came away with what seems a sincere, though mild, disgust with the Russian people, preferring to defer final judgment until the "building of socialism in one country" had progressed beyond the chaos they witnessed.

Throughout the Spanish civil war, the three maintained right-wing postures — Burgess with the BBC, Philby as a London Times correspondent with the Franco forces and MacLean as a rising Foreign Office diplomat. With the beginning of the Second War, Burgess joined the Special Operations Executive and found a berth there for Philby. Later, Philby moved to MI6 where he was counter-intelligence chief for the Iberian section.

Defector Betrayed

In September 1945, Konstantine Volkov approached a British official in Istanbul and asked for political asylum in Britain for himself and his wife. He identified himself as an NKVD officer and claimed to know the true names of three Soviet agents operating within the British government, two in the Foreign Office and one as head of a counter-intelligence organization in London. A report of the meeting was promptly sent to Maj. Gen. Stewart Menzies, chief of MI6, by pouch since Volkov had also reported that the Soviets were intercepting and successfully decrypting British cypher traffic. Menzies proposed the dispatch of David Roberts of MI6 to Istanbul to handle negotiations with Volkov. Roberts claimed an unconquerable aversion to flying and Menzies then turned to Philby, asking that he depart London for Istanbul by air.

Philby, on reading the Volkov file before leaving London, called for an urgent clandestine meeting with his Soviet controller in London and reported Volkov's "treachery." By the time Philby arrived in Turkey, Volkov had been seized, brutally beaten and transported to the Soviet Union by a special military aircraft on an unscheduled flight. Philby in his KGB-sanctioned version of the event concedes that Volkov's information would have destroyed him had not the Soviets intervened.

Lurid Behavior

Burgess' outrageous behavior, his drunkenness and total disregard of personal hygiene formed the basis for the Evelyn Waugh character "Basil Seal" about whom Waugh wrote: "... He seldom descended to the artifice of the toilet. . . ." Burgess was flattered by Waugh's attentions and took several autographed first editions with him to Moscow.

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MacLean's uncontrollable rages and suicidal drinking bouts continued to be indulged by an implausibly forgiving Foreign Office. In 1963, when they were joined in Moscow by Philby, the melancholy trio pretended fulfillment and gave a brave face to the West.

Philby's former wife Aileen, deserted in England, soon died. When Eleanor, his third wife, found Moscow uncongenial, Philby turned his attentions to Melinda MacLean.

Burgess, unable to form easy homosexual relationships in the workers' paradise, was morose until the visiting Tom Driberg led him to an underground public convenience in Moscow where he met "questing male slavs . . .", including Slava, the electrician who later became his roommate. Burgess died, pseudonymously, on an iron bed in the Moscow Botkin Hospital as Jim Andreyevich Eliot. His brother Nigel, the MacLeans, Philby and a mournful Slava attended the memorial service.

Burgess had bequeathed to Philby his books and clothes when he died. Among the books were the signed first editions of Waugh; among the clothes, a few Eton-made suits. MacLean's eventual loss of his wife to Philby and the Burgess bequest were seen by the social historian Martin Green as "cessions of property which, perhaps, indicate the usual style of transactions between Philby and his more flamboyant cohorts — each, in different ways, made submission to him. . ."

Few Triumphs Left

Burgess is dead. MacLean is seldom seen. Philby's last reported operational success was the theft of MacLean's wife.

Kim Philby is best remembered for his betrayals of British agents, Albanians, school chums, various wives and other women, the British Establishment, Volkov and the many service colleagues who have their trust.

Today he is redundant to the needs of modern Soviet intelligence, having little left to contribute and no other place to go. He lives in surroundings in which his urbanity and disarming stammer count for little. As a matter of course he lives iso-

lated among people for whom he has always had scant regard and less respect. His Russian superiors know him for what he is, an aging, congenital deceiver, recruited more than 40 years ago for purposes which have been obscured by the passage of time.

Among those victims of his treachery who are still alive there is a small, vindictive wish that he will live a very long life.

Unresolved Question

The Fourth Man seems to have had the advantage of interpretive insights as provided by the parable speakers among the senior retired service officers who had direct knowledge of the events gained while in positions of responsibility. Still unclear is the proposition that the U.S. permitted Philby's continued participation in a joint US-UK operation in Albania at a time when his Soviet connections were suspicious if not confirmed.

Sir Dick White, one-time chief of MIS and later chief of MI6, was given the Augean task of restoring the service. His political masters viewed the case as a manufactory of further embarrassment and adverse political reaction. The temporizing of Eden and others, who would not confront the problem, inhibited the investigation and contributed to the massive damage.

Maurice lives comfortably in England, Basil near Washington. Both have enjoyed distinguished public careers which have brought them high honors. It is conceivable that their secret careers, though less well known, might have had greater import on the world. Perhaps one day they will record the details of their work as ideologically driven Soviet agents and document this nearly extinct species.

— Following publication of Boyle's *The Fourth Man*, (UK title: *The Climate of Treason*), Blunt was identified by Prime Minister Thatcher as Maurice. The British press has named Wilfred Mann as Basil.

CHICAGO DAILY CALUMET

17 November 1979

Spy Conviction Upheld, But Attorney Hopeful

By Mark Kiesling

(Staff Writer)

The decision to uphold the conviction of accused spy William Kampiles by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Thursday has not halted action on the part of Kampiles' attorney to vindicate his client.

Although all nine points of the appeal were rejected by the three-judge panel, attorney Michael Monico indicated yesterday that he will file a petition for an appeal review before the entire 7th Circuit, but will also file a motion in federal court in Hammond for a new trial.

Kampiles, convicted one year ago today in Hammond before U.S. Judge Phil McNagney, remains locked up at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Chicago, where he has been since his arrest Aug. 17, 1978.

"We may state all nine points again," Monico stated. "We're going to raise the same issues before the whole (appeal) panel."

The nine points dealt with the sufficiency of government evidence, the adequacy of the court's handling of pre-trial publicity, the district court's treatment of the Kampiles' confession, Monico's allegation that Kampiles was coerced into confessing by FBI agents and the court's refusal to grant the defense an hour's continuance to call a witness in from Chicago.

The 29-page opinion of the appeals court went into all nine points raised by Monico, but the attorney indicated yesterday he has another plan of attack for a retrial motion.

According to Monico, he plans to introduce evidence linking two men con-

victed of espionage in California in early 1977 to the leaking of the same information Kampiles was convicted of selling in February and March of 1978.

Monico cited the April 29, 1979 edition of The New York Times as providing sketchy information about convicted spies Andrew Lee and Christopher Boyce which alleged, Monico said, "a year before Kampiles sold the documents, the Soviets had information about our photo satellite system."

"Exactly what they (Lee and Boyce) had, I don't know," Monico admitted, "but the article said that among the hundreds of documents sold by Boyce and Lee were plans for the KH-11."

It is the technical manual for the KH-11 orbiting surveillance satellite that Kampiles was convicted of selling on a vacation to Greece. He received \$3,000 from Soviet agent Michael Zavali for the booklet, and the information compromised the U.S. space technology and jeopardized the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II talks, according to the CIA.

As a former CIA employee, Kampiles had access to the KH-11 manual every day in his job, and was convicted of taking the document before leaving the agency in November, 1977. He had only worked for the agency for eight months, and was allegedly having some problems with his job.

However, Monico is also disputing the CIA contention that the sale of the document actually compromised any U.S. security or put the SALT negotiations in jeopardy. "We have

statements from Department of Defense people who were at the SALT II talks that seem to contradict the statements of the CIA on the effects of the alleged compromise," Monico said.

Monico added the motion will be filed for the new trial before McNagney as well as the appeal review petition in the 7th Circuit within the month.

Kampiles, 24, graduated from Chicago's Washington High School, 114th and Avenue O, in 1972 and from Indiana University in 1975. He moved to an apartment at 7645 Hohman Ave., Munster, in mid-1978. He was arrested at the apartment six weeks after moving in with Perry Felecos, a Munster police officer and lifelong friend.

Kampiles' mother, Nicoletta, still lives in Hegewisch at 13558 Burley Ave.

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SALT II

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THE WASHINGTON POST
4 December 1979

White House Asking Arms Firms to Lobby for SALT II

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House is asking defense contractors to give President Carter an assist in persuading the Senate to approve the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II).

Several executives of firms that produce weapons for the government told the Washington Post they had been called over the last few weeks by White House staff members.

Anne Wexler, head of the White House public liaison office, confirmed that defense contractors are among the businesses her staff had called on behalf of SALT II.

She termed the calls "very routine." She answered "absolutely not" when asked if there was any White House implication that future defense contracts would be linked to SALT II support.

Wexler said the calls being made to defense contractors and other businesses are in the "survey" stage to be followed later by White House briefings on the arms treaty.

Most executives contacted about SALT II, Wexler said, told the White House staffer who called them that they would have to check with their top management before giving the firm's stand on the treaty.

One aerospace executive said he

was called by Judy Mercado, a White House fellow working for Wexler, and asked if his firm, which is one of the nation's top defense contractors, would get behind the treaty.

"They want us to contact our congressional delegation," he said. "I told them I would have to check with my top management and report back. They do this kind of thing all the time. I considered it routine."

Mercado said she called defense contractors, as well as others, on behalf of SALT II. She replied, "I would rather not comment" when asked what she had requested defense contractors to do.

"Of course the intent is to help us with SALT," Wexler said of the phone conversations with defense contractors. Mercado was "doing nothing improper" in making those calls.

Some defense executives told The Post that the calls seemed to be White House pressure to support the treaty.

"They really shouldn't feel that way," Wexler replied when told about this interpretation. Some business executives will be for the treaty, some will be against it, she said.

She put the Carter administration's SALT II lobbying in the same category as the earlier effort to make the case to the business community for the Panama Canal treaties.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-4WILMINGTON NEWS JOURNAL
2 December 1979

Kissinger accused of 'doctoring' SALT data

By JOE TRENTO

WASHINGTON — The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty now awaiting Senate action is based on doctored intelligence provided as long as 10 years ago by Henry Kissinger, according to high-level officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State.

The first SALT treaty, signed by President Nixon and ratified by the Senate in 1972, was approved after Kissinger ordered the suppression of CIA intelligence showing the Russians were ahead of the United States in strategic nuclear weapons, according to officials close to the negotiations.

The technical assumptions made for the first SALT agreement are the basis for SALT II, now before the U.S. Senate. That technical information was distorted and suppressed by Kissinger, then President Nixon's national security adviser, officials said.

One of the CIA officials involved in evaluating satellite information about Soviet missile capability was John A. Paisley, who disappeared a year ago on the Chesapeake Bay. Former and present CIA associates of Paisley say he became so disgusted with the suppression of the information that he quit the agency, only to return in a role where he helped investigate counterintelligence chief James J. Angleton's suspicions about Kissinger's loyalty.

The SALT II treaty was largely drafted by William Hyland, a Kissinger aide at SALT I. Hyland left the Carter Administration last winter to become Kissinger's occasional spokesman and aide. He declined comment on the charges, saying only, "We have nothing to say to you about this." Kissinger himself did not return phone calls.

Evidence that Kissinger ordered the information suppressed, and replaced with doctored information, comes from top-ranking government officials who served in the CIA, State and Defense departments between 1969 and 1972 when these events took place.

According to present and former CIA officials, a secret bureaucratic civil war began in the spy agency in 1969 when Kissinger asked the CIA's Office of Strategic Research to withhold data from certain military leaders, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Kissinger feared that such information would damage his efforts to achieve détente with the Soviets and to negotiate successfully an arms limitation treaty.

Among the officials confirming Kissinger's actions was Dr. Raymond S. Cline, who was in charge of strategic nuclear information for both the State Department and the CIA during 3½ years that spanned the negotiations.

Kissinger lied about numbers and accuracy of Soviet warheads to "mute opposition to SALT I and get the treaty he wanted," Cline said.

"Kissinger feared the estimate the CIA had given him would have given enemies of the treaty enough ammunition to see that it never passed the Senate," Cline explained.

"Kissinger pulled numbers out of his hat," Cline charged, and he did it to "get the treaty through because he didn't have confidence that the facts were on his side."

Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., D-Del., said that "at a minimum there was confusion created by some of the assertions Kissinger made at SALT I and after SALT I that related to what the Soviets did have and what they didn't have and what they would do. Some people say that we just got outbargained, others said that Kissinger may have flatly misled us."

"There is no question that something went wrong," said Biden, who is a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate committee charged with passing on the strategic verification of SALT II.

Biden, a treaty proponent, said national security prevented him from commenting directly on areas that Kissinger "may have misled the nation on."

Cline charged that Kissinger went to Moscow in 1972 to negotiate the final treaty terms with the Russians but left in Helsinki various CIA strategic weapons experts who could have advised Kissinger on whether the Soviets were telling the truth about their capabilities. Angleton says that Kissinger's solo negotiations "put our security in jeopardy."

"To this day the CIA does not know exactly what was agreed to in the Soviet Union, nor what we gave away to get the agreement," said Cline, who has become a strong critic of Kissinger during the SALT II debate.

According to Senate Intelligence Committee sources and Cline, Kissinger tried to "play it both ways with intelligence." Cline said that before the SALT talks Kissinger needed a "stick to get the Russians to the table so he decided to try and scare the President and Congress into believing that the Soviets had caught up with us in MIRVs in order to get more ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) funding to intimidate the Soviets. MIRVs are multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, missiles with several warheads, which can be directed to different targets."

According to Cline, in 1969 Kissinger tried to block CIA intelligence showing the Soviets were unable to outfit their ICBMs with multiple warheads that could be directed to different targets from one rocket.

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Kissinger insisted that Edward W. Proctor, then head of the CIA's Office of Strategic Research, have his staff rewrite data and interpret intelligence to show that the Soviets were far ahead the United States in this technology, according to Cline and CIA sources.

"He did this because he wanted heavy new U.S. expenditures that CIA intelligence showed was unnecessary to stay ahead of the Russians. Our intelligence showed the Soviets had MIRVs in a sense, but that they could only lob several bombs from the same missile in almost a random fashion," Cline said. The former CIA and State

Department official said American technology since 1968 had been on such a level that "we could target individual warheads up to within half a mile of the nuclear target."

According to Cline, "Kissinger as usual got his way and won the MIRV fight and got the president to ask for extra defense funds." The Soviets agreed to start arms limitation talks because they saw an increased strategic threat from the United States, sources said, but in the fall of 1969 Kissinger had a more serious problem.

CIA spy satellites had spotted a new generation of Soviet rockets being tested that had the lifting capacity that would allow them to use powerful enough nuclear devices to destroy American Minuteman silos in a single pre-emptive "first strike." A first strike is an attack that is designed to prevent an enemy from responding in an atomic war by destroying all the enemy's ICBMs before they can be launched.

Information that the Soviets had a new generation of heavy missiles came from telemetry picked up over the Pacific during Soviet rocket tests in the summer of 1969. The information was sent directly from the National Security Agency to Paisley, Proctor's chief deputy.

Paisley urged Proctor to notify the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

White House immediately of the alarming findings. For the first time the heavy Soviet rockets were accurate enough to chance a first strike on the U.S. nuclear missile fleet.

According to a Paisley deputy who sat in on a meeting between the two men, Paisley argued that "our light Polaris and Minuteman missiles carried warheads less than one-eighth the size of the Soviet ICBMs. Our warheads could never be successful at a similar first strike attack with any hope of success."

Proctor, according to the source, told Paisley that he would make a decision in a few days and get back to him. According to Paisley's wife, Maryann, her husband thought Proctor was putting him off. "John didn't abide by fooling around with this kind of intelligence for any reason. He thought it was unlike Ed to hold it back. Ed explained to John that the information could get in the hands of the hawks and cause problems."

CIA associates of Paisley who asked not to be identified say Paisley's battle with Proctor caused Paisley to lead a mini-rebellion against Kissinger and several top CIA officials after he learned, through friends at the Defense Department, that Proctor had distorted intelligence reports put together by Paisley and his staff.

Mrs. Paisley said that "John confronted his mentor and boss," Proctor, over the issue. She said Proctor refused Paisley's request to feed the correct intelligence through normal military and other intelligence experts because "it could give hawks ammunition."

Mrs. Paisley said her husband broke with Proctor in late 1969. Paisley's colleagues at the CIA say he began to leak the secret information to the Pentagon and National Security Agency as well as some powerful members of Congress.

Proctor was unavailable for comment. The CIA, through spokesman Dale Peterson, refused any comment.

According to Mrs. Paisley, her husband quit the CIA and accepted a job at the Department of Defense. She said Paisley remained there only a few weeks before returning to the CIA.

Within one month, his associates say, Angleton recruited Paisley into counterintelligence under the cover of his old analyst's role. This time, however, Paisley was convinced he

had to protect the work of the agency from Kissinger and others in the Nixon administration. He agreed to come back to help "plug leaks," as one former colleague of Paisley described his job.

With Angleton's help, Paisley was assigned to the SALT I negotiations in Vienna and later Helsinki during 1971 and 1972 as a Russian-speaking "technical expert."

In reality, Paisley was attempting to discover if there was any validity to charges that Kissinger was a Soviet agent, an investigation to which Angleton put his entire European counterespionage efforts in 1971.

One retired counterintelligence employee, Claire E. Petty, said that in 1970, "Angleton ordered me to investigate Kissinger for possible ties to the Soviet KGB. Jim thought he might be a Russian agent. We could never find hard evidence one way or the other so it was dropped."

In an interview, Angleton said, "Kissinger, against all our advice, would repeatedly meet with Soviet officials alone. He would refuse to be briefed before or after these meetings. I thought this put our security in jeopardy. He could have either deliberately or inadvertently leaked something important."

Angleton himself will not comment directly on agency operations he was involved in, nor will he confirm for the record any role regarding Paisley. He does admit meeting with Mrs. Paisley last summer to discuss her husband's relationship with Angleton.

Paisley's split with Proctor united a group of CIA analysts against Proctor. According to one of these CIA officers: "We began calling him Ed Proctor the data doctor. He was Kissinger's man and he got rewarded for it." In 1970 Proctor was elevated to job of deputy director for intelligence at the CIA.

Cline says, to this day "Kissinger has not explained what happened at SALT and I don't think you find out what went on in his memoirs either."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E-2

NEW YORK TIMES
2 DECEMBER 1979

What Price SALT? Quite Considerable

Among the reasons Henry A. Kissinger is not very popular at the State Department and the White House these days is his lukewarm, at best, support for SALT II, even though he drafted two-thirds of the arms limitation treaty while he was Secretary of State. Mr. Kissinger, the charge goes, is playing politics to win the hearts and minds of Republican Presidential candidates.

Nevertheless, last week Defense Secretary Harold Brown negotiated personally with Mr. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat who is the Senate's reigning expert on military affairs, over higher levels of defense spending. Such is the Administration's need to win wavering skeptics on SALT, that when Mr. Nunn told Mr. Brown that Mr. Kissinger would be present for their private talk, the Defense Secretary did not object.

More to the point, the Administration approved a rise of nearly 5 percent (President Carter had earlier announced 3) for the fiscal year beginning Oct. 1, 1980. That would mean a Pentagon appropriations request near \$160 billion; the current (1980) year's request was \$138.6 billion.

Even more spending may not push SALT through the Senate. A draft report by the Armed Services Committee, disclosed last week, recommended "major changes" in the treaty text, including eliminating Moscow's "heavy" intercontinental missiles and limiting its Backfire bomber (not covered by the treaty). Examination of those supporting the report raises to seven the antitreaty Democrats now in the open. That means at least 15 Republicans are needed for ratification, a prospect that, at the moment, is doubtful.

Barbara Slavin
and Milt Freudenheim

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-15

THE WASHINGTON POST
2 December 1979

Senate SALT Debate Not Seen Likely To Begin This Year

By Robert G. Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writer

Because of the Iranian crisis and an overcrowded congressional calendar, the Senate debate on the SALT II treaty is unlikely to begin this year, Senate sources predicted last week.

Pro- and anti-SALT maneuvering continues intensely in the Senate, but both sides now expect the floor debate to begin in earnest no sooner than January. It may be difficult to get a final vote on the treaty before the New Hampshire primary on Feb. 26, some Senate sources say.

Friends and foes of the treaty agree that continued slippage in the SALT timetable is likely to help the treaty's opponents more than the Carter administration.

The Senate majority leader, Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), has expressed dismay at the prospect that SALT will be on the floor during the presidential primaries, but that now appears to be inevitable.

Byrd told reporters yesterday that in view of Senate delays on the windfall profits tax bill and of the need for a week or so for the Armed Services Committee to study five-year projections for military spending, it's only marginally likely that the treaty would even be made the pending Senate business before the scheduled Dec. 21 adjournment. And that final vote wouldn't come until many weeks, perhaps months, into the 1980 session.

Some opponents of the treaty scored public relations points last week with a strategic leak of a draft report that the Senate Armed Services Committee may consider soon that is sharply critical of SALT II.

Aides to senators hostile to SALT II leaked the document, a 31-page report written by staffers which had no official status and claimed that 11 members of the 17 member committee would endorse it.

At least one of the alleged 11 supporters, Robert Morgan (D-N.C.), said he would oppose the proposed report if it comes before the committee, but there appeared to be majority support for a strong anti-treaty statement, if the committee decides to make any statement of this kind.

Treaties are outside the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee, and some senators, probably including Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), may oppose a committee finding on SALT II.

Treaty supporters on the committee were angered by the leaks. One, Gary Hart (D-Colo.), called the leaked draft report "a hoax," since it had no official status, and had not even been circulated to the full committee.

Numerous aides and other Senate sources said the report was the work of Richard Perle, the resourceful defense policy aide to Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.). Perle acknowledged helping write the report, which he called a "collaborative effort" of several Senate offices.

Behind the scenes last week, the Carter administration continued its efforts to placate senators (and former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger) who have demanded increased defense spending as the price for their support of SALT II.

Defense Secretary Harold Brown met during the week with Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Kissinger, and with both Byrd and Stennis to discuss additions to the defense budget. Administration officials have also met with more dovish senators who are unenthusiastic about increased defense spending to explain their position.

According to well-placed sources, the president is likely to approve a 3.6 percent real increase, after inflation, in the fiscal 1981 defense budget. This is a much bigger increase than Carter planned before defense spending became an issue in the SALT debate.

In the subsequent four years, these sources said, the president will probably propose annual increases of more than 4 percent per year in defense spending. If appropriated, these increases could bring the defense budget close to \$200 billion a year by 1985. However, strong congressional opposition to such increases is expected.

Nunn declined to say last week what his inclinations on SALT are, adding that he wanted to wait for the president's final decisions on the defense budget, which may come this week.

Some SALT opponents in the Senate began predicting that Nunn would end up supporting the treaty, though perhaps not with much enthusiasm. Administration lobbyists regard his support as crucial.

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ON PAGE D-2

THE WASHINGTON POST
2 December 1979

New Nukes for NATO: A No-Win Idea

By Arthur Macy Cox

IN TWO WEEKS the NATO alliance will decide whether to deploy 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe which have sufficient range to destroy targets in the Soviet Union. This proposal is ill-conceived — not because Soviet President Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromyko oppose it, but because it may mark the end of any further arms control agreements and a substantial increase in the possibility of accidental nuclear war. The nuclear weapon package for NATO is directly tied to the SALT II treaty, but it abandons an essential principle of SALT even before the treaty is reified by the Senate. Ground-launched cruise missiles cannot be monitored by intelligence. If they are deployed, verification of a SALT II agreement will be virtually impossible.

It has long been understood that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would risk arms control agreements based on trust. During the seven years of complex negotiation of SALT II both sides made compromises to enhance verification because they knew that no treaty was possible without insurance against cheating. Perhaps the most controversial issue of the negotiations, from this standpoint, was the control of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles.

The control of these weapons was so difficult, in fact, that the SALT II treaty merely postpones a final decision. The protocol to the SALT II treaty provides that "each party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers [360 miles] on sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers." The 360-mile range limit is important because weapons based in Europe could not reach the Soviet Union at that distance. The protocol, an integral part of the treaty, remains in force until Dec. 31, 1981.

Attached to the SALT II treaty are the agreed "Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations" which Presidents Carter and Brezhnev signed in Vienna on June 18. These guidelines call for resolution of the issues included in the protocol in the context of "significant and substantial reductions in the number of strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on modernization of existing strategic offensive arms." The intent of this language is clear. Both sides have agreed to cut existing forces, rather than deploy additional weapons.

But the NATO proposal calls for the deployment of 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-

launched cruise missiles with a range of more than 1,000 miles each to be located in West Germany, Britain, Belgium and Italy. The NATO decision will also include a yet unspecified, but directly linked, proposal to the Soviets to negotiate a reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and Western Russia.

□ □

The justification for the new NATO weapons is that the Soviets have been modernizing their medium-range weapons by deploying about 100 mobile SS20 ballistic missiles, each with three warheads and about 90 supersonic Backfire bombers. Neither of these weapons is controlled by SALT II, though Brezhnev in a letter to Carter has made a commitment to limit the deployment of the Backfire to 30 a year with no refueling capacity.

Both sides have had medium-range systems since the 1950s. The United States has forward-based systems capable of reaching the Soviet Union, including bombers located in Britain and on aircraft carriers, as well as Poseidon submarines, carrying almost 500 warheads, which are assigned to the NATO command. Both Britain and France have their own independent nuclear forces capable of hitting Soviet cities. The medium-range nuclear forces have been essentially balanced for years.

However, since the Soviet weapons are more modern it is claimed that they must be matched by NATO.

It might make sense to plan the deployment of the Pershing II, which is a ballistic missile with characteristics somewhat similar to the SS20. It might make sense also to build a new bomber as advanced as the Backfire. But it makes no sense at all to plan to deploy the ground-launched cruise missile.

These weapons are so small, about 18 feet long and two feet wide, that they can be easily hidden, easily moved and easily launched from mobile launchers. Modern intelligence technology has amazing capabilities, but it cannot provide adequate information on the location and numbers of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. Adequate verification would be impossible. The deployment of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles would provoke an unrestrained arms race with no way to put the genie back in the bottle.

U.S. proponents of the cruise missile deployment decision come from opposing camps, making for strange bedfellows indeed. The opponents of arms control and the SALT II treaty see the decision as a possible means to kill the SALT process. They are not concerned about


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verification, because they oppose the treaty. They believe we should use our technological advantages to reassert our nuclear superiority. We have a lead in cruise missile technology which we should exploit, they believe. Furthermore, they note that the ground-launched cruise missiles will have longer range than the Pershing IIs and can be produced a year or two faster.

The conventional wisdom in the Carter administration, however, is that a NATO decision to deploy the weapons now will provide a bargaining chip which will advance the cause of arms control in the next round of negotiations. Theoretically it would appear that a NATO commitment to deploy the weapons would strengthen the hand of Western negotiators to press the Soviets for real cutbacks.

But the history of the nuclear arms race, so far, demonstrates the opposite. Once the decision to deploy the new weapon is made the bargain is lost, because the Soviets invariably counter with additional weapons of their own in order to strengthen their bargaining position. Both Brezhnev and Gromyko have stated that this would be their position. Whether that proves to be true or not, a decision to deploy weapons inevitably generates so much momentum — political, military, technological and budgetary — that it becomes very difficult to reverse.

The decision to deploy multiple warheads (MIRV) on our missiles in 1970 was supposed to be a bargaining chip, but there was no bargain. Five years later the Soviets mastered the technology and placed multiple warheads on their big rockets. The result is that we are less secure today than we were in 1970. If we had negotiated a ban on MIRV before making a decision to deploy we would be more secure, and we would have saved billions of dollars. The real bargaining chip is the decision itself, before it is made.



In the case of a NATO decision in December it is true that no action will be taken until the parliaments of the NATO governments have approved the action, and until the weapons have been produced, tested and deployed, which may take three or four years. The West German government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is very sensitive to the implications of the looming decision. West Germany would receive the largest share of the new weapons. If they are deployed, it would be the first time that nuclear weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union were located on German soil.

Schmidt has urged that NATO make clear to the Soviet Union its willingness to negotiate on the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Schmidt is willing to go along with a NATO decision but says: "If negotiations with Moscow are successful it might not be necessary to develop all of the weapons, perhaps only a few and in the ideal case, absolutely none." Schmidt does not want to jeopardize the benefits to West Germany of the detente with the East which he and Willy Brandt have negotiated.

Henry Kissinger, in a September speech in Brussels, created a furor by questioning the plausibility of NATO's continuing reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for its future security, because the United States no longer has strategic superiority over Russia. Since then many editorial writers and columnists have asserted that there must

be a buildup of theater nuclear forces in Europe, so that invoking the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee does not become Europe's only option in a conflict. This argument is wrong on all counts.

Unlike the independent French and British nuclear forces, the proposed NATO weapons will be owned, operated and controlled by the United States. In fact, the West Germans have stated categorically that they will not accept the two-key system whereby a decision to send a nuclear weapon toward Russia would be shared by the United States and Germany. Thus, a decision to launch would be an American decision, whether the weapons used are based in the United States or in Europe.

NATO would not gain any greater assurance of protection than it has today. The president of the United States would still make the decision and U.S. cities would be equally threatened by Soviet retaliation. Moreover, the deployment of these weapons in Europe would guarantee that the NATO member states would be early targets of Soviet rockets in the event of war. What would be the security benefit for Western Europe?

And why should the NATO governments be subjected to this emerging political turmoil, which may weaken the alliance? Furthermore, why should the U.S. taxpayer be subjected to the substantial cost of producing these weapons if, after all, it is not intended that they should be deployed? The implications of the cruise missile deployment have not been thought through, nor have they been debated.


The best course would be for NATO to adopt the position recently taken by the Danish government. Denmark has called for a six-month postponement of the NATO decision to ascertain whether the Soviets are willing to negotiate mutual cuts, including the level of their SS20s and Backfire bombers. If so, the negotiations would begin at once. If not, NATO would move ahead.

Arthur Cox is a former State Department and CIA official who writes and lectures on U.S.-Soviet affairs and arms control issues.

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ON PAGE 111-118NEW YORK MAGAZINE
10 December 1979

How to Learn to Start Worrying And Care About SALT

By Michael Kramer



I do have deep reservations about some of the aspects of SALT II, but I think you'll note that when I said deep reservations I was focusing with greater priority on the concept of American defense in the central strategic area and the evolution of thought and the trending toward first parity, and then what we call in the trade "minimum deterrence" or "assured destruction" or "launch on warning concepts," which really place our posture in a position where the Americans have really no alternative but to indulge in population destruction in a crisis with the Soviet Union that's nuclear in character, when you follow the scenario through the doomsday application.

—General Alexander Haig (Retired)

Someone—usually an expert—is almost always saying something like that about the SALT II treaty, which is

Maybe we shouldn't dismiss doomsday scenarios.

probably why no one listens and why more than 50 percent of the respondents in a nationwide poll could not even name the two countries who are parties to the agreement (us and them). But just because most of us don't know anything about SALT doesn't mean it's not important. It is.

The second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) is now before the Senate for ratification. It's chances are iffy—at best. As usual, many of our representatives, the ones we elect to supposedly exercise their judgment, are looking to public opinion (the kind measured by Gallup and company) to clue them in on how to vote. What follows then is a layman's guide to a few of the arguments and issues sur-

rounding SALT, with special emphasis on the question of verification—defined simply as our ability to detect Soviet cheating once the treaty is in effect.

□ *What SALT is not:* SALT is not, as its title would have us believe, an arms-limitation treaty. That goal, a true reduction in Soviet and American arsenals, will come in SALT III—or so say the treaty's proponents. SALT II, say its supporters, and SALT I before it are merely part of a long process, a feeling-out, a dialogue, a way to develop the understanding and trust which will permit true arms control next time—which is what SALT I's proponents originally, and incorrectly, prophesied for SALT II. In any event, as Senator Moynihan has written, "whatever else SALT I might have done, it accomplished little by way of

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limiting strategic offensive arms." And, says the *Wall Street Journal*, "it is by now an uncontested fact that during detente and under SALT I we have witnessed a massive Soviet military buildup."

What about SALT II? Here's William Perry, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering: "I anticipate that [under SALT II] the Soviet Union will continue to pursue the modernization of their ICBM program and that we will respond to that, so that both sides then will continue to have significant increases in nuclear warheads. That is the bad news. The good news [here it comes again] . . . is that SALT II also establishes a process and goals. The most significant goal [emphasis mine] is the one to achieve a real reduction in nuclear weapons." And so on.

□ *The death of MAD:* To many proponents of SALT, Dr. Perry has hit the nail on the head: The process is everything. No matter that both SALT treaties ratify the arms race; at some point all the talking and negotiating will help us to trust each other, and then, finally, real arms reduction can begin. Behind this thinking lies MAD—the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction," the rationale of deterrence. As defined by Robert McNamara some years ago, deterrence "means the certainty of suicide to the aggressor." In other words, the Russians are supposed to know that if they strike the United States, enough of our nuclear force will survive so that we can retaliate and destroy the Soviet Union. So, the argument goes, let the Russians foolishly spend millions of dollars in order to overkill us a hundred times. It doesn't matter—as long as we know we can wipe them out *once*.

Sounds good. But wait. There are some—and their number is growing—who say that those sneaky Russians are actually developing (*have already developed!* says Moynihan) nuclear superiority, the kind of superiority that permits them to wage a nuclear war they can not only survive but actually

win. A common scenario runs something like this: The Russians cheat on the SALT agreement and develop the capability to take out our land-based Minuteman missile force. We would still have our submarine-based nuclear missiles and our strategic bombers—enough, presumably, to wipe out the Soviets—but before the president orders the retaliatory strike the Russian high command offers us an option: We can go ahead and launch against the Soviet Union, in which case, the Russians tell us, they will simply launch back and destroy the remainder of the United States, not merely our Minutemen. Or, say the Russians, we can stop here. You Americans can accept the loss of your missiles—and the collateral loss of, say, 5 million, but not 150 million, people. And, best of all, you Americans don't even have to turn over your own country. How about some other countries? How about America getting out of Western Europe? Would a president of the United States yield to such a demand? Would he, as they say in Haig's trade, go the route of "damage limitation"? Would he sell out Europe to save the United States? Well?

There is another, *perhaps* more realistic theory concerning the advantage gained by nuclear superiority, short of its actual use. It is the notion that the stronger side in the nuclear equation can be more adventurous, can "move in on" other nations without fear of reprisal from the other nuclear superpower. This is the argument of Paul Nitze, a leading opponent of SALT II and a former deputy secretary of defense. Nitze maintains that we have already seen this theory at work—in *our* favor—during the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, confrontations with the Soviets which we "won" because we held the bigger stick and, presumably, were prepared to use it.

"To some of us who lived through the Berlin crisis in 1961," says Nitze, "[and] the Cuban crisis in 1962 . . . [the idea] that an adverse shift in the strategic nuclear balance will have no political or diplomatic consequences

comes as a shock. In the Berlin crisis our theater position was clearly unfavorable; we relied entirely on our strategic nuclear superiority to face down Chairman Khrushchev's ultimatum. In Cuba, the Soviet Union faced a position of both theater inferiority and strategic inferiority; they withdrew the missiles they were deploying."

Nitze goes farther: As the Soviets gained nuclear strength, we could no longer have our way. Thus, he says, "in the 1973 Middle East crisis, the theater and the strategic nuclear balances were more balanced, [so] both sides compromised."

"The nuclear balance is only one element in the overall power balance. But in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum upon which all other levers of influence—military, economic or political—rest."

To, the Nitze crowd the Russians have invalidated MAD, thus forcing us into a new ball game—where the other guy is winning and the consequences are dire. "Strategic [nuclear] superiority," says Moynihan, "is the ability to make other people do what you want them to do."

□ *Watch out:* Assume that the Soviets seek (may already possess) nuclear superiority and that MAD is no longer a credible policy. Assume *that* and you understand the need for us to know *exactly* what the Russians are up to. Assume further that the Soviets will rush through every loophole in order to legally—if only technically—violate the spirit of the SALT treaties. "That in fact is the clear history of the Russians and SALT I," says John Glenn, the one U.S. senator to have become an authority on the complicated question of verification. "Will the Russians cheat?" asks Glenn rhetorically. "They will if they can. They always have."

John Glenn is conscientious and straightforward. Despite having voted against SALT II in the Foreign Relations Committee, he wants very much to vote for the treaty when it hits the Senate floor—which could be within a few weeks, or not for some time.

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There is, however, no chance that Glenn will vote for SALT II if he continues to believe, as he does today, that we are incapable of verifying Soviet compliance with the treaty's provisions. "The administration," says Glenn, "has been very careful, very precise. It speaks of being certain that we have the means to 'adequately' verify Soviet compliance. That is to say, we can detect large-scale Russian cheating 'in time' for us to take 'appropriate' countermeasures—either protest or military buildup of our own. All of those words are, of course, open to varying interpretations, which is bad enough, but the key point is that we can't verify the treaty *now*, at the time when the Senate is being asked to ratify it."

The Carter administration has come to take John Glenn very seriously. He is briefed regularly, often by Defense Secretary Harold Brown and CIA Director Stansfield Turner themselves. He is thoroughly familiar with our intelligence capabilities—and he is worried. "The loss of Iran was a great blow," says Glenn. "I don't care what anyone says." Here Glenn is referring to our two supersecret Iran-based eavesdropping installations some 700 miles from the Soviets' main missile-testing facility at Tyuratam, near the Aral Sea.

"At this point, the administration confesses the significance of the Iran loss," says Glenn, "but it keeps asking us to be confident that we can regain that lost capacity by other means, and quickly. But we haven't regained it yet, and I'm waiting for them to prove to me that we have. At first, the administration asserted that we could make up for the Iranian loss by employing U-2 overflights. But the planes would have to fly over Turkey, and our relations with the Turks are pretty strained. The Turks finally agreed to permit the flights, but only if the Soviets didn't object. Well, the Soviets have objected—which, by the way, gives you some indication of their real interest in seeing that SALT II is followed. In any event, the U-2 argument is no longer credible, so it's been dropped.

"The administration would also have

us believe that we can make up for a lot of what we lost in Iran via our reconnaissance satellites. But those satellites were compromised when the Russians got their hands on the operating manuals. So now the Russians know how the satellites work and can take measures to negate their effectiveness. But even if the satellites weren't compromised, you just can't get the same quality of information from 100 miles up that you can get from ground stations in Iran.

"I'm sure we can make up for the Iranian loss in other ways. The question is when? Harold Brown says we can do it in a year, but we haven't yet. It all gets back to what constitutes 'adequate' verification. I don't see anything wrong with our delaying a vote on the treaty until the administration can prove that we once again have the kind of intelligence capacity we lost in Iran."

While there is disagreement over the extent of the Iranian loss, a candid appraisal of the problem and a detailed evaluation of our overall intelligence abilities are the subject of a sensitive 177-page report under 24-hour guard, on the top floor of the Capitol in Washington. The report may be read only by senators themselves and by a mere handful of senior aides. It may be read during business hours only, and no notes may be taken from the room. It is, says Glenn, comprehensive, "sizzling" stuff. It took him almost four full days to fully comprehend and digest. "Once again," says Glenn, "the problem is the administration's assumption, this time contained in the report's 'executive summary.' The summary asserts that we *will* have an adequate verification capability. But, I say again, we don't *now*, and I'm still waiting to see it proved. I hope it will be, of course. But I'm still waiting." According to columnists Evans and Novak, one paragraph of the report says, "If a covert deployment were attempted, the Soviets could evade detection and identification of the activity for as long as three years, during which some 200 missiles might

become operational." As Evans and Novak point out, "a block of 200 new missiles could change overnight the strategic balance of power"—especially if those particular missiles are of the "heavy" variety and happen to carry a large number of warheads.

Incredibly, as of the middle of November, only a very few senators, only a handful, have bothered to take the time and trouble to read the report in its entirety. Such is Glenn's acknowledged expertise in this area (combined with his general reputation for fairness) that it is likely that some of his colleagues will follow his lead when the treaty finally comes to the floor for a vote. And, although he is mum on the subject, it seems reasonable to assume that Glenn would request a closed Senate session in order to go over the report for the benefit of those colleagues who can't see their way clear to reading it themselves. Still, it would be far preferable for the senators to do their own homework, and, given SALT's importance, those who don't should probably be drummed from office. This is no penny-ante game. The stakes couldn't be higher—especially if you subscribe to the notion that the Russians are anxious for nuclear superiority and a first-strike capability.

SALT professes to be about peace, and it may be, although there are those, like Senator Moynihan, who argue that "everything the SALT process was designed to prevent has come about" (including a further increase in the defense budget—a Carter-administration concession designed to win the support of SALT opponents like Senator Sam Nunn). If Moynihan is correct (and he makes a persuasive case in the November 19 *New Yorker*) it is because, above all, SALT is about war. And while weapons have changed dramatically over the centuries, war itself has remained pretty much the same. It is *not* a punch-pulling activity. What Thomas Hobbes wrote in 1651 is true today: In war, "force and fraud are the two cardinal virtues." ■

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE

6 December 1979

Diplomats no stranger to espionage

*Embassies offer haven
for intelligence work*

By John Maclean

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON — The Secret Committee of Correspondence, a high-level federal group, dispatched its agent to the Continent with all appropriate secrecy.

Under the false name of Timothy Jones, the agent was to appear as a simple merchant. His intelligence reports home were to do be done in invisible ink between the lines of common business letters.

Jones' reports concerned the most vital interests of his country, the possibility of French military, political, and economic aid for the American Revolution. Was Jones, whose real name was Silas Deane, America's first spy?

Hardly. He was America's first diplomat, sent to France in 1776 under orders from Benjamin Franklin, chairman of the Correspondence Committee, which has since been supplanted by the Central Intelligence Agency and State Department.

EVER SINCE the pattern of modern diplomacy first appeared during the Middle Ages, there has been a blurry, gray area where legitimate intelligence gathering overlaps with illegal espionage. When Italian cities of centuries ago first exchanged envoys, ambassadors often became noted spies.

It was said that "an ambassador is often nothing more than an honorable spy acting under the protection of the law of nations."

Today in Iran, that statement has no meaning. In the eyes of militants holding American hostages in Iran, there is

no difference between a CIA employee engaged in legal intelligence gathering and one involved in covert activity. The militants say that proof of CIA employment is enough evidence for them of illegal espionage activity.

Espionage, however, long has meant the clandestine gathering of information and the practice of covert action, or "dirty tricks" as such activities became known during the recent years of public CIA scandal.

ESPIONAGE MAY be the world's second oldest profession. It may even tie for first, considering the role often played by women's wiles.

Acts of espionage crop up in the Bible — such as Joshua's dispatch of spies into Jericho before his assault across the Jordan river. Classical authors such as Xenophon and Caesar also give examples.

In modern times the practice of building intelligence organizations and supplying diplomatic cover for spies has created special problems. Organized espionage first appeared in the 17th Century under Cromwell in England and Richelieu in France. Since then it has become standard practice for diplomats proven to be spies to be expelled from host countries.

EMBASSIES TEND to attract spies because they offer a safe haven. Two Soviets employed at the United Nations were convicted last year of espionage and were sentenced to 50-year terms. A third Soviet citizen was implicated in the scheme, but was released because he was an attache at the Soviet mission to the U.N., entitling him to diplomatic immunity.

"AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE, EMBASSIES DO NORMALLY CARRY ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS," SAID David Trask, the State Department's chief historian. "Most intelligence gathering involves reading public documents.

"There's a hell of a difference between Mata Hari and an embassy official whose job is to observe trends in the local press. That distinction is getting lost [in the Iranian crisis]."

IRONICALLY, ONE of the clearest statements about the role of diplomatic spies came from the Shah of Iran. During a television interview in 1976, he was asked about the operations of his intelligence agency, SAVAK, within the United States.

He told the interviewer the purpose of SAVAK activities here was "checking up on anybody who becomes affiliated with circles, organizations hostile to my country, which is the role of any intelligence organization."

The role of the CIA in Iran has ranged from overwhelming to incompetent.

Much attention has been focused on the CIA's masterminding of the scheme that returned to shah to power in 1953. Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA agent in charge of the plot, said it took no more than \$100,000 in cash and six agents' to sweep the shah back onto the Peacock Throne.

BUT WHEN Iranian revolutionaries ousted the shah earlier this year, the State Department wound up paying \$2 million ransom to the rebels to secure the release of 22 CIA employees at an electronic spy station near Iran's border with the Soviet Union.

As late as 1978, the CIA had minimized the significance of unrest within Iran, an intelligence failure that prompted a major shakeup of the organization. One major reason for the misjudgment was the shah's insistence that no CIA agents talk with anyone who might be considered the political opposition.

During the final three years of his reign, he repeatedly warned U.S. officials that he would expel any CIA agents who engaged in activities he thought improper.

but then, the U.S. intelligence agency had become so dependent on SAVAK to provide its information that it had only three agents in Iran who could speak the local language, Farsi.

THE CIA and foreign intelligence agencies continue to operate worldwide.

John Barron, author of a book published in 1974 called "KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents," has said that so many Soviet spies now operate here that there are not enough U.S. counterintelligence agents to watch them all.

THE GATHERING of intelligence will always be a primary duty of envoys abroad. A lesson exists in the career of Silas Deane, the first American envoy, in how to carry out this function.

Deane foundered in his mission. He could not speak French, he had not been told of efforts under way by Frenchmen on behalf of the U.S., and his clumsy cover story fell apart. Charges of personal dishonesty were rumored.

When the French connection showed hopeful signs for the American revolutionaries, the able Franklin was dispatched with more formal credentials to nourish the alliance. He succeeded brilliantly. Historians say his dispatches home read like highly skilled intelligence reports.

Deane died an embittered and disgraced man. The good manners and striking appearance that had contributed to his choice as envoy proved no substitute for preparation, seriousness, and skill.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 24

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
6 December 1979

Honesty on Iran

As the crisis in Iran grinds on, one of the tests of the American nation will be its ability to be honest with itself. This may not be decisive in the crisis itself, but will by and large determine whether lessons are learned for the future.

The thought is immediately brought to mind by the UN Security Council resolution, which is almost universally proclaimed a "victory" for the United States. It is of course true that the resolution passed by a 15 to 0 vote, and that it does urgently call for the release of the hostages. While the resolution is not much likely to influence the Iranians, these accomplishments are probably worth the baggage that accompanies them.

But before bragging about a victory, we ought to look at the rest of the resolution. For example, the clause urging "the governments of Iran and the United States to exercise the utmost restraint in the prevailing situation." And the clause calling on the two governments "to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them." And we also ought to note the resolution's legislative history, including what amounts to a U.S. government invitation for the Iranians to come to the UN for a propaganda field day against the shah and the U.S.

Taken in its totality, the UN resolution tends to obscure the reality of the Iran crisis: That the Iranian regime has committed an act of aggression against the United States. That Iran stands in flagrant violation of historical convention and international law. That the United States has been restrained for humanitarian and prudential reasons, but would have every moral justification for the use of force against Iran. For our "victory" at the UN, we have paid the very considerable price of undermining our right to assert these principles unilaterally.

Thoughts about honesty are also stirred by the administration's actions on the shah. President Carter said at his press conference last Wednesday that when the shah should leave is "a decision to be made by the shah and by his medical advisers," and that while the shah had stated his intention to leave when medical treatment was completed, "I have not encouraged him to leave. He was free to come here for medical treatment and he will leave on his own volition."

Within 48 hours Mr. Carter's administration was leaning all over the shah to get him out of the country. As soon as the Mexicans decided not to readmit him, the administration put out public word that it still expected him to stand by his "promise" to leave. The administration is being pushed toward honoring the President's proclamation by the reality that no good refuge exists for the shah. But clearly there was a discrepancy between the President's words and his policy before and after he uttered them, and this is a disquieting portent.

For if the episode ends in anything but total disaster, the nation in general and the administration in particular will be tempted to grasp straws looking for a victory. All of us want the hostages released, of course. And all of us will breathe a sigh of relief if that happens, regardless of what further national humiliation this may involve. But even if they were released tomorrow, we need to recognize that the U.S. has suffered a massive international setback, and that its repetition cannot be tolerated.

We are already witnessing the spread of the Iranian tactics; the assault on the U.S. embassy in Pakistan probably did not involve government connivance, but the assault on the U.S. embassy in Libya almost certainly did. We risk being shoved around by any dictator with enough gall to storm an embassy, especially if he has some oil to sell. We need to think through how we are going to stop the trend.

Military retaliation against Iran, and for that matter Libya, should not be ruled out. We need to insure that we have the military forces to make this option real. We need to redevelop a capability for covert action, and can start now by straightening out the congressional reporting requirements that hobble the CIA. We need to provide our own protection for embassies, even at the price of breaking relations when a host government, like the Libyans, objects to Marines. In short, we need to abandon the supine postures that invite these provocations.

These are the lessons of the Iranian crisis, regardless of how it is ultimately resolved. If we fail to face them squarely, we will not have salvaged even so much as a lesson.

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WASHINGTON POST
5 DECEMBER 1979

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

The Soviet 'Forgery Offensive'

The decision by Iranian militants to show the world an alleged "secret" document that they said had been purloined from files in the occupied U.S. Embassy adds an ominous new factor in the battle of American intelligence against Soviet forgeries aimed at discrediting the United States.

Whether the militants have what they claim to have or whether the alleged CIA assignments for the two new staffers at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran are bogus, the surfacing of the document compounds the problem of identifying and exposing proliferating Soviet forgeries. These forgeries are now known to have drawn both President Carter and Vice President Walter Mondale into their worldwide operations.

The Soviet forgery game was analyzed early this year in a classified government document called "the forgery offensive," which opened with this flat assertion: the dangerous Soviet game of lying about the United States in the struggle between the two superpowers is undergoing "an appreciable upsurge."

"The political purpose of these forgeries, their technical sophistication and intelligence reporting all point to the Soviet Union, its various East European allies and Cuba as being the responsible parties," the document said.

The study containing that charge against Moscow was followed in late summer by a second analysis, limited to "official use only" and published by the Defense Intelligence Agency—a major branch of the U.S. intelligence community. It proclaimed that Moscow has "continually employed forged documents to implement foreign policy, support political objectives and to lend substance, credibility and authenticity to their propaganda claims."

The United States has never played the forgeries game against Russia or any other country. One reason could be that in an open society forgeries would almost surely be exposed by those opposing the practice—by politicians, for example, who in the past have taken pride in exposing undercover operations by the CIA, regardless of foreign policy objectives.

The Soviets have a closed society and no known scruples against dirty tricks of any kind. But the efforts—described as being "of suspected Soviet origin"—to put false words in the mouths of the president and the vice president of the United States touched a new low. The falsification of Jimmy Carter's spoken word came in December 1977, in the form of a bogus press release from the United States Information Agency (now the International Communications Agency). It purported to be a verbatim report on a speech Carter gave in the "American perspective series."

Newspapers in Greece—and almost certainly in other countries where the forgery never surfaced—received the phony Carter speech in the mail. Two newspapers in Athens published it. In his "speech," Carter flayed the Greeks for letting down NATO, demanded far higher defense spending by Greece and made demeaning remarks about this major Mediterranean ally.

The forgery involving Mondale came just over a year ago when Xeroxed copies of an interview he allegedly gave to a

European newspaperman named "Karl Douglas" were mailed to Paris-based correspondents of several newspapers.

In the "interview," the vice president cast aspersions on Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Mondale, according to the bogus "interview," called Sadat not the master of his own house (implying the then-pending treaty with Israel would not be adhered to) and claimed that Begin was suffering from a "terminal illness."

Both these efforts were crude, and neither one did American policy much, if any, damage. But they illustrate this point: there is no limit to the Soviet effort to "disinform" governments and peoples of the world about the perfidy of the United States by exploiting all techniques of forgery and black propaganda. Moreover, other attempts to undermine the United States have had conspicuous success.

In 1978, in an altered version of a genuine State Department document known as "Airgram A8850," dated Dec. 3, 1974, U.S. embassies in Europe were

ordered to collect information "on ways to bribe European officials and to develop other covert means by which to damage or eliminate foreign trade competition" with the United States. The timing was calculated to cash in on the uproar in the United States over bribery accusations against U.S. corporations.

This forgery, American intelligence now believes, was "an eminent Soviet forgery success" despite some sloppy discrepancies, such as bad punctuation in the covering letter that came with fuzzy copies of the alleged airgram.

With superpower competition now heating up, partly under the stress of the Iran crisis, top intelligence officials have ordered the anti-forgery watch put on overtime duty. But for every forgery discovered, there probably are half a dozen that go undiscovered. The whole world is a forgery market and it is inconceivable that the United States will not be damaged in the days of heated rivalry that lie ahead with an adversary who plays by only one rule: the rule to win.

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ON PAGE A-16

WASHINGTON POST
5 DECEMBER 1979

Diplomatic Titles Often Used to Protect Intelligence Aides

By Robert G. Kaiser
Washington Post Staff Writer

Though rarely proclaimed publicly, the use of diplomatic titles to protect intelligence officers in foreign countries has long been standard practice for the United States—and for the Soviet Union, Israel, Britain, France, West Germany and probably every country that maintains an intelligence service.

U.S. officials dismiss as irrelevant accusations by Iranian radicals that the American Embassy in Tehran was a "nest of espionage." In the views of these officials, no such accusations justify a blatant violation of international law—the arbitrary detention of persons with diplomatic immunity.

An intelligence officer assigned to an embassy and given formal diplomatic status enjoys the full benefits of diplomatic immunity, according to traditional diplomatic practice.

The stationing of Central Intelligence

Agency employees with diplomatic titles in American embassies has been discussed openly for years. In 1974 The Washington Monthly published an article called "How to Spot a Spook" in which John Marks explained how CIA employees with diplomatic cover could be identified in open State Department directories.

The directories Marks cited have not been published since then. However, CIA agents apparently continue to carry the most telltale designation Marks described, an FSR (foreign service reserve officer) rank instead of the standard FSO (foreign service officer) tag carried by ordinary State Department diplomats.

The cable released by Iranian students Saturday in which the U.S. charge d'affaires in Tehran appeared to acknowledge the presence of two CIA men in the embassy included a reference to this telltale "R" as "the old and apparently insoluble problem of R designation" for CIA employees.

Knowledgeable sources report that the CIA regards diplomatic cover as the best possible protection for its operatives abroad, and has long struggled in Washington to maximize the number of diplomatic slots allocated to agency employees.

The present ratio of ordinary diplomats to CIA employees in foreign missions is not publicly known, but informed sources said the division was the subject of a formal 1977 agreement between Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and the president's national security affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Several sources pointed out that intelligence work covers a myriad of activities, including much information-gathering that is essentially the same as normal diplomatic reporting. "Every CIA employee is decidedly not a James Bond," one source said.

"Espionage" can mean counting the number of trucks that cross a particular bridge as well as opening the prime minister's mail, one source noted.

If a host country is displeased by a diplomat's behavior, the remedy is to expel the diplomat, a State Department official said. Expulsion has been used by dozens of governments around the world, most often in recent years against Soviet diplomats, but against Americans and others as well.

In 1978 the United States expelled a Soviet diplomat at the United Nations, Vladimir P. Zinyakin, after implicating him in a spy operation that involved two other Soviet citizens who did not have diplomatic status. Those two, Rudolf F. Chernyayev and Vladik A. Enger, were tried and sentenced to long prison terms before being swapped to the Soviet Union this year for a group of dissidents.

In 1971 the British government expelled 105 Soviet nationals, most of them diplomats, after charging them with improper espionage activity. The Soviets also have followed this pattern when they have caught

western spies with diplomatic status on their territory.

Several official sources say it was sloppy of the embassy in Tehran to keep on file copies of a telegram referring directly to a CIA presence in the embassy. One source close to the intelligence community also expressed surprise that the CIA apparently had been eager to put new agents into the Tehran embassy last summer, given the sensitivity of the situation there. Other sources said the agency was just doing its job.

A number of past and present foreign service officers said in interviews that the American personnel in embassies abroad invariably know who among them is working for the CIA. In some capitals the name of the station chief, or senior CIA official in the embassy, is common public knowledge.

Most embassy staffs also include military attaches, one of whose undisguised functions is to gather information on the military establishment of their host country.

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
4 DECEMBER 1979

Andy Rooney

Spying shouldn't be left to politicians

ONE OF THE GREAT mysteries about us as a nation is how we've always been so suspicious of everything our government has done here at home and so trusting about what it's done abroad.

We don't let our elected officials cross the street in Washington without complaining about the way they do it. On the other hand, when it comes to foreign affairs we assume that what they do is honest and in the best interests of the United States and mankind in general.

The strange thing about it is that the exact reverse is true among the politicians. They trust the democratic process when it comes to letting us decide what they should do here, but when it comes to foreign affairs they seem to think that what we don't know won't hurt us.

I think we're all becoming a little less confident of our conduct in foreign affairs because, for the first time, there's some evidence that we've been sneaky in the past. It isn't that our foreign policy operatives have been dishonest. It's just

that they've made the same mistake all the wrong public officials who ever lived made. They think they're doing what's best for the country, but they don't dare tell us because they don't think we're smart enough to understand. They think they have special information that makes them better able to decide for us.

MOST OF THIS "special information" comes to diplomats from our Central Intelligence Agency. I just wonder how bad it would be if all CIA reports were printed in the newspapers every week. Is there any chance it wouldn't be bad at all but good in the long run?

The Iranian terrorists have accused us of having spies in our embassy in Tehran. Spy is a strange word. It means one thing to us if it's applied to a devious, furtive Soviet agent ferreting out the most important secrets of our defense; it means something else if it's about James Bond gathering information in a foreign country about their plans to destroy the United States.

If the Iranians mean we had people in charge of gathering information about a lot of things going on there, I suppose they're right. Spying these days wouldn't make much of a movie. It's mostly a matter of gathering a lot of dull statistics about crops, production facilities, gross national product, and political movements. Spies aren't even looking for that one all-important secret written on a little piece of paper anymore. There is no such secret. Probably the closest we have to that is the number of the telephone on the nightstand next to President Carter's bed.

THE BEST SPY story I ever heard is one I may have rewritten in my memory, but it is closer to the truth about spying than most of the novels written about it. During World War II, a German spy got hold of the top secret formula this country had for its most devastating nerve gas. After the war, someone asked the German spy how he ever got it. He said that he found out the name of the company that manufactured it and simply wrote to them and asked for the formula, which they sent him.

I have a theory about what ought to happen to any of the cloak-and-dagger spies who are caught. I'm not for any drastic punishment. Any spy caught in the act ought to be put to bed in his embassy without his supper and not allowed to go out and play with the other spies for two weeks.

If our diplomats don't want to lose the confidence we've always had in them, they might consider doing away with all this sneaky maneuvering. They ought to trust the democratic principle even in diplomacy. My history is weak, but I remember Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points just well enough to have been able to look them up just now. He referred to "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."

Right on, Woodrow!

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 December 1979

Chronology of hostage standoff

- Nov. 4** Tehran: "Students" seize US Embassy; hold some 100 hostages, including 63 Americans; demand Shah's return for trial.
- Nov. 5** Washington: US rejects demand.
Iran: US Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz seized by followers of Ayatollah Khomeini. 1959 treaty with US and 1921 treaty with USSR cancelled; treaties gave the two powers right to intervene militarily.
- Nov. 6** Iran: Prime Minister Bazargan resigns; Ayatollah Khomeini orders Revolutionary Council to take over government. "Students" warn they will kill hostages if US uses force in rescue attempt.
- Nov. 7** Iran: Ayatollah Khomeini refuses to negotiate with US, PLO envoys.
- Nov. 9** New York: UN Security Council expresses "profound concern" for hostages; calls for immediate release.
Washington: US halts \$300 million military shipment to Iran.
Tehran: Abolhassan Bani-Sadr is named acting foreign minister.
- Nov. 10** Washington: President Carter orders deportation proceedings against Iranians in US illegally.
- Nov. 11** Beirut: Iranians break into US Embassy, occupy for 90 minutes before being dispersed.
Tehran: Ayatollah Khomeini rejects Vatican offer of mediation.
- Nov. 12** Washington: President Carter orders suspension of oil imports from Iran.
Tehran: Oil embargo declared against US; PLO abandons negotiation effort.
- Nov. 13** New York: Iran requests UN Security Council meeting and return of Shah's property in US.
- Nov. 14** Tehran: Iran plans to withdraw funds from US banks.
Washington: President Carter orders Iranian assets in US frozen.
- Nov. 15** Tehran: Government hints that women and blacks will be freed soon; "students" reject any compromise.
- Nov. 17** Tehran: Ayatollah Khomeini orders women and blacks freed; others to be tried in Islamic courts as spies.
- Nov. 18** Tehran: One white woman and two black marines released, flown to West Germany.
- Nov. 19** Tehran: Ten more hostages released.
- Nov. 20** Washington: US suggests use of military force to free 50 remaining hostages; President Carter orders second naval task force to Indian Ocean.
Mecca, Saudi Arabia: Takeover of Grand Mosque by Muslim fundamentalist splinter group.
- Nov. 21** Tehran: Five non-Americans released; other hostages will be executed if US uses military force.
Washington: President Carter warns Iran will be held "strictly accountable" if hostages harmed.
Islamabad, Pakistan: Mob attacks US Embassy; two marines killed.
- Nov. 22** Iran: Iranian Navy put on full alert.
- Nov. 25** New York: UN Secretary-General Waldheim schedules urgent Security Council meeting for Dec. 1.
- Nov. 26** Washington: US orders partial evacuation from Muslim countries.
Tehran: Acting Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr requests delay for Security Council meeting.
- Nov. 27** Tehran: Ayatollah Khomeini attacks plan for Security Council meeting; militants at embassy say entire compound wired with explosives.
- Nov. 28** Tehran: Mr. Bani-Sadr replaced by Sadeq Ghotbzadeh as Foreign Minister.
Washington: Speech by President Carter: "We will not yield to blackmail."
- Nov. 29** Washington: US asks International Court of Justice to order release of hostages.
Mexico City: Mexico says it will not renew Shah's visa.
- Nov. 30** Tehran: Mr. Ghotbzadeh will not make trip to UN.
- Dec. 1** New York: Security Council opens debate.
Tehran: Militants announce they hold two CIA spies.
- Dec. 2** Tripoli, Libya: US Embassy attacked by 2,000 demonstrators.
Tehran: Some hostages moved from embassy to guarded locations in city; Mr. Ghotbzadeh will send a representative to UN for administrative duties only.
New York: Shah flies to a military hospital in Texas; granted temporary "sanctuary."
- Dec. 3** New York: Security Council debate continues.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1979

*Rowland Evans
And Robert Novak*

A Soviet Hand In Iran

That Moscow is playing a malevolent hand in the country's Iran crisis became indisputable when the CIA's top-secret National Intelligence Daily informed President Carter that Moscow has privately promised to "support" Iran in the event of U.S. military action.

The Russians intentionally left the nature of that "support" ambiguous. As pieced together by high-level operatives in the Pentagon, the State Department and the intelligence community, the Soviet objective is clear: induce Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to hold the hostages long enough to entice President Carter into military reaction.

If and when that happens, Moscow's intention may well be to offer Iran no more than political and moral support.

But no official here is certain that the Russians would be content (as one prominent authority put it to us) "to harvest the rich anti-American crop" throughout the Moslem world that would bloom with an American attack on Iran. If not content, Moscow could indeed offer military help, using a mechanized division manned by crack Farsi-speaking Soviet soldiers long held in readiness just north of the Iranian-Soviet border.

This malevolent game, clearly the design of Soviet policy at the highest levels, may be understandable as one superpower seeks to exploit the other's vulnerabilities. But amid the shadowy power politics swirling around Iran, there seems more than simple exploitation. This looks like calculation and design.

Some three weeks after the hostages were seized, the state-controlled Iranian radio and television suddenly stopped its harsh, unrelenting criticism of the Soviet Union. This propaganda shift contradicted the historic reality that the Russian giant to Iran's north has always been viewed as a potential aggressor, never a friend.

Eric Rouleau, a leading Western journalist on Iran, wrote in the left-leaning Paris daily, Le Monde, Nov. 23: "Even the denunciations of the 'oppressive communist regime' of Afghanistan have stopped, as well as the hostile slogans against the Tudeh [Iran's Communist Party] that the masses have been shouting out."

The shift is directly traced to Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, boss of Iranian radio and television ever since he accompanied the ayatollah from Paris to Tehran last February. This is the same man who now dominates civilian political power in Tehran, as acting foreign minister under Khomeini.

The sudden pro-Moscow propaganda switch ordered by Ghotbzadeh coincided with the Soviet offer of "support" against U.S. military intervention, delivered in Moscow by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Iranian Ambassador Mohammed Mokri.

Although Ghotbzadeh has been portrayed on some American television screens as a moderate since his surprise elevation to foreign minister, officials here believe otherwise. He not only announced Iran would not attend the emergency session of the U.N. Security Council, but is regarded as an author of the boycott policy.

Indeed, U.S. officials have long suspected that of all the non-religious radicals in the Iranian revolution, Ghotbzadeh is the most dangerous to the United States. He has known Marxist links and is closely associated with radical Arab liberation fronts—including the far-left Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which helped in taking over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran Nov. 4.

Thus, the ascendancy of Ghotbzadeh clearly gave new leverage to the Soviets in exploiting U.S. vulnerability in the Iranian crisis. The day before Ghotbzadeh ruled out his presence at the Dec. 1 U.N. session, Soviet delegate Oleg Troyanovsky showed the true Soviet colors: while Moscow confirmed the illegality of the embassy takeover, he told council members, the Security Council should let the Iranians speak first at the meeting.

That would establish an immediate anti-American tone for the extraordinary Security Council session. The accused, not the accuser, would have the run of the courtroom at the outset of the trial.

Nobody knows how far Moscow is willing to risk playing out its malevolent hand, but an example may have been set by the Kremlin's refusal to give Carter an escape hatch in the recent Cuban crisis. The prospect of similarly disdainful treatment in this far more serious Iranian crisis helps explain the anxiety that permeates the administration today.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A 36THE WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1979*At the United Nations*

IT IS TRULY regrettable that Iran's acting foreign minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, an authoritative confidant of Ayatollah Khomeini, was not present in the U.N. Security Council to hear Donald McHenry's presentation of the American case for the release of the hostages. For it is of the essence that a direct and honest dialogue be substituted for the ragged exchange of statements and signals that is now the mode of communication between the United States and Iran, and the United Nations would be a good place to launch it. If Mr. Ghotbzadeh were there, moreover, he could test for himself the truth and significance of the position Mr. McHenry laid out to open the debate.

Mr. McHenry said, first of all, that "no country can break and ignore the law while seeking its benefits." Unquestionably, Iran is breaking the law by holding the hostages. It mortgages much of its immediate future as a nation if it does not act in a way that allows it to claim the protection of the law as events move forward.

At the same time, Mr. McHenry addressed the emotional core of Iran's conduct. "None of us is deaf to the passionate voices that speak of injustice, that cry out for understanding," he said. "There is not a single grievance alleged or spoken in this situation that could not be heard in an appropriate forum"—upon the release of the hostages. These are words of great

portent. They signify a readiness to listen with complete seriousness to whatever the Iranian regime wishes to say to the United States. This is, we believe, a fair offer, and it would baffle Americans, and many others, if the Iranians did not take it up.

The latest moves in Iran are not good. For instance, the students have produced a document purporting to show that among their 50 hostages are two CIA officers. This is, of course, completely irrelevant. For even if the two are CIA men, they enjoy diplomatic immunity on the same basis that intelligence officers do in many embassies, including Iranian embassies, abroad. Moreover, they have not been accused of any suspect activity.

Yet it cannot be ignored that to many Iranians "CIA" evokes the full panoply of fears and resentments left over from past American intervention in Iran. For some—not the cynical leaders—it may have been those fears that led them to mistake the shah's arrival in New York for medical treatment as part of a continuing pattern of American deviousness. Whether Iranians can understand the plain fact that America is not trying to restore the shah to power in Iran is a question. If Mr. Ghotbzadeh is among those who do not truly understand this, it is all the more unfortunate that he did not come to the United Nations to hear the case authoritatively stated by Ambassador McHenry.

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ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES
2 DECEMBER 1979

IRAN SAYS HOSTAGES INCLUDE C.I.A. AIDES; U.S. CONCERN RISING

USE OF SCAPEGOATS IS FEARED

A Cable Students Say They Found Lists Two Agency Employees Assigned to the Embassy

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 — Militant Iranians holding the United States Embassy in Teheran said today that they had identified Central Intelligence Agency personnel among the 50 Americans they are holding, a development that heightened concern here over the safety of the hostages. They are in their 28th day of captivity.

The United States had no official comment on the purported cablegram made public by the Iranians that was said to have been sent on Aug. 8 by L. Bruce Laingen, the chargé d'affaires. The message spoke of "the great sensitivity locally to any hint of C.I.A. activity."

It has been assumed throughout the crisis that some of the embassy hostages may be C.I.A. employees carrying out duties that are often similar to those of regular Foreign Service officers — to report and analyze political, economic and military events. Most nations attach intelligence officers to their embassies to perform such function.

Concern They May Be Scapegoats

There is concern that the Iranians, conditioned to equate "C.I.A." with efforts to subvert Iran, may try to make scapegoats of those they charge with being intelligence officers. The agency usually has analysts attached to United States embassies under a cover title.

The document mentioned two embassy officers, Malcolm Kalph and William Daugherty, and said that they should be involved in "S.R.F. coverage" and should use the titles of second and third secretary as cover. The message also said the embassy should limit "our S.R.F. assignments for the foreseeable future." The Iranians at the embassy said Mr. Daugherty had acknowledged working for the C.I.A. in the past.

Reference to Cover Designations

The State Department declined to explain the abbreviation "S.R.F.," but former officials said it stands for "special reporting facility" and refers to an office in embassies that is usually staffed by C.I.A. analysts who perform functions similar to those of Foreign Service officers.

It is common, a former official said, for an embassy to pass on a recommendation and assert that "S.R.F. concurred," meaning that the C.I.A. analysts agreed.

The purported Laingen cablegram also expressed concern about the "old and apparently insoluble problem of 'R' designation for S.R.F. officers."

This was a seeming reference to the identification of embassy personnel.

Those who enter the Foreign Service through examination are listed as "F.S.O." or Foreign Service Officer. Those who enter the Foreign Service some other way are listed as "F.S.R." or Foreign Service Reserve. C.I.A. employees attached to embassies are among those in the "F.S.R." category.

The two categories of Foreign Service personnel used to be identified in a public document, The Biographic Register, issued by the State Department. Its publication was halted three years ago to prevent vital information from becoming public.

Officials said the United States had sought to reduce the number of C.I.A. analysts in Iran because of the volatility of the situation. The document produced in Teheran today seemed to indicate that the C.I.A. presence was minimal compared with other posts.

Similarly, military attachés attached to United States embassies report to the

Defense Intelligence Agency, and some Pentagon officials have expressed concern about the fate of the attachés in Iran.

The cablegram also mentioned the word "reflets," or reference telegrams, meaning previous exchanges.

The State Department, meanwhile, showed irritation over conflicting signals from Iran. Yesterday the new Foreign Minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, said that Mr. Laingen and two of his aides who have been isolated at the Foreign Ministry since the embassy takeover were free to leave but that their safety could not be

guaranteed if they did. The Iranians holding the embassy said the three could not leave.


The State Department commented that the Foreign Minister "may not have the powers traditionally associated with the Foreign Ministry."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 55-58NEW YORK MAGAZINE
10 December 1979

America Moves to Oust Khomeini

By Tad Szulc

"...The Carter administration sees Khomeini as a 'cancer' which, in the national interest, must be removed by any possible means..."



"What you must comprehend is that Ayatollah Khomeini is going for broke."

The man speaking was an experienced Western European diplomat based in Washington, concerned, as are so many in the international community, that Iran's religious leader has simply become a clear danger to world peace and the world economy. "You must see the historical dimension of what is occurring," he continued. "Khomeini is determined to push for the fullest confrontation possible. He wants to push President Carter into military action—he is baiting him. He wants to draw everybody, Islam and the infidel West, into a bloody battle. He is a fanatic, but he has coldly thought out his moves. He is playing on anti-American and anti-Western sentiment in the Arab world and everywhere in the Third World. He thinks that time is on his side, that the Third World is with him, and he's not afraid of a bloodbath. This is Carter's terrible dilemma."

The acceptance of this view has only come recently to the Carter administration. Indeed, it actually followed Khomeini's threat to try the 49 hostages held in Teheran, the attack on the Great Mosque in Mecca, and the anti-American rioting—inspired by the aya-

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tollah—which ensued in Pakistan. But even before these occurrences, the administration had concluded that Khomeini was a "cancer," as one official put it, to be removed before it spread. It was at that point, around November 18, just two weeks after the embassy siege began, that the Carter administration began studying a mix of possible military action and CIA-managed subversion to remove the ayatollah from power by any means possible. Indeed, the U.S. government concluded that removing Khomeini was in the national interest.

Although senior administration officials would not publicly discuss the likelihood of direct application of United States power, overt and covert, toward the ouster of the ayatollah and his regime—particularly while the hostages were still in danger—top-priority studies are now under way in the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, and other government organs. Indeed, it was only concern for the hostages that prompted the president to veto a secret plan to drop weapons and possibly American agents into the oil fields of Khuzistan, where Iranian Arabs are strongly opposed to the ayatollah.

The American hope in removing the ayatollah is that he can be replaced by a more moderate leadership, perhaps one including former Prime Minister Mehdi Barzargan and military commanders not tainted by close relations with the former shah. The U.S. government thinks that a

favorable climate for Khomeini's removal might be created in time—despite his popular support—if Iran falls into further internal chaos.

Yet the view that the ayatollah "must go" does not stem from a desire to punish him for the capture of the embassy in Teheran—and the threat to try the hostages still under detention on espionage charges. The concern over Khomeini's continuation in power goes much deeper in terms of fundamental American strategic considerations in the Middle East: Iran under the ayatollah's sway is seen as a formidable threat to the stability of the whole region. What the seizure of the embassy and its aftermath accomplished was to convince the administration beyond any doubt that normal dealings with Khomeini were no longer possible and that, therefore, drastic steps were justified to hasten his departure from power.

"The eighties will be the crucible of intense crisis for the United States," a respected diplomat said last week. "You Americans are the target. And no matter what happens, the Middle East and the world won't ever be the same again. A historical line has been crossed, and you lack power to draw new lines."

In recent private discussions, several senior administration officials have recognized that the United States may have been inexorably damaged by Khomeini's politics and posturing. Indeed, the Iranian crisis has precipitated the sudden unraveling of the basic American relationships in what has been called

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the "arc of crisis," the immense Islamic swath of the world extending from North Africa to Pakistan and possibly to Indonesia and the Philippines.

This process of unraveling, in turn, now threatens to undermine and destroy the policies and relations painstakingly built by the United States in the Middle East and in the Third World generally. It touches on the menace of a partial or complete cutoff of oil to the United States (notably if there is military intervention in Iran), on Arab-Israeli peace prospects, and on continued American influence in Middle East politics.

While Khomeini's Iran was the flash point of this crisis of "historical proportions," senior administration analysts now acknowledge that the explosion might have occurred elsewhere sooner or later. Ruthless and reckless as the old ayatollah's challenge to the established world order has been, it nevertheless symbolizes the essential conflict between the North and South, between the affluent, industrialized West and destitute Third World, between producers and consumers of raw materials, and between two sets of cultural values separated by a vast chasm. The explosion was perhaps inevitable, though America never really believed it. And, in the case of Iran, it was enormously aggravated by religious fanaticism so dexterously exploited by the ayatollah and by the oil weapon he wields.

It is now evident that the Carter administration—and the West—misunderstood and underestimated the true meaning of the student takeover of the Teheran embassy, its origins, and its consequences. This presumably explains policy errors committed before and after the occupation of the American compound. The first miscalculation was clearly the decision to admit the shah for medical treatment in the United States, humanitarian as the motives may have been. To say this is not simply hindsight: Classified messages between the State Department and the embassy in Teheran, found and publicized by the Islamic students, show that the administration was fully aware that the shah's entry into the United States might well trigger violent adverse actions by the Iranians. But it is equally clear that the administration had minimized the inherent dangers, and, above all, failed to place them in the historical context of the runaway Iranian religious revolution.

Once the embassy was seized, the

administration committed a second error stemming from the original misjudgment. It thought that the situation was negotiable through diplomatic channels, and that, with patience, it would be resolved. This led President Carter to decide from the very outset to rule out military action in Iran, a decision which subsequent and inevitable events in Iran forced him to reconsider sixteen days later, when it finally dawned on the administration—after Khomeini threatened to try the embassy hostages for espionage—that the conflict with the ayatollah transcended the fate of the shah. As a Washington intelligence expert remarked privately that week, "You must never rule out anything, because you don't know what is going to happen next."

Though there is general approval in Washington of Carter's handling of the crisis—his coolness and prudence—the view was developing among many administration officials and foreign diplomats that the White House did not fully understand the situation until quite late in the crisis. Khomeini's rejection of mediatory attempts by the Palestine Liberation Organization, despite his closeness to the PLO, and by Pope John Paul II, a fellow religious leader, should have convinced the administration that the ayatollah was—and would remain—totally uncompromising. There was no reason to believe that mildly punitive actions such as the ban on imports of Iranian oil and the freezing of official Iranian assets in the United States and in U.S. banks abroad, required as they evidently were to satisfy American public opinion, would sway Khomeini.

Overall, the growing conviction in Washington is that Khomeini's attitude and the ongoing confrontation with Iran have already wrought irreparable damage to the United States in the Middle East, and that it will worsen progressively.

Thus administration analysts see the Middle East already greatly destabilized. The attack on the mosque in Mecca has visibly shaken Saudi Arabia, creating new fears of moves by Muslim fundamentalists and other radicals of the left or the right. These fears in a country with a large foreign work force, including Palestinians and Pakistanis, may be affecting the Saudis' oil and foreign policies. Whereas the Saudis had raised their production by a million barrels a day, over 10 percent, to make up

for the post-revolutionary shortfall in the Iranian output, Treasury Secretary G. William Miller, visiting Saudi Arabia late last month, was unable to obtain assurances that the high production level will be maintained.

The Saudis, according to some Washington officials, may not wish to appear to their own population or fellow Muslims, regardless of sect, to be excessively pro-American. A reduction by the Saudis may be imitated by other Persian Gulf and Arab producers, who are inclined, in any event, toward conservation for political reasons. Most of them disapprove of the ayatollah, but, given rising internal pressures, they may be wary of antagonizing him. Khomeini has already urged them to withhold oil from the United States, and, analysts say, there are signs that the Middle East understands the "historical dimensions" he has unveiled.

A reduction, let alone a suspension, of Middle Eastern oil production would have catastrophic consequences for the United States, which imports one half of its petroleum consumption, and for Western Europe and Japan—particularly with the onset of winter. It could throw their economies into a tailspin.

Built into Middle Eastern oil strategies are other political considerations as well. These add to new dangers in the stalemate in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel over the ultimate fate of the West Bank and Gaza. Saudi Arabia is opposed to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and it has been hinting it will use the "oil weapon" if Israel fails to make basic concessions to the Palestinians.

In the context of a generalized Middle Eastern turmoil resulting from the Iranian crisis, the Palestinian deadlock may force the Saudis' hand. Iraq, a radical Arab state, has again been urging the application of this "oil weapon" against the United States if Israel remains intransigent. Thus far the Iraqis have failed, but the situation could well change overnight. To persuade Israel to return oil fields in the Sinai to Egypt under peace-treaty provisions, as the Israelis did late in November, the United States had committed itself to provide it with alternate petroleum at tolerable prices. But this could become impossible, reopening the full question of the peace treaty.

Likewise, Washington analysts say the United States can no longer underestimate Khomeini's impact on Islamic countries. Pakistan has apologized for

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the burning of the Islamabad embassy, but, at the same time, it has warned the United States against the use of force in Iran. The Pakistani military regime, dominated by Islamic fundamentalists and facing serious internal stresses, is portrayed as being torn between old loyalties to the United States and new loyalties to Khomeini. In a crunch it would certainly turn against America.

Intense anti-American sentiment growing in the Middle East could also be reflected in a variety of political reactions, threatening United States interests. Khomeini may capitalize on it to expand his influence and to sway Bahrain, a Persian Gulf state, which has been traditionally pro-American but where the ayatollah's Shiite followers are strong. Existing contingency plans in Washington call for assistance to

Bahrain, but American resources are limited if the Khomeini "cancer" spreads in the area.

Unrest in the Middle East is seen as carrying a long-term threat to the survival of President Anwar el-Sadat in Egypt. He has been isolated by all his fellow Arabs, and the increasingly powerful PLO is working in tandem with Khomeini, who has called for Sadat's ouster. In the volatility of Egyptian politics, American analysts say, no "worst case" situation can be ruled out at this point.

Rightly or wrongly, the United States recently decided to supply weapons to Morocco, a friendly state, in its war with the Algerian-supported Polisario guerrillas in the former Spanish Sahara. The Sahara conflict is growing in scope, creating serious instability in

North Africa. The Carter administration's decision to support Morocco may embroil it in tensions with Algeria as well as Libya, a fundamentalist Islamic country, which is being heavily armed by the Soviet Union with the most modern equipment. Both Algeria and Libya are important oil producers, and they may react to the arming of Morocco with the denial of petroleum to the United States. Washington regards the survival of the moderate Moroccan monarchy as vital to its interest, and it fears that the loss of the Sahara war could cause the fall of King Hassan. Thus the United States faces another dilemma in the Islamic "arc of crisis."

The position of Middle Eastern oil producers in terms of supply and price is expected to be clarified to some extent at the ministerial conference of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries—OPEC—opening in Caracas, Venezuela, on December 17. With the world oil markets already in considerable chaos, the expectation is that OPEC will decide to encourage curtailment of production, allegedly for conservation reasons, while raising the prices by at least 10 percent. In the present climate, the United States is powerless to stop these trends. As one diplomat remarked, Khomeini's influence will hover over Caracas like "Banquo's ghost."

November 1979 is thus likely to be remembered as a time fitting Sir Winston Churchill's concept of the "hinge of fate," an extraordinary historical turning point. Such moments of truth occur rarely: The Second World War and its multifarious consequences, changing the face of the globe, was the last comparable moment of this kind. And 40 years from the start of that war, the world seems to be in for another radical face-lift. Even if the administration succeeds in removing the ayatollah, the events he has set in motion may only be forestalled, not arrested. Indeed, considering the problems created for America through destabilizing regimes elsewhere, the removal of the ayatollah could portend unforeseen difficulties: Some experts feel the Soviet Union could be the ultimate beneficiary of a change of regime. But no matter how the Iranian crisis itself is resolved, the conclusion in Washington is that not Iran, nor the Persian Gulf, nor the Middle East, nor much of the Third World will ever be the same again.

The Anti-Khomeini Options

With the Carter administration's decision to remove the Ayatollah Khomeini from power, these are among the measures known to be contemplated by the United States to succeed in the destabilization effort.

Economics. A shutoff of the exports of Iranian petroleum through the imposition of a naval blockade would be a first step. Denial of all revenues would, over a period of time, deplete Iran's financial resources, preventing it from importing foodstuffs, industrial spare parts, etc. American navy ships would establish a blockade either at the Hormuz Straits, which are the narrow gateway to the Persian Gulf, or around Iranian oil-shipping ports. The U.S. no longer buys Iranian oil, and Washington's judgment is that Western Europe and Japan could survive on supplies from other Middle East producers. A blockade is an act of war, but the U.S. considers the occupation of the Teheran embassy and the holding of hostages similarly one. The navy is in a position to impose a blockade. Currently nineteen warships, including two aircraft carriers, are on station in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. Another economic warfare measure would be to ban sales of U.S. food to Iran; other world food producers would be unable to pick up the slack. Economic troubles are expected to produce shortages, greater unemployment, and thus internal plotting against the ayatollah.

Subversion. In tandem with the blockade, the CIA, working through remaining local agents in Iran, would seek to exploit economic hardships to encourage anti-regime sentiment in the country. Simultaneously, CIA operators would concentrate on identifying moderate elements in Iran, particularly among the military, and encouraging them to move against Khomeini—with assurances of full U.S. support. It remains unclear, however, whether the CIA commands adequate assets in Iran for such an operation. Special support would be given to Iranian Arabs, Kurds, and other anti-regime minorities.

Military. Recourse to force is likely only if the hostages are killed or harmed. Military options include the bombing by carrier aircraft of Iranian oil fields, refineries, pipelines, and port facilities, as well as the destruction of the Iranian navy in the Persian Gulf and of aircraft on airstrips. The bombing of Teheran and Qom, where the ayatollah resides, is low on the options list, but not wholly ruled out. The same applies to the landing of American troops at coastal military facilities and/or in the Khuzistan oil fields. The United States is now assembling its Rapid Deployment Force, which includes marine units, the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Air Mobile Division, an air cavalry unit, and ranger battalions. —T.S.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 23U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
10 DECEMBER 1979

The Impact Spreads

Support for the use of military power, a big increase in defense spending, new backing for CIA covert action and still more to come—the effects of the Iranian crisis add up to a change of course for U.S.

Show of force. Much of the increase in defense funds is earmarked to establish a stronger American presence in the Persian Gulf region and to develop a capability to intervene militarily in crises in that area.

Pentagon sources say that a carrier task force will be maintained in the Indian Ocean almost continually in the future. And the American naval facility on the island of Diego Garcia will be upgraded to provide logistical backup for the fleet.

In addition, more transport aircraft will be ordered for a rapid-deployment force that is being developed for quick

intervention in remote crisis spots. Roving supply ships also will be built to provide logistical support for this force.

Odds are that the administration will keep permanently in deep freeze its negotiations with Russia for an accord to limit superpower naval strength in the Indian Ocean. Pentagon officials point out that such an accord would have prevented the U.S. from staging the massive show of naval strength under way in that region.

An armada of 19 American warships, comprising three separate task forces, is deployed in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. It is the greatest demonstration of U.S. sea power in this region in recent history. The armada is built around two aircraft carriers, the *Midway* and the *Kitty Hawk*.

For an administration that took office with a pledge to slash defense spending and that has been preoccupied with arms control, all of this represents a dramatic change of course.

Besides the military buildup, the crisis in Iran has led to a radical change in sentiment concerning the role of the Central Intelligence Agency. Even certain liberal columnists such as Joseph Kraft are advocating that the agency's capability to carry out covert opera-

tions around the world be rebuilt. A similar change has shown up in Congress as well.

Says Representative Samuel Stratton (D-N.Y.), chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations: "We've got to re-establish an effective CIA. Some people wonder why we don't have the CIA ... take back our embassy to free the hostages. The sad fact is that the CIA no longer has that capability."

Even more striking is the change in attitude toward the use of American military power. One knowledgeable official says it is noteworthy that, in the current crisis, no one has mentioned the War Powers Act. The law was passed after the Vietnam conflict to limit the President's authority to use military forces.

"What this tells me," says the official, "is that there is support for a more interventionist policy—but within limits. This does not mean a blank check for the President to go to war."

The ranking Republican member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Sea Power, Representative Floyd Spence of South Carolina, put it this way: "I'd say Iran has turned around the anti-Vietnam syndrome. Now, here in the House, I hear members talking hawkish."

The fallout from the Iranian crisis is also having an impact on congressional attitudes toward energy needs. Representative Bob Eckhardt (D-Tex.) says that he senses a new determination to escape from dependence on foreign oil producers. His assessment: "Events in Iran are making people for the first time look at energy realistically."

EXCERPT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 3

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
2 December 1979

Iran pulls rug out: our aide can't exit

By JOSEPH VOLZ

Washington (News Bureau) — State Department officials were baffled yesterday in the face of conflicting comments from the new Iranian foreign minister, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, about the future of the top U.S. diplomat in Tehran, L. Bruce Laingen.

Qotbzadeh said on Friday that Laingen, the U.S. charge d'affaires, and two other diplomats who have been staying at the Foreign Ministry were free to leave, although providing security to the airport would be "rather difficult."

But yesterday, Qotbzadeh denied that he had ever said they could leave. Qotbzadeh's backdown appeared to come in response to the increasingly militant tone of the Moslem students occupying the U.S. Embassy.

State Department officials here said that it is just about impossible to know who in Tehran speaks with any authority. At times the militants, who hold no position in the government, appear to have more influence with the Iranian strongman, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, than cabinet officers. At other times cabinet officers seem to be in charge, only to be summoned by the ayatollah and chastised.

See a CIA presence

One key theme seems to be emerging, though, with increasing force — the theory of the students that Central Intelligence Agency officers are among the hostages. Although the students have called all 50 hostages spies, there is some question as to whether they believe that.

But yesterday, for the first time, the militants showed newsmen in Tehran a

document that they said was an August 1979 cable from Laingen to Secretary of State Vance discussing how to provide cover for CIA officers at the embassy.

State Department officials never comment on allegations of U.S. espionage activities and had no comment yesterday. It could not be learned here whether the cable was legitimate or a forgery.

But some of the terminology puzzled former intelligence officers who have read CIA cables from abroad in past years. The cable reportedly told Vance that "we should hold to the present total of four SRF officer assignments for the foreseeable future." It was not clear what SRF might mean.

The cable named two Americans who were supposedly CIA officers but were serving under diplomatic cover.

A key reason for the turmoil over the CIA now is that the agency in the past did play an overwhelming role in Iranian internal affairs. A CIA task force, led by Kermit Roosevelt, engineered a counter coup in the 1950s that returned the briefly deposed shah to power.

It seems clear from talks with officials here that the CIA is not currently carrying out any espionage activities in Iran.

But some of the more militant students are said to believe that somehow the shah will make one last return to power in Iran with the help of the CIA.

U.S. officials argue that anyone who really believes that is just incapable of listening to reason. Not only has the shah no support and bad health, the officials state, the Carter administration would under no circumstances allow the CIA to participate in bringing him back to power.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-2THE BALTIMORE SUN
2 December 1979

Iranians charge 2 U.S. hostages are CIA agents

By DOUGLAS WATSON
Sun Staff Correspondent

Tehran—The Iranians holding 50 Americans hostage in the United States Embassy here charged yesterday that 2 of their captives, William Daugherty and Malcolm Kalp, are employees of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The "students" who seized the U.S. Embassy November 4 distributed a purported copy of a secret message sent in August by L. Bruce Laingen, the American chargé d'affaires here, implying that the two men are CIA agents.

A spokesman for the Iranian captors alleged, "William Dougherty confessed he is a CIA officer."

The Iranians did not contend that any of the other hostages, including Mr. Kalp, have acknowledged spying or working for the CIA.

The captors did not further identify the two Americans except to say, "They are both with us."

The Iranians also released a booklet of other U.S. Embassy communications dug out of the files during nearly a month of ransacking the embassy. They charge the documents show that "this was not an embassy. This was a den of espionage. Here they [Americans] plotted against the people of Iran to loot their resources."

The communications presented by the Iranians are quite routine documents, containing the kind of reporting that nearly all embassies send back to their governments. Their presentation as "evidence" demonstrates what could, at best, be called the captors' lack of sophistication.

The one purported U.S. cable released yesterday that Iran could use as particular evidence against individual hostages is the one naming Mr. Daugherty and Mr. Kalp. Sent to the State Department from Mr. Laingen last summer and labeled "Secret," it reads: "I concur in assignments Malcolm Kalp and William Daugherty as described Reflets."

"With opportunity available to us in the sense that we are starting from a clean slate in SRF coverage at this mission, but with regard also for the great sensitivity locally to any hint of CIA activity; it is of the highest importance that cover be the best we can come up with. Hence there is no question as to the need for second and third secretary titles for these two officers. We [must] have it.

"I believe cover arrangements in terms of assignments within embassy are appropriate to present overall staffing pattern. We should however hold to the present total of four SRF officer assignments for the foreseeable future, keeping support staff as sparse as possible as well until we see how things go here.

"We are making effort to limit knowledge within EMB of all SRF assignments; that effort applies particularly to Daugherty, pursuant to new program of which he is a product and about which I have been informed.

"I suppose I need not [remind] the department that the old and apparently insoluble problem of designation for SRF officers will inevitably complicate and to some degree weaken our coverage efforts locally, no matter how much we work at it. Laingen."

Asked what the initials "SRF" refer to, a spokesman for the hostage-holders said, "You can ask the CIA and tell us."

What is clear from the cable, if it is genuine, is that Mr. Laingen insisted that Mr. Daugherty and Mr. Kalp be give diplomatic status within the U.S. Embassy here so that they would be protected by diplomatic immunity if they got in trouble in Iran because of the sensitive nature of their work.

The Iranian captors reiterated yesterday their threat to disregard traditional respect for diplomatic immunity and to try the American hostages for alleged spying.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES
2 DECEMBER 1979

In Iran, Students Step Up Pressure for 'Spy Trials'

By JOHN KIFNER

Special to The New York Times

TEHERAN, Iran, Dec. 1 — Pressure for "spy trials" of American hostages at the United States Embassy appeared to increase today as Iranians holding 50 hostages at the United States Embassy released a document that they said proved that two of the captive diplomats were Central Intelligence Agency operatives.

The diplomats were identified in the document as Malcolm Kalp and William Daugherty. It said they "must" be given "cover" because of the "great sensitivity locally to any hint of C.I.A. activity."

The students, who have held the American Embassy since Nov. 4, said that Mr. Daugherty had "confessed to being a C.I.A. officer."

Denial Issued by New Minister

In another development, the Foreign Minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, denied that he said at a news conference yesterday that L. Bruce Laingen, the American chargé d'affaires, and two other American officials who have been in the Foreign Ministry since the takeover of the embassy were free to leave the country.

The denial was broadcast over the state radio about an hour before the students insisted at their afternoon news conference at the embassy that "Laingen is a spy like the rest and will be tried like the rest."

There has been a rising chorus from the revolutionary leadership and the students in recent days that the American Embassy on Taleghani Street was not an outpost of diplomacy but a "nest of spies" and an "espionage den" that had interfered in the internal affairs of this Persian Gulf country.

A part of this chorus has been the threat that the 50 hostages will be tried as "spies" although they would be forgiven and freed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini if the deposed Shah Mohammed

Riza Pahlavi was returned to Iran for trial.

However, the prospect of the Shah's leaving the United States for some other country — a "worse crime" on the part of the United States than the admission of the former ruler, the students said today — put the situation into a new light.

Having insisted that the hostages were "proven" to be spies by the papers found at the embassy, could the Iranian authorities release them without obtaining the Shah in exchange?

"We'll cross that bridge when we come to it," Mr. Ghotbzadeh said at his press conference yesterday. But he also presented a hypothetical situation:

Suppose, Mr. Ghotbzadeh told the assembled foreign reporters, you had caught a thief. Suppose, however, that the thief had given your stolen goods to someone else. You insisted on getting the goods back, but the thief said his accomplice no longer had the goods. Did that mean, Mr. Ghotbzadeh asked, that you should release the thief?

If the Shah is not returned to Iran, the students said at their news conference today, "the hostages will be tried and the trials will be conducted on Islamic principles."

The students distributed copies of a telex message, addressed to the United States Secretary of State and signed "Laingen," concerning the two men.

The message was marked for distribution through "Roger channel" and referred to designations called "S.R.F. assignments." It was marked secret.

Contents of Message

The message said:

"I concur in assignments Malcolm Kalp and William Daugherty as described reflets.

"With opportunity available to us in the sense that we are starting from a clean slate in S.R.F. coverage at this mission, but with regard also for the great sensitivity locally to any hint of C.I.A. activity,

it is of the highest importance that cover be the best we can come up with. Hence there is no question as to the need for second and third secretary titles for these two officers. We must have it.

"I believe cover arrangements in terms of assignments within embassy are appropriate to present overall staffing pattern. We should however hold to the present total of four S.R.F. officer assignments for the foreseeable future, keeping supporting staff as sparse as possible as well, until we see how things go here.

"We are making effort to limit knowledge within emb of all S.R.F. assignments; that effort applies particularly to Daugherty, pursuant to new program of which he is a product and about which I have been informed.

"I suppose I need not mind the department that the old and apparently insoluble problem of R designation for S.R.F. officers will inevitably complicate and to some degree weaken our cover efforts locally, no matter how much we work at it."

Proof of Espionage Claimed

The students said the message proved that those inside the embassy had carried out espionage "and plotted against the Iranian nation."

They also distributed a booklet in Persian and English of the documents they had previously released, several of which appeared to show that the United States had been considering admitting the Shah at least as early as July, three months before he entered a New York hospital for medical treatment.

After the students said Mr. Laingen would be tried along with the other hostages, several reporters pointed out that Mr. Ghotbzadeh had said yesterday that Mr. Laingen was not a prisoner and that the only problem in his leaving Iran was guaranteeing his safety between the Foreign Ministry and the airport.

"Mr. Ghotbzadeh did not say such a thing," the student spokesman said. "I deny this."

Remarks Recorded on Tape

There was a loud burst of derisive laughter from the more than 200 foreign correspondents, most of whom had heard Mr. Ghotbzadeh make the statement three times during yesterday's news conference. Some of the correspondents recorded his remarks on tape.

Further questions on the subject were cut off.

Mr. Ghotbzadeh released a letter today that he had sent to the United Nations Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, warning that "American imperialism and international Zionism have resorted to a new plot to carry out their crimes on an international scale."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
2 December 1979

Iranians Say Document Ties 2 Hostages to CIA

By Jonathan C. Randal
Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Dec. 1 — Militant Iranians occupying the U.S. Embassy here produced a purported secret State Department cable today that they said shows that two of the 50 hostages they are holding are Central Intelligence Agency officers serving under diplomatic cover.

In a news conference held in a courtyard at the embassy, the Iranians distributed copies of the document, apparently signed by chargé d'affaires L. Bruce Laingen. The document accepts assignment of the two to the embassy.

One of the two individuals named, William Daugherty, has admitted he is a CIA employee, the Iranians said. The other name in the cable was Malcolm Kalp.

[State Department spokesman David Passage refused to comment on the allegation that the two men were CIA agents. He said, however, that the Iranians occupying the embassy "have an ample record of forgery, misrepresentation and fabrication."

[Passage added that "the matter of confessions should be viewed in the context of the circumstances in which the hostages are being held," noting that "they are into the 27th day under duress, in barbaric conditions."]

The students insisted the alleged document was "only a single example" proving their case that the hostages were not "simple diplomats" protected by immunity, but spies who face trial unless Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi is returned to Iran.

More documents existed "about CIA involvement in our internal affairs," the students said, "and we will publish them when we feel it is necessary."

The alleged document, dated Aug. 9, approved assignment of Kalp and Daugherty. In it Laingen said they "must have" cover as second and third secretaries, because of the sensitivity of the situation.

Diplomats noted that governments routinely assign covers to intelligence operatives stationed to missions abroad to provide them with diplomatic immunity.

The students also said that Laingen, political officer Victor Tomseth and Col. Leland Holland, the embassy security chief, are now considered spies. They have been living in a wing of the Foreign Ministry since the seizure of the embassy.

"A lot of evidence has been found about the espionage of these people," a student spokesman told reporters as armed men looked on. "They, too, will be tried, like the rest" of the hostages.

Underlying their emergence as the seemingly paramount power in the country alongside Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini himself, the students contradicted new Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh who subsequently fell in with their hard line.

In a news conference yesterday, Ghotbzadeh had said that the three U.S. diplomats at the Foreign Ministry were not considered hostages, would not stand trial and were free to leave Iran although it was not safe at the moment for them to do so.

"If they want to leave I will try to facilitate things," he had said, although noting that "providing security from the Foreign Ministry to the airport at this time is rather difficult with the tension in the country."

Faced with serious student denunciations, Ghotbzadeh made a radio announcement just before the students' news conference today. He denied that the three Americans could leave Iran.

If Laingen "and his two colleagues leave the Foreign Ministry where they have taken refuge," Ghotbzadeh said, "the Foreign Ministry will not accept any responsibility."

Ghotbzadeh's predecessor, Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, was meanwhile quoted as indirectly accusing Khomeini and Ghotbzadeh of having undermined efforts at negotiation.

"The point really is we adopted a policy that led to deadlock," Bani-Sadr was quoted as saying in an interview published by the afternoon Tehran newspaper Ettelaat.

Bani-Sadr, who was dismissed as acting foreign minister earlier this

week but who retains his economic portfolio in the Islamic Revolutionary Council, was reported as saying that Ghotbzadeh had spread false propaganda and slandered the U.N. Security Council.

This and Khomeini's hard-line demand for the extradition of the shah in exchange for the hostages "is not something that would be fruitful," Bani-Sadr was quoted as saying.

Diplomats noted that Laingen, Tomseth and Holland have not sought refuge at the Foreign Ministry. Rather, the diplomats said, they were there to demand that the Iranian authorities provide the protection guaranteed foreign missions under international law and dislodge the students.

A student spokesman said Kalp had not yet been questioned about his alleged CIA connections.

Once again the students declined to fix a date for the threatened spy trials — claiming the decision was "up to the people and Imam Khomeini."

But they hinted nothing would be announced until the shah physically left the United States for a third country.

"Letting the shah leave the United States is a bigger crime than admitting him in the first place," they said, developing the argument that the United States was responsible for returning the deposed monarch to Iran to stand trial for his alleged misdeeds.

Apparently stung by complaints by President Carter and other American and foreign sources about the hostages' conditions of detention, the students said, "We assure the people of the world and the American people of (their) safety, health and comfort."

There have been charges that the hostages were kept bound, prevented from communicating with any of their colleagues except those in the same room, were unable to change their clothes and wash themselves adequately.

Newsman's questions suggesting the press be allowed to verify the hostages' condition, however, were summarily dismissed by student spokesmen "for security reasons" which were never explained.

Asked about rumors that they had transferred hostages from the embassy, the students evaded the question. Instead they repeated their standard line that "the hostages are in our hands and we protect them

strongly. We are ready so that in the case of any military intervention we will destroy them."

Ironically, the purported document said the assignment of Daugherty and Kalp meant starting "with a clean slate" in light of the "great sensitivity locally to any hint of CIA activity."

"It is of the highest importance that cover be the best we can come up with," the purported cable said. "Hence there is no question as to the need for second and third secretary titles for these two officers. We must have them."

The purported cable described Daugherty and Kalp's assignments as "SRF assignments" and said that the embassy would "hold to the present total of four SRF officer assignments for the foreseeable future."

There is no indication what the letters SRF meant and one of the Iranians conducting the press conference suggested that the reporters "ask the CIA."

[Officials in Washington would not say what SRF stands for.]

Text of Embassy Document Given to Reporters in Iran

TEHRAN, Iran, Dec. 1 (AP)—Following is the text of a photocopy of what the militants holding the U.S. Embassy claim is a cable communication last August from U.S. Charge d'Affaires L. Bruce Laingen to Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance. Abbreviations and cable terminology are not explained.

1. S [Secret] Entire text
2. I concur in assignments Malcolm Kalp and William Daugherty as described refuels [reference to previous telegrams].
3. With opportunity available to us in the sense that we are starting from a clean slate in SRF coverage at this mission, but with regard also for the great sensitivity locally to any hint of CIA activity. It is of the highest importance that cover be the best we can come up with. Hence there is no question as to the need for second and third secretary titles

for these two officers. We must have it.

4. I believe cover arrangements in terms of assignments within embassy are appropriate to present overall staffing pattern. We should however hold to the present total of four SRF officer assignments for the foreseeable future. Keeping supporting staff as sparse as possible as well, until we see how things go here.

5. We are making effort to limit knowledge within emb [embassy] of all SRF assignments; that effort applies particularly to Daugherty, pursuant to new program of which he is a product and about which I have been informed.

6. I suppose I need not mind the department that the old and apparently insoluble problem of designation for SRF officers will inevitably complicate and to some degree weaken our cover efforts locally, no matter how much we work at it.

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 545THE NATION
1 December 1979

EDITORIAL

A TIME FOR
RESTRAINT

With the Ayatollah Khomeini's announcement that the remaining hostages are "spies" and "therefore" will be put on trial, it becomes clear that only concern for the hostages' safety is holding back an explosion of frustration and hatred toward Iran in this country. Violence begets violence, and one hopes that whatever the Ayatollah's next action or threat, the Carter Administration will heed the counsel of restraint, and begin a belated process of education explaining to the Iranians why the United States can't extradite Mohammed Reza Pahlevi under our law and our moral and political values, and why any attempt to bring him to justice must take place in accordance with international law. Carter should also explain to the Americans the motives behind the Iranians' tragic action. No peace will be possible between Iran and the United States until the Administration acknowledges our past complicity in the Pahlevi regime's installation and, by extension, its record of torture, repression and economic plunder.

The more we learn about the decision to admit the Shah to this country, the more his entry takes on the cast of another Henry Kissinger sideshow. It now seems clear that the Shah could have obtained adequate medical treatment in any number of other countries, and the Carter Administration has yet to explain why it submitted to the Kissinger-David Rockefeller pressures. Those pushing for the Shah's admission could not, perhaps, have anticipated the embassy takeover but they could not have been unaware that it would destabilize our relations with Iran and thus strengthen the advocates of an interventionist foreign policy. It would be a catastrophe if we permitted the emotions aroused by this affair to provoke a resurrection of the covert intelligence activities that saddled the world with the Shah in the first place.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A8THE WASHINGTON POST
1 December 1979

When the Iranians Bore Gifts

Remembering the Subtle Seduction of High U.S. Officials by Zahedi

By Eugene L. Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

Shortly before his sudden departure from Washington nine months ago, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's ambassador to the United States gave a Persian rug to Henry A. Kissinger for his New York City apartment.

The gift from Ardeshtir Zahedi was described almost casually by a Kissinger aide as "kind of a going-away present" from one friend to another. In this case, however, it bespoke a friendship between a former secretary of state and the emissary of the deposed ruler of Iran.

Zahedi had also given Kissinger and his wife a gold goblet as a wedding gift. Since Kissinger was then in office, that gift was turned in to the government, as were a silver tea set and a silver cigar box from the shah himself.

Friendships such as this, nurtured during the years when Kissinger was one of the shah's chief proponents in the U. S. government, would later form part of the backdrop for the crisis that has engulfed Washington and Tehran since the ailing shah was admitted to the United States for medical treatment four weeks ago, it has been alleged, at Kissinger's behest.

EXCERPT

At various other times, Zahedi gave away the clips, cuff links, Persian pill boxes, pistachios and gold coins, the last "to ladies he would meet officially in his travels," according to Delphine Blachowicz, Zahedi's personal secretary from 1973 to 1976.

EXCERPT

Blachowicz recalled the 1973 Christmas gift list as "mostly my work. I sat with the ambassador for several hours while he personally went over every name."

The final list, she said, included "20 in the White House, practically everyone in the Cabinet, lots of congressional figures and five in the (Central Intelligence) Agency." That year, she said, "The Turquoise Bridge," a handsome book of Persian art, was dispatched to Cabinet members and White House staff.

Also on the list, she said, were State Department officials "who dealt with Iran" and "a number of military people."

FLORIDA TIMES-UNION (JACKSONVILLE)
25 NOVEMBER 1979

Events in Iran underscore need for an effective CIA

"The lesson from the events in Iran is that America needs a stronger Central Intelligence Agency."

"Our intelligence operations have been operating almost as if America has one arm tied behind its back, while the rest of the world is swinging with both arms."

"Why aren't we anticipating these problems rather than reacting to them?"

"Why must we be faced with no effective options between being humiliated and sending in the Marines?"

These statements by Pennsylvania Sen. John Heinz are hardly original — just about any man on the street could make them today — yet noteworthy for two reasons.

One is the timing: All this has been said before — but now people are ready to listen.

Back in 1975, veteran CIA "street man" (spy) Mike Ackerman told why he resigned in a copyrighted article in the *Miami Herald*. His decision came after a secret meeting with a Communist source who was risking his life to see me.

"I realized I could not guarantee his security. There was no way I could promise

him that some irresponsible member of Congress or (CIA) ex-employee wouldn't leak his information or that some reporter wouldn't blast it all over the front page."

Former CIA Director William Colby earlier this year wrote (prophetically) in the *Washington Star*:

"It is often wise to use the minimum necessary intervention (CIA type operations) rather than order carrier task forces or Marine amphibious groups to the alert."

Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, at about the same time, summed matters up bluntly:

"(Today) there is no intelligence agency of any consequence within the United States government."

The second reason that Sen. Heinz' statement is important is that he puts the blame where it should be — upon the very body which can do something about it:

"Unfortunately, the blame for this sad state lies as much with the Congress as with the administration. In its effort to correct abuses Congress has reined in our intelligence community to the point where it is seriously handicapped in its basic mission."

Approved For Release 2009/04/27 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. R. S.", is centered on the page.

Approved For Release 2009/04/27 : CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 23THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
14 December 1979

Crisis played in a lower key

By Joseph C. Harsch

Perhaps it didn't mean anything, but on at least one day this past week (Dec. 11) there were no marching, shouting demonstrators performing for television cameras outside the United States Embassy in Tehran.

Was it because Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had other things to worry about besides the American hostages who had been cooped up for over a month inside that embassy compound?

Perhaps someone in the office for demonstrations in Tehran forgot to schedule a contingent for that day. Perhaps it was because a new consensus had built up among the Ayatollah's leadership group in Qom that the hostages had lost their usefulness.

The essential fact out of it is that the hostage crisis does seem to be quieting down. The new watchword among the Iranian leadership is that the Americans in the embassy are "guests," not hostages. It now is asserted repeatedly that none of them, not even those alleged to be CIA agents, hence "spies," would be killed.

Sometimes crises end like that. They just seem to dissolve in other preoccupations.

Ayatollah Khomeini does have other things on his slate right now. The referendum on his new constitution has not been accepted by all provinces, or by all other ayatollahs, in Iran. Azerbaijan province, in the north, on the Soviet frontier, is in a state of rebellion. So, too, are Kurdistan and Baluchistan, and the area around the oil fields along the coast. There is as yet no effective Khomeini dictatorship. Perhaps most important is that for the moment anti-Americanism no longer seems to be enough to maintain Ayatollah Khomeini's grip.

Presumably, if he could get any more use out of holding the hostages, out of abusing them, or out of general anti-American propaganda — he would do whatever served his purposes of the moment. But if such tactics cease to serve his purposes — well, call them "guests" and begin to ignore the whole business almost as though it had never happened.

The main beneficiary from the crisis continued over the past week to be President Carter in Washington. Polls showed his public approval rating at a new high. A majority of Democrats had decided, according to the polls, that they now prefer Mr. Carter over Sen. Edward Kennedy. Republicans were suggesting that perhaps Mr. Carter ought to begin moving away some of those US warships now in Arabian waters. Sen. Howard Baker, an important Republican presidential candidate, noted that having them near Iran could lead to some dangerous incident between the US and the Soviets.

In other words, Mr. Carter's rivals for the US presidency have a stake now in the earliest possible deflation of the crisis. A Khomeini outburst calling on Americans to vote against Mr. Carter was, of course, the best propaganda boost Mr. Carter has had in a long time.

A Herblock cartoon captured the mood. It showed all the rivals looking in horror at a headline: "Khomeini says: Vote against Carter." "There goes the ball game," say the rivals. Only deflation of the crisis could restore anything resembling the pre-crisis political status quo in the US.

PATTERN OF DIPLOMACY

The Western allies could share the hope of the rival American politicians for a deflation of the Iran crisis. It has brought down on them heavy US diplomatic pressure to join in boycotting Iran. They find the pressure unwelcome.

US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was treated with utmost courtesy when he reached Brussels for the dual purpose of promoting "new nukes for NATO" (Pershing II and cruise missiles) and rounding up support for the Iran boycott. He would have had an easier time getting agreement on the "new nukes" had he not had to try for the other. On that other, he got more politeness than performance.

The Japanese were also unhappy about the pro-boycott pressure. The sharp American reaction to their purchases of Iranian oil reminded them of the affront they still feel when they learned from the newspapers that Richard Nixon was going to Peking. They continued to buy up all the Iranian oil they could, find on the "spot" market.

Perhaps Moscow was a minor beneficiary. The continuation of the crisis, even though in lower key, kept attention away from reports that the Soviets had moved a unit of their own troops into Afghanistan. Their client regime in that country is still having serious guerrilla trouble in spite of rising Soviet support.

Guerrilla sources put the number of Soviet people in Afghanistan as high as 25,000 men. US sources think this estimate may be exaggerated, but agree that Moscow is doing a lot to try to help the regime in Kabul. Guerrillas say the Soviets have sent in 100 big armored helicopter gunships. The Soviet position in Afghanistan looks more and more like the US experience in Vietnam.

Perhaps Moscow got a little advantage out of bad US relations with Iran. It continued to pump out propaganda "warnings" against any US military actions against Iran. It was an easy and safe move since the US has no intention of taking any such action.

But Moscow has its own preoccupations. Its continued attempts to scare NATO away from those "new nukes" has failed. The Iranian crisis and Soviet efforts to exploit it have almost certainly shelved SALT II. Conceivably that project might be revived next year; but it seems more likely than ever that the Carter White House will allow it to go over until after the next presidential election.

Moscow's effort to sweeten its relations with its Western neighbors by a token pull-out of an armored division from East Germany seems to have come too late. It did not head off the decision on the new nuclear weapons for NATO. It did not save SALT II. US-Soviet relations seem to be at their worst point since Henry Kissinger invented "détente." Little is left of that idea now.

And this deflation of détente comes at a time when the Soviet economy is doing as poorly as is the US economy, in some ways worse. Moscow has managed to conceal its inflation. But it has not even tried to conceal its shortfall in grain production. It is more dependent on the US for its food today than it was a year ago, or a year before that. Soviet crop failures are putting Moscow in the same position toward the US that the US is in toward its foreign suppliers of oil.

The Economist magazine (London) says that in 1979 Moscow turned in "its worst peacetime economic performance."

Neither the USA nor the USSR is yet a "pitiful, helpless giant." But the economic foundation under the military power of both is sagging. For Westerners there is at least some consolation from their troubles in that Moscow is in deepening economic stagnation as well.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A15THE WASHINGTON POST
14 December 1979*Stephen S. Rosenfeld*

On Iran, Prudent

Iran means not only a crisis but a prize in the policy-making wars. Everyone is trying to lay exclusive claim to it to bolster the policy of his choice. The people who have been arguing for a military buildup and a more strategic approach to world affairs are saying with grim satisfaction that Iran nails down their case. Those who believe the episode proves that we should show more understanding for the sensitivities of others are, though not so numerous, no less insistent. The argument recalls what somebody once said about drinking: it intensifies the mood you're already in.

Okay. Iran proves to everyone that it's necessary to review old assumptions about how the United States should deal with instability in the Third World. The debate is yet to be properly focused. The show-we're-tough people, for instance, have not explained how adding more muscle

solves the problem of our being muscle-bound in dealing with Iran. The show-we're-sympathetic types have not indicated where to draw the line between showing historical or cultural empathy and being a doormat. But the argument goes on.

It is, however, too narrow. An important element is missing: the question of political management. If this crisis has proved one point beyond contesting so far, it is that skillful management, in the broadest sense, tends 1) to smooth out the differences in substance and approach that usually dominate our foreign policy debate and 2) to bestow political rewards.

Since Nov. 4, Jimmy Carter's performance has earned the respect of most people, as measured in the polls and—in the special Washington coin—in what people around town say quietly to each other. Vulnerable earlier, he has presented a shrinking target as the crisis has flowered. As a result, he

has strengthened his hand—the American hand—in dealing with Iran. He has gone far to separate his own standing from the disaster that remains one possible outcome of this affair.

Interestingly, few people are saying that Carter is playing it too hard or too soft in Iran, or even that he is playing it hard or soft. He has made those categories seem not really relevant. He has gotten people to take his performance on its own terms.

I think this goes beyond matters of tactics—threats, feints and inducements, ship movements, economic sanctions and diplomatic initiatives—though these seem to have been handled well enough. It also goes beyond the impression Carter has conveyed of being serious, cool and in charge—in this crisis, anyway.

I think it is that for the first time Carter appears to be accepting the legitimacy of all the purposes and all the instruments of American foreign

policy. That is, for the first time his policy is not inherently tendentious and divisive. The moralistic element, which has made him seem so interested in using foreign policy to struggle for the soul of Americans, has been subdued. Such discussion as there has been has centered on means, not ends.

We can all guess what Carter privately thinks of the shah, for instance. But publicly he is not turning his back—quite the contrary—on a figure who for all his failings provided services (keeping the Russians out, keeping the oil flowing, performing political odd jobs) that the United States prized highly at the time and that it sure would be glad if someone else were providing now. And what he does publicly is what counts.

In the past, Carter made no secret of his view that it is unworthy to contemplate the use of force. But in this crisis, though he has not yet been put to a final test, he has pretty well

tamed that prudish and unseemly prejudice. I am not saying he necessarily will or should use force in Iran or elsewhere, or that he has abandoned prudence for the big show. But his manner suggests, to me anyway, that he will do what he has to do.

The "students" in Tehran are gleefully producing what they describe as evidence of a CIA presence. If this turns out to be so, my guess is that many Americans will be pleased at the proof that Carter was not denying himself intelligence resources in a place where good intelligence has been in notably short supply. They will be pleased to know that he had not let the ayatollah staff the embassy.

In sum, slinging our weight around is not the answer. Nor is taking a crash course in cultural anthropology. Using our considerable assets wisely is the better way and, in this crisis at least, Carter has been following it.

12 December 1979

Shah's search for a home: US out on the limb with him

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

After working closely with United States presidents, Cabinet officers, and military men since World War II, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran sits under US Air Force protection in Texas, wondering whether that is his final residence.

In a controlled interview taped for Iranian and then US television Dec. 10, Marine Cpl. William Gallegos of Pueblo, Colorado, one of 50 US hostages in Tehran, expressed "hope" for the Shah's return to Iran, as his Iranian captors demand.

But only a small minority of Americans seem to echo that view, and many doubt that it is really what Corporal Gallegos himself believes.

The Carter administration is firm in its determination never to yield on this principle, and to guard the life of the Shah, a staunch friend of the US since the 1950s.

Neither President Carter nor any other US spokesman has so far been willing to address in public the question of whether the Shah should have permanent US asylum if he is unable to go elsewhere.

Since the US Defense Department took over direct responsibility for the Shah's well-being at his new residence in the Wilfred Hall medical facility at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, only President Sadat of Egypt has publicly offered a haven for the Shah.

At early stages in his exile in Egypt, Morocco, the Bahamas, and Mexico — before his arrival in October in New York for medical treatment — the principal Western governments had all privately turned thumbs down on permanent asylum for the Shah.

The Shah accepted President Sadat's hospitality after he left Iran last Jan. 16. Some administration analysts believe that if the Shah accepts it again, President Sadat's government, the cornerstone of US Mideast peace efforts, would be in great danger from extremist subversion. President Sadat himself, these analysts say, would be even more the target of possible assassins than he has been since his historic Jerusalem trip in November, 1977.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's associate, Ayatollah Khalkali, has announced that his "hit teams" would ruthlessly hunt down the

Shah and all who befriend him. Ayatollah Khalkali has said one of these teams was responsible for the murder in France recently of one of the Shah's nephews.

The Shah's eldest son, Crown Prince Reza, and his wife, Empress Farah, who is with him, seem to be as equally threatened as are his sisters and other relatives and close friends, scattered in hiding around the Western world.

Sheltering the Shah and Prince Reza, who has completed his US Air Force pilot training in this country, is likely to compound US difficulties in the third world — especially since neither the Shah nor his son have formally abdicated or renounced the Iranian throne.

In memoirs now being published in installments in Europe, the Shah repeats charges made to this reporter in an interview Sept. 18, 1978, and to others, that some American elements sought his downfall.

Although in September, 1978, as the revolution began, the Shah's suspicion fell on US oil companies, his blame now falls on the US military. He had worked with US military men ever since 1943, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt first sent to Iran a US military mission to work with the Shah in building the future Iranian gendarmerie and Army.

Gen. Robert Huyser, now commander of the Military Airlift Command, headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, went as top US military emissary to assist US Ambassador William Sullivan during the final days last January before the Shah's departure.

General Huyser's job, the Shah now charges in his memoirs, was to "neutralize" Iran's Army during his overthrow by mobs. The Shah quotes an Iranian general as saying General Huyser "threw the king out of the country like a dead mouse."

General Huyser has declined comment. But Defense Department officials, at the time of the Huyser mission, described it privately as an effort to prevent a budding "white" coup by top pro-Shah Iranian Army officers against the transition government of Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar, and not at all to speed the Shah's departure.

As former US Central Intelligence Agency officer Kermit Roosevelt describes in his new book, "Counter-Coup," the CIA, with President Eisenhower's approval, helped restore the Shah to his throne after a wave of Iranian support for nationalist Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq in 1953.

Azerbaijan: Camel's Tail Is Twisted

By Jonathan C. Randal
Washington Post Foreign Service

TABRIZ, Iran—An old saying has it that Azerbaijan, the populous, northwestern province of Iran, is like a camel: "hard to rouse and get on its feet, but once up, difficult to stop."

With the recent events in its capital of Tabriz, Azerbaijan is now finally involved in the very core of the Iranian problem, which it long seemed determined to sidestep at almost any cost.

Whether Azerbaijanis will ultimately crimp Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's powers is far from clear and events are still unfolding.

But this solid, hard-headed people, who account for a third of Iran's population, once again have demonstrated that they are a force to reckon with.

The best educated, most organized, richest and most politicized of Iran's ethnic minorities, Azerbaijanis consider the Persians not as their betters, but as their equals. In fact, Azerbaijanis traditionally have provided the backbone of Iran's officer corps and bureaucracy.

Theirs are not the demands for autonomy voiced by the smaller minorities—the Kurds in the west, the Turkomans in the northeast, the Arabs in the southwest's oil-rich Khuzestan or the Baluchis in the southeast.

For Azerbaijanis autonomy has the ring of separatism. And they equate separatism with the autonomous republic the Soviets set up during their World War II occupation of the province to reunite Azerbaijanis living on both sides of the Iranian-Soviet border under Kremlin control.

That episode ended in 1946 when, under diplomatic pressure from the

United States, the Soviets evacuated Azerbaijan and young Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's Army carried out massive reprisals against alleged collaborators.

Rather Azerbaijanis object to key provisions of Khomeini's handtailored constitution that give virtually unlimited powers far surpassing—at least on paper—those that the previous constitution allowed the shah.

Azerbaijanis also are convinced that they received less than their fair share of the country's oil wealth under the shah and that it is time for economic discrimination against the province to cease.

The Azerbaijanis feel they have the right to participate fully in the affairs of the Iranian nation and in its central government. And they are now challenging Khomeini for a share of national power.

They point to Iranian history. The 16th century Safavid Dynasty, which adopted Shiite Islam as the state's official religion to distinguish Iran from its marauding Arab and Turkish neighbors to the east, sprang from Azerbaijan.

In 1906 the Western-influenced constitution, which only last week was replaced, owed much of its impetus to Azerbaijanis' role in forcing modern concepts of the state on a failing Qajar Dynasty.

Azerbaijanis are also proud of their role in the Islamic revolution. It was in Tabriz in February 1978 that the drive which eventually unseated the shah took on massive proportions for the first time.

Tens of thousands of angry Azerbaijanis rampaged down the long Pahlavi Avenue—now renamed for Khomeini—

smashing banks, liquor stores, movie houses and other signs of Western culture deemed sinful by devout Moslems.

That set the pattern for a year of turmoil. Aside from the characteristic violence, the Tabriz riots also were distinguished by the disappearance of police unwilling to shoot fellow citizens and the overreaction of the Army, which killed scores of Tabriz residents.

It was also in Tabriz in November 1978, that the first instance was reported of Army troops in significant numbers throwing away their weapons and joining the demonstrators. That, too, was to prove an increasing problem for the Iranian military, which was finally paralyzed by massive desertions and takeovers of various units and bases by dissidents.

Listening to Tabrizis complain gives a visitor a clear view of their grievances in postrevolutionary Iran. There is a city which has never accepted outside dictation, and they are not about to start now.

They seem genuinely furious about Khomeini's use of toughs to prevent their Moslem People's Republican Party from touring towns and villages to recommend boycotting last week's constitutional referendum.

They are sincerely angered by Khomeini agents; announcements claiming that 340,000 Tabrizis, or all the eligible voters and then some, had voted and massively approved the draft constitution when only meager lines were seen at polling stations.

They believe reports that in some villages ballot boxes were stuffed with yes ballots before they were put in the polling booths.

And they are especially infuriated that their basically moderate reasons for revolting are variously explained by Khomeini and his aides as being remote-controlled by the CIA. Communists or SAVAK, the shah's once-dreaded secret police.

"We are like cats," a university professor said. "If you push us too far, if you mistreat us, forget to feed us, we will scratch."

"We Azerbaijanis will not accept peace at any price," he added.

But, like many other Azerbaijanis, he is beginning to realize that his Moslem People's party—and its moderate spiritual leader, Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari—relied too much on sweet reason and not enough on party organization, much less on military strength.

If indeed the central government succeeds in imposing its views on Tabriz, it will be because of that over-

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THE WASHINGTON STAR
12 December 1979

Iran to Form Special Panel On U.S. Role

By Bruce van Voorst
And Raji Samghabadi
Time-Life News Service

TEHRAN, Iran — Iran's foreign minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, says that the 50 Americans being held hostage here will not be tried as alleged spies before an "international grand jury" — which he hopes will meet within 10 days — can hold hearings and deliver its findings.

"The trial is not going to be conducted before the grand jury is formed and the results known," Ghotbzadeh said at a press conference yesterday.

The foreign minister indicated earlier that the hostages would testify in the investigation.

"We are going to investigate the American foreign policy in the past 25 years in Iran," Ghotbzadeh told ABC television. "Those Americans who have been here will testify before the grand jury on what they have done. Some of them are engaged in espionage and we have the documents."

(In Washington, aides indicated that President Carter does not intend to "sit by as a spectator" if the American hostages are put on trial. But press secretary Jody Powell refused to say what Carter contemplates if "show trials" are held in Tehran.

(State Department officials said yesterday that they cannot account for the whereabouts of about 20 of the 50 Americans who have been held hostages since Nov. 4 and that it is possible they are being brainwashed in preparation for a trial.

(The officials, who asked not to be identified, spoke in reaction to a Monday night television interview with one of the hostages, Marine Cpl. William Gallegos of Pueblo, Colo., in which he said he had not seen about 20 of the hostages.

(Officials said it was possible that the remaining 20 are being held elsewhere in the embassy compound under conditions similar to those described by Gallegos.

(But they said it is also possible that the Iranians have singled out those hostages they intend to put before courts on espionage charges and are somehow coercing them into making confessions.)

Ghotbzadeh, in his comments yesterday, could not say how long the so-called grand jury session would last. "That all depends," he said. "We are trying to expedite that as fast as possible."

Ghotbzadeh gave assurances the proceeding would be open. "Obviously, that's the main purpose of the grand jury," he said.

He confirmed that independent visits to the hostages are imminent.

"We hope to have international representatives visit the prisoners within a very short time," he said. "A visit is agreed upon and it will be done in the very near future."

Later Ghotbzadeh said that members of the local diplomatic corps would be included in the delegation, as well as outside participants. He was unclear whether members of the press would also be included.

Ghotbzadeh expressed little interest in how the militant Moslem students holding the hostages may react to the notion of a grand jury.

"It is not a student affair," he said. "It is a government affair where we intend to explore American foreign policy in Iran for the past 25 years. This is what we are going to do. Whether the students might give their grievances and testimony will be determined afterwards."

A spokesman at the embassy said an official student position would be released later.

The foreign minister dodged a question whether the United States might be represented on or at the "grand jury" sessions to answer charges.

"The grand jury is not a court," said Ghotbzadeh. "Generally the jury will be free to ask anybody and are free to do so."

Ghotbzadeh, who has repeatedly promised to set a date for the trials of the hostages, refused to do so yesterday. Asked flatly whether he would provide a starting date, Ghotbzadeh said: "No."

The foreign minister even hedged somewhat on whether there would be trials. Pressed further on a trial date, he replied with some irritation:

"I didn't even say the trial would go after (the grand jury). All I said is that the trial would not start beforehand."

Ghotbzadeh remained as hard-line as ever on the basic Iranian demand for the return of the shah.

How and in what manner the United States goes about this, "is more or less their problem," he said.

Asked whether, in light of Carter's apparent determination not to deliver the shah, there were other diplomatic possibilities, Ghotbzadeh said: "I don't see any."

Also a hostage

Some days following the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran, the State Department got around to lodging a relatively mild protest with the Soviet Union for what it termed "unacceptable" broadcasts to Iran.

Overshadowed as it was by the Iranian crisis, the news about this development was more or less lost in the shuffle and didn't attract much attention. Therefore, the Wall Street Journal has performed an unusually useful service in employing its considerable resources to discover what this was all about.

Extracts of Moscow's Persian-language broadcasts into Iran were printed by the Journal, and reprinted by other newspapers throughout the country.

A study of these transcripts gives a better insight into: 1 — The Soviet Union's incendiary role in the Iranian crisis — an example of the unceasing hate

campaign being waged against the United States throughout the world, and 2 — a partial explanation, although certainly not an excuse, for the irrational Iranian hostility toward Americans.

The Soviet propaganda is spiced with enough half-truths to lend plausibility to trumped-up charges of U.S. imperialism and interference in Iranian internal affairs, counter-revolutionary activities, and CIA espionage.

So much for détente.

The Journal makes a telling point in analyzing the Carter administration's soft answer to the Soviets despite their serious aggravation of a dangerous crisis involving U.S. lives and national honor: The administration, having staked its political prestige on ratification of the SALT II treaty, does not wish to raise public fears about Soviet duplicity lest this raise fresh questions about the treaty. In other words, the Soviet Union holds a hostage of its own.

14 November 1979

Several Iranians here disagree with takeover of U.S. Embassy

BY JOHN O'NEILL
Chronicle Staff

Several Iranians residing in Houston say they disagree with the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran but maintain that the shah should be returned to Iran.

Interviewed Tuesday as they waited for meetings with Immigration and Naturalization Service officials, they indicated some sympathy with the goals of Iranians demonstrating throughout the United States but disagreed with the violent anti-American actions taken in their native country.

Magid Ahrabi, 26, said he thinks Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is taking such strong actions to force the United States to hand over the shah because the religious leader is pursuing a personal feud with the ailing ruler.

Ahrabi, who said he is an English major at Texas Southern University, said the ayatollah is seeking revenge because the shah ordered the deaths of two of his sons.

He said he left Iran when the revolution was just beginning last year, but does not want to return until he earns his degree here. Ahrabi also said he is concerned about his safety in Houston because some Houstonians are becoming increasingly anti-Iranian.

Khosorow "Bob" Soltani, 26, who was in the INS office with his American wife Dagmar, 22, acknowledged that he was in violation of his student visa because he was taking a semester off to work full-time as an electrician.

But Soltani said he was hoping the INS will grant him a permanent resident visa

and allow him to stay in this country because he was forced by a tuition increase to suspend his education.

"I have a kid and a wife, and I cannot spend \$1,000 for tuition," he said, noting that when he enrolled at TSU in 1976, tuition for foreign students was only \$350.

Both Soltani and Ahrabi say that some Americans have made obscene gestures at them. The two men said they are concerned that Houstonians are venting their anger indiscriminately despite the fact that some Iranians have not participated in the demonstrations here and do not support the anti-American actions overseas.

"Even if you're not a demonstrator they (Americans) persecute you too, which is not totally fair," Soltani said. "Two wrongs don't make a right."

Mrs. Soltani said her husband has never participated in demonstrations. She said her friends have remained "very supportive" despite the recent increase in anti-Iranian feelings.

"When you come here on a student visa, you should study," Soltani said. "Most of the demonstrators don't go to school. Personally, I'm against the shah and what he did to my country. He murdered many people, and I think he should be sent home. But not this way. I hope the hostages will be safe. It's not good what Khomeini did."

Mrs. Soltani said that if her husband were ordered deported, she would remain in the United States because in Iran she would be persecuted for being an American and a Christian. She dismissed Khomeini as "nothing but a mouth. I

don't think he's really religious."

Nick Fardi, 25, a TSU graduate and owner of Mehran's Deli and Restaurant, 2405 S. Shepherd, described the situation in Iran as "terrible" and said he will not return to his native country until the religious fervor and anti-Western hysteria dies down.

He said his family in Iran has suffered from the revolution: "They (Khomeini's followers) took away our home. They took away our money."

Fardi said that unlike many of his countrymen, he believes the shah is ailing in New York. He said the people in Iran think the shah is well and plotting with the CIA to regain control of his country.

Fardi explained why the ayatollah and his followers refuse to accept news of the shah's illness. "They don't believe anybody. Because they are not straight (truthful), they think no one is straight. They are corrupt."

Fardi said he is not religious and is scornful of the Moslem holy men directing the revolution in Iran.

"They (the religious leaders) are very stupid. I know it because I was raised among them. They are against technology. They are against progress. They are not open-minded."

Fardi said he is sorry that Americans are being held captive in Tehran. "I would do anything to help them," he said. "I would exchange myself for them."

Jholan Jahanahmadi, 27, who identified himself as a TSU student, said the Iranian people seized the U.S. Embassy because they could not get justice through normal means.

5 DECEMBER 1979

E-Systems to sue Iran for work on 707 jets

By ROBERT DODGE

Staff Writer

E-Systems Inc. said it will file suit today in federal court seeking approximately \$15.2 million in damages and cancellation of \$4.4 million in letters of credit from the Government of Iran and the Bank of Melli Iran.

The Dallas electronics company said it would file the suit in U.S. District Court in Dallas charging that Iran defaulted on a 1977 contract in which the company's Greenville Division was to install communication and navigation equipment on two Boeing 707 jets owned by the Persian Gulf nation.

"We filed the lawsuit to protect the company and its shareholders property interests in these aircraft," John M. Dixon, chairman and president, said in a prepared statement. "We are asking the court to declare the contract in default and to permit foreclosure of liens existing on the aircraft. Once authorized, the aircraft will be sold at auction."

In its one-page statement issued Tuesday, E-Systems said the value of the contract, originally set at \$28 million, had escalated in value to about \$35 million by the time Iran defaulted in November 1978. The amounts to be claimed by E-Systems, the company said, represent sums due under the contract and other unspecified damages.

An E-Systems spokesman, who asked to remain unnamed, declined to explain why Iran defaulted on the project, how the planes would have been used or what efforts the com-

pany has made in the last year to recover the money it is owed.

"The company is being careful about the answers to questions due to the effect on legal proceedings," the spokesman said.

But according to a Pentagon source familiar with the contract, the two tanker-type jets were to be equipped with sophisticated electronic hardware for use in a "James Bond" like program called IBEX in which the latest American technology was being applied in Iran for deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Under the \$500 million program, the Shah wanted to establish a border surveillance system for Iran. The project called for 11 ground monitoring posts, six airborne units and several mobile ground units. Bids were submitted by four U.S. corporations including E-Systems, Rockwell, GTE Sylvania and Mechanics Research Inc.

IBEX, which according to some press accounts, involved the laundering of millions of dollars through Swiss bank accounts to pay for work done by American corporations, was started in 1974 when the Shah decided he wanted the best electronic ears and eyes on his borders.

Informed sources said the 707 jets were flown to E-Systems' Greenville facility from the Boeing Co. in Seattle in late 1977. While E-Systems has declined to say how the planes were to be used by Iran, a company spokesman said Tuesday that the aircraft were being outfitted with sophisticated

navigation and communication systems.

No work is currently being done on the planes other than that needed to preserve the aircraft, the company said.


The IBEX program has been beset with troubles since it began. A Jan. 2, 1977, story by The Washington Post detailed instances of corruption, payments to U.S. firms from Swiss bank accounts and the Aug. 28, 1976, murder of three Rockwell International employees connected with the project in Tehran.

The CIA has also declined to answer questions regarding the program.

E-Systems was one of many United States firms to have business with the country before the fall of the Shah. In most cases, firms selling military hardware to Iran were protected against losses under the Foreign Military Sales program which required Iran to establish a trust fund and make pre-payments on projects. But sources close to the Defense Department said the E-Systems work was not a part of the military sales program and did not qualify for any of the trust fund money.

The company declined to say how it was paid or if the Bank of Melli — the government owned bank of Iran — had failed to honor letters of credit that would have provided E-Systems payment for its work. However, the company did say loss of the payments would not have any "material adverse effect on its financial statements" because of a \$1.5 million reserve fund

CONTINUED



Greenville facility where Iran's Boeing 707 jets were being worked on by E-Systems

the company established in 1978 to cover Iranian losses.

Sources close to E-Systems have indicated there are a number of subcontractors who also worked on the program and who are also waiting to be paid. In its news release, E-Systems

said that its attorneys had advised the company "its liens on the aircraft are superior to the claims of third parties which may file lawsuits to attach the aircraft in satisfaction of their claims against the Iranian Government."

The E-Systems spokesman said the


company had originally intended to file its suit later in the week, but decided it needed to do so earlier than planned. "We will have someone there (district court) as soon as is physically possible," the spokesman said.

17 DECEMBER 1979

The Editor's Page

A Matter of Principle

By Marvin Stone



The search for a place of refuge for the deposed Shah of Iran has started a controversy in this country that regrettably is spilling over into the presidential campaign.

Obviously, it would be convenient if a foreign sanctuary were found for this sick and beleaguered man, thus weakening Ayatollah Khomeini's pretext for holding 50 Americans in the occupied U.S. Embassy in Teheran.

But this is not a question of convenience. It is a question of principle—moral and political. In simple decency, the United States has a responsibility to offer succor to a former head of state who was a loyal ally to this country for more than 30 years and who now, in his dying days, finds himself without a home.

To argue thus is not to say that we condone without reservation the policies or the behavior of the Shah during the long period that he ruled Iran. He doubtless was guilty of a measure of tyranny and corruption. But seven American Presidents did not find his "crimes" so gross or intolerable as to jeopardize their close relationship with the Iranian ruler.

Henry Kissinger put the point well: "I do not doubt that wrongs were committed by the Shah's government in his long rule; the question is how appropriate it is to raise them, after four decades of close association, in the period of the Shah's travail."

In appraising Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's regime, and our role in it, a little history is useful. Persia-Iran has been a violent arena through much of its existence. As late as the 1700s, political victors put whole towns to the sword or worse. The country has always been a place where one ruled by getting the other fellow first—because he was plotting to do the same to you. That tradition persists to this day.

One can go further. Were the Shah's transgressions any more abhorrent than those of countless leaders still occupying power, and some who are in exile? Indeed, who would argue that his excesses were worse than the Aya-

tollah's hundreds of senseless killings?

Diplomats have run into trouble in Persia before. In 1218, the Persians beheaded a Mongolian ambassador who was trying to make a trade agreement. In 1829, a Teheran mob looking for a fugitive royal eunuch and two harem women invaded the Russian Legation and hacked the ambassador to bits.

Historically, thus, it has been a problem to find someone in Persia with whom to safely negotiate. The United States found such a person in the Shah. And he was a friend.

In the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, with the Middle East in turmoil, he accepted the risks of ignoring the Arab oil embargo, fueled our Navy and even continued to supply fuel to Israel. When the U.S. needed intelligence monitoring stations to watch Russian missile tests, he offered Iranian sites freely. American administrations, Democratic and Republican alike, looked to the Shah to contribute to stability in the volatile and strategically vital Persian Gulf region.

Now he is a man without a country. He had assumed that, once his medical treatment for cancer in New York was completed, he could return to his haven in Mexico. But the Mexican government got weak knees.

Whether or not the Shah finds lasting sanctuary outside the U.S., he should have the assurance of a safe resting place in the United States as long as he requires it. Honor demands no less. And politically, if America succumbed to the intimidation of the zealot who now rules Iran, who would trust America again?

For Senator Edward Kennedy to drag this issue into the campaign raises anew questions about his judgment—and his steadfastness as a leader. He seemed to be implying that, if he were President, he would contemplate a deal of some sort—sending back the Shah. This is unprincipled, even as an electioneering ploy. It is the kind of loose talk that can contribute nothing to the resolution of the crisis and the release of the hostages.

Excerpts of Interview With Hostage Marine

NEW YORK (AP) — Here are excerpts from the text of the interview yesterday with Marine Cpl. William Gallegos, one of the hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, conducted for NBC-TV News by its correspondents George Lewis and Fred Francis.

NBC: Cpl. Gallegos, do you have something to say before we start questions?

Gallegos: I just want my family to know I'm OK. . . . I want everybody's family to know, most of all, we're all fine. We haven't been mistreated in any way, yet, at all. . . . It was just what do you do here. You know, what's your name? How long have you been here? And that's it. And then we were taken and just kept in our little cubicles. . . . I know everyone here wants to go home. I don't know what negotiations there are towards this, what's happening between the Iranian students and the American government.

I know they keep telling us they want the shah to return to Iran, and we'll be released. Other stipulations were that if the shah wasn't returned, all the hostages would be put on trial. I don't know what would happen after that, but I'm leaving it up to my country, my people. I have faith in them.

Q: Have you discussed . . . this type of political observation with your captors. . . .?

A: No, we haven't. . . . They ask us why, you know, (why) our government keeps him (the shah), and we don't have the answers.

Q: How do you personally feel about the issue of returning the shah?

A: Myself, as a Marine guard, you all know I'd give my life for any American — any American; any president of the United States. . . . And I just, I can't see it now. . . . In some way, I don't see this as a good cause.

Q: If President Carter accedes to the demand that the shah be returned, isn't that inviting similar attacks on other U.S. embassies elsewhere in the world? . . .

A: Yes, sir, it does implicate (imply) that in such a way. As, I don't know, I don't know, like I said before, I don't know the circumstances. . . .

Q: Let me ask you about human rights; your own. . . . What is your daily routine like?

A: . . . Get up in the morning, have breakfast, go take a shower, come back, read a book, clean up my area a little. . . .

Q: Are you tied?

. . . Not uncomfortably. We're tied with cloths so that we can read books and exercise. . . .

Q: You said, 'we.' Are you kept alone?

A: Oh no, sir. There are many, many hostages with us. I'd say at least 30.

Q: Are you permitted to converse with each other?

A: No, sir. The rule is, silence is golden here.

Q: Why were you the one singled out to do this interview?

A: I don't know. . . . I was reading a book. Next thing I know is; they come and say, "Come with me."

Q: What if you just said "no?"

A: I, I thought about saying no, but I felt that many of the people don't know what's going on. . . . I want them to know that we're okay. . . . I want President Carter to know . . . that we're relying on his decision to let us go home.

Q: Will you accept his decision no matter what? . . .

A: Yes, sir.

Q: . . . What about the psychological strain of being in that room? How do you see your fellow hostages? Are they holding up well, or are any of them having problems?

A: The strain is tremendous on all of us. We're holding up, though. . . . The hostages look at each other, they look at the Marines, and the Marines give them a smile of confidence. . . .

Q: What has the worst part of all this been for you personally?

A: The first two days; I would imagine, were the worst part of this — the takeover of the embassy — were the worst part. . . .

Q: Did they accuse you of being a spy, corporal?

A: Yes, sir. I was accused of being a CIA agent. I was accused of working in a "spy den." I was accused of, of many types of activities.

Q: Are you a spy?

A: No, sir. I'm not. I'm a United States Marine security guard.

Q: What kind of interrogation have they given you, if any, about the spy issue?

A: Nothing else, sir. They . . . made accusations, and as far as we know, the students seem to think they've found quite a few documents that implicate us.

Q: How do you know that?

A: I don't, sir. I said 'the students think.'

Q: . . . Do you feel like you're being brainwashed?

A: No, sir. Not at all. . . .

Q: There are about 30, you say, in this room.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where are the others?

A: I have no idea, sir.

Q: Some of the political officers who were at the embassy?

A: . . . I was with one of them, and after that we were moved down to this other place — mushroom — and I haven't seen the other one. And then they were taken away with some other ones. And they move them in and out.

Jack Anderson

Carter Was Advised Not to Admit Shah

In the backrooms of Washington, everyone seemed to know the shah was bad news. The State Department and Central Intelligence Agency advised against admitting him to the United States. It would probably incite militants in Iran, they warned, to storm the American Embassy and seize American hostages.

President Carter was aware of the warnings. In response to implorings that he admit the shah, Carter reportedly once asked his advisers ruefully: "When the Iranians take our people in Tehran hostage, what will you advise me then?" Nevertheless, he authorized the shah's entry.

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance understood the danger. On July 28, he sent out an urgent, "eyes-only" cable to Charge d'Affaires L. Bruce Laingen in Tehran.

"We are considering," the cable said, "how to respond to the shah's continuing query to us through various channels regarding establishing residence in the United States . . . I would like to have your personal and private evaluation of the effect of such a move on the safety of Americans in Iran [especially the official Americans in the compound.]"

Laingen warned that the shah's arrival in America could ignite anti-American actions, including probable reprisals against the embassy. Yet Vance advised the president to admit the shah on "humanitarian" grounds.

The shah's case was handled at the State Department by Undersecretary David Newsom. He probably understood better than anyone else in Washington the consequences of granting the

shah a visa. He was privy to the many warnings and prognostications that the shah's presence in the United States would mean trouble.

Yet Newsom's only concern was how to minimize the impact of the shah's arrival. He would have preferred, for example, to bring the shah into the country next year — after the Iranian situation became more stable.

Henry Preet, who heads the Iranian desk at the State Department, was in touch with developments in Iran daily. He knew the political ingredients in Iran were highly combustible and, with the slightest spark, could explode in America's face.

Yet on Aug. 2, he sent the American embassy a "secret/sensitive" planning paper on how to prepare "for the shah to come to the United States." The plan was to wait until Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini pushed through his new constitution and established a new government.

Then, the paper stated, "we should inform the new government that we wish to clear our decks of old issues on the agenda. One of those old issues will be the status of the shah. We could inform the government that we have resisted intense pressures to allow him to come to the U.S. because we did not wish to complicate [the ayatollah's] problems or our efforts to construct a new relationship.

"Now with the government firmly established and accepted, it seems appropriate to admit the shah to the U.S. The new government may not like it, but it is best to get the issue out of the way."

Proposed the State Department planners: "This discussion, with the new

[government] should take place after it is in place some two-three weeks and some few days before the shah would come here. In the meantime, we should begin to prepare the Iranians by telling them of the intense pressures for the shah to come here — pressures which we are resisting despite our traditional open-door policy . . .

"If there is no prospect for Iran to settle down, there may be an argument for going ahead and admitting the shah anyway to get that inevitable step behind us, but it will be necessary first to review how dangerous the situation is. In either of these scenarios we should aim for a positive change in our position on the shah by January 1980."

Instead the shah, pleading medical need, arrived in October. Sources close to the shah acknowledge that his ailments, though real enough, could have been treated elsewhere. The humanitarian appeal, in other words, was a ruse.

The compelling question is why? Why were our leaders so determined to admit the shah, contrary to the best interests of the United States? The usual justification is that they could not turn their back on a loyal ally and that they could not give the ayatollah a veto over who can enter the country.

Poppycock. Their greater obligation was not to the shah but to the national interests. A day seldom passes that the United States doesn't bar undesirables whose presence would not be helpful.

The pressure to admit the shah came primarily from David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger. Despite their disclaimers, they conducted a relentless campaign in Washington to grant the shah refuge.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1NEW YORK TIMES
11 DECEMBER 1979

KHOMEINI REBUFFED BY RIVAL AYATOLLAH

Shariat-Madari Refuses to Disband Rebellious Azerbaijani Party

By JOHN KIFNER

Special to The New York Times

TEHERAN, Iran, Dec. 10 — Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari today resisted pressure from Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the revolutionary leader, to dissolve the rebellious Moslem People's Party, which has been active in the Azerbaijani minority region of northwestern Iran.

"We cannot announce that the party is annulled," the dissident Ayatollah said in a statement. "Today it is the turn of the Moslem People's Party, tomorrow it is the turn of other parties. They want to make all these parties step aside to have one single party and we will not accept it."

Critical Letters from Seminary

Ayatollah Shariat-Madari was criticized today in letters from the faculty and students of Qum Theological Seminary. In view of the interplay of religion, law and politics in Iran, a rough analogy would be an attack on the Chief Justice of Supreme Court by the Harvard Law School.

The faculty of the seminary called on Ayatollah Shariat-Madari to reject the Moslem People's Party "so that this stain on the clergy and dear Islam can be removed."

A letter from the theology students contended that the party was anti-Islamic and had created the disturbances along with counterrevolutionaries, including the Central Intelligence Agency. This letter, too, asked that Ayatollah Shariat-Madari dissolve his party.

Ayatollah Shariat-Madari's statement, which was not broadcast over the state radio or printed in the newspapers, charged that the agreement he had worked with the ruling Revolutionary Council had been broken and that the council wanted to discredit all other political parties by calling them agents of the United States and enemies of Islam.

Ayatollah Khomeini's speech, which was broadcast over the radio and television, condemned those responsible for the disturbances in Tabriz. "These people are not Tabrizis," the Ayatollah said. "Tabrizis do not think of fighting Islam."

In an apparent allusion to Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, the revolutionary leader said people had been going into the villages calling for a holy war.

"A holy war against Islam?" Ayatollah Khomeini said. "A holy war on behalf of Carter? You wage a holy war so that Carter can be successful and take your country over? Those who come and say so are lackeys of the embassy and its affiliates."

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-10THE WASHINGTON POST
11 December 1979

Khomeini's Rival Forbids Talks on Tabriz Conflict

By Stuart Auerbach

Washington Post Foreign Service

TABRIZ, Iran, Dec. 10.— Representatives of Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council were rebuffed today in their effort to halt factional fighting between supporters of rival ayatollahs.

In the holy city of Qom, Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari, the spiritual leader of this region's Turkish-speaking Azerbaijanis, forbade negotiations with the team and issued a statement supporting his partisans here and accusing the central government of reneging on an agreement reached with him last week.

His rival, revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, meanwhile put out his statement blaming the troubles in Tabriz on "American spies" and calling on American voters not to reelect President Carter, whom he branded a "traitor."

The Revolutionary Council peace mission, headed by Finance Minister and former foreign minister Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, was only able to see a Khomeini representative, Ayatollah Mohammed Enghji. Members

of Shariatmadari's Moslem People's Republican Party declined to meet with the delegation.

Although the city remained tense tonight, there was no repetition of Sunday night's fighting between supporters of Khomeini and Shariatmadari, who is regarded as the country's second most popular ayatollah and the most revered religious figure here in his native Azerbaijan.

At the Moslem People's Republican Party headquarters here, Sadreza Moghimi, a party worker, said, "Khomeini is saying these people who want freedom belong to the United States. Please take notice of me. Do I belong to the United States?"

There was great confusion tonight at the party headquarters, an old building overlooking a roundabout with a small pond in the center.

Crowds were gathered in front of the building when darkness fell, and party workers had dragged large sewer pipes across part of the road to slow down traffic. The front gates were chained and padlocked shut, and armed guards sat behind sandbagged barriers on the first floor balcony with automatic rifles trained on the street.

Inside, party workers were rushing about and handing out weapons. Moghimi told reporters he expected an attack during the night from Khomeini supporters.

"Get out, get out," he said. "Maybe they will attack here. I will see you tomorrow—if we are alive."

In Tehran, Rahmatollah Moghadam-Maraghei, a political leader allied with Shariatmadari, was reported still in hiding after his office was raided last week. Revolutionary authorities said the students had found his name in files in the U.S. Embassy.

The file purportedly contained a report of an interview he gave to U.S. political officers in the embassy on the situation in Iran. One of Moghadam-Maraghei's recommendations was that the United States press for meetings with Khomeini to try to ease the strains between the two countries. He also suggested that Americans not in the government be encouraged to come here.

Among the two he suggested as representatives were Ramsey Clark, the former attorney general who met Khomeini in Paris, and Richard Cottam, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, considered here to have been generally friendly to the revolution. One local newspaper, however, changed Cottam's name to Richard Helms, the former CIA chief and U.S. ambassador to Iran.

EXCERPTED

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THE WASHINGTON POST
11 December 1979

Not 'Mistreated'

Hostage Says Fate of 20 Others Unknown

By William Branigin
Washington Post Staff Writer

A Marine corporal, one of 50 American hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, said in a television interview last night that he and about 30 fellow captives are being held together and "haven't been mistreated yet at all."

But the Marine, William Gallegos of Pueblo, Colo., said he did not know the whereabouts of the other 20 hostages and expressed concern about their fate.

The interview was filmed inside the occupied embassy for NBC television on condition that one of the student captors also be shown making an unedited speech that called for the extradition of the deposed shah. The captors appeared to have orchestrated the interview to refute Carter administration charges that the hostages have been "abused and threatened."

Nevertheless, the interview raised questions about the mental strain on the hostages, which was alluded to by Gallegos, and about those whose locale is unaccounted for.

There were several inconsistencies between statements Gallegos made about the hostages' conditions of detention and what has been reported previously by the students and witnessed by visitors to the embassy.

In a later interview by NBC, White House spokesman Jody Powell said the Iranian staging of the Gallegos interview "was a cruel and very cynical attempt to divert public attention from international demands" that independent observers be permitted to visit the hostages.

Powell predicted that this effort "will not be successful." He said Gallegos' statements "were made under duress and have no validity." He repeated President Carter's assertions that some of the hostages have been interrogated at gunpoint.

Powell said the comments before and after the interview by an Iranian student spokeswoman were "a challenge to the American people" and asked Americans to

write to the Iranian Embassy in Washington and the Iranian mission to the United Nations to condemn this "blackmail."

The spokeswoman read from a prepared speech that included exaggerations about events during the revolution. Appealing to a nation that she said had reacted against governmental actions such as the Vietnam War and Watergate, she repeatedly said, "Now is the time for another test" and called for the return of ousted shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who is recuperating in the United States following cancer treatment.

Gallegos said that his captors had repeatedly accused him of being a CIA agent, a charge that he denied. He also said that although he and other captives had been so accused, he had not been interrogated. He said he did not know whether the others had been.

After saying "the students here have been really good to us," Gallegos disclosed that he and about 30 other captives were being kept in "little cubicles." He described a room divided up by partitions four or five feet high.

Gallegos said each hostage was loosely bound and had a mattress, toilet articles, books to read and enough to eat, but were not allowed to speak to each other or their captors. The Marine, shown by an Iranian television crew throughout the interview with a large color poster of Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini in the background, added that "the cleanliness is really great."

He said the hostages were allowed to shower every day. This contradicted the reports of other recent visitors to the embassy, including Rep. George Hansen (R-Idaho), who said after seeing some of the hostages that they badly needed baths and changes of clothes.

The Marine said he was allowed to exercise at least three times a day for 15 minutes at a time.

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Asked if he would accept a presidential decision to custody indefinitely, Gallegos said, "Yes, sir. I'd have to, sir."

Later, asked by the NBC interviewers what he would like to see happen, the corporal replied, "We're not ready to hold out here forever. I don't know how much longer we can take this. And especially if the shah's not returned, I imagine it would get a little worse. I don't know."

Gallegos, 21, appearing remarkably composed for being held hostage for 37 days, lost some of his composure when he was asked about the 20 hostages whose whereabouts he did not know.

"Where are some of the senior people at the embassy?"

Gallegos was asked. "Have you recognized any of them?"

"Senior people as to who, sir?" he answered, showing signs of nervousness about the subject.

"Some of the political officers who are at the embassy," an interviewer said.

"I was with a couple of political officers before we were up here in some of the houses. I was in one of them and after that we were moved down to this other place, mushroom, and I haven't seen, I've seen the other one and then they were taken away with some other ones. They move in and out."

"It doesn't trouble you?"

"Yes it does trouble me. I'm wondering when I'm going to be taken out of here, where I'm going to be taken and what's gonna happen, you know, but as of right now, I really don't have any fears myself. I know that many other officers might have fears in different ways, but I have no fear from the students right now."

Gallegos never explained the meaning of the term mushroom.

The interview also revealed that the students are misleading the hostages about developments in the United States connected with the embassy occupation.

Gallegos said letters received from the United States were "censored" by the captors, who "black out" portions of the letters.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
10 December 1979

Iranian Troops Move To End Tabriz Battle

Hostages to Face Tribunal

By Stuart Auerbach

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Dec. 9—Iran's foreign minister said tonight that all 50 American hostages being held at the U.S. Embassy here will be forced to appear before an international tribunal, which he called a "grand jury," to see if they have been guilty of spying.

"Unless they appear before the grand jury, no one knows if they are guilty or not guilty," Sadegh Ghotbzadeh told reporters.

Earlier, on NBC-TV's "Meet the Press," he said this international tribunal will be formed to investigate "American interference and wrongdoing in Iran" since the 1953 CIA-sponsored coup that returned the shah to power. He said he hoped the tribunal could be formed within 10 days.

Ghotbzadeh said he wants the tribunal to be formed as soon as possible so "at least we can release some who are not guilty."

[In Washington, meanwhile, the White House announced that President Carter has sent Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti to The Hague to present the American case against Iran to the International Court of Justice, whose public hearing begins tomorrow on a U.S.

request for an interim order directing Iran to release the 50 hostages immediately.

"[In light of the importance and urgency of this case, the president has asked the attorney general personally to present the position of the United States to the court," the White House statement said.]

Ghotbzadeh's statements today did not appreciably clarify the prospects of the hostages, who alternately have been threatened with trial by Islamic courts and by the "student" militants holding them.

The foreign minister reiterated his Friday promise that international observers would be allowed to see the hostages, but he did not specify when. And, although he acknowledged that he has not seen the hostages himself, he nevertheless said they are "fine, in good health, comfortable."

He denied that any of the captives are being brainwashed and insisted that when the neutral observers saw them, "You'll realize all the propaganda [about the poor health of the hostages] against us is false."

Repeating his Friday statement, which had been denied immediately by the embassy captors, he said, "Those not guilty of spying cannot be held forever. The release of the hostages not involved is coming, but the date cannot be fixed with certainty." The militants have insisted that all hostages face trial.

The release of the hostages found guilty of spying "depends on when the shah is returned to Iran," he insisted today.

While the U.S. government has said the international tribunal is unacceptable, observers see it as a way for Iran to release at least some of the hostages quickly while focusing widespread public attention on what it believes are the major issues—the crimes of the shah and U.S. interference in Iran.

The tribunal is also seen as a way to defuse the anger of the students holding the embassy. Ghotbzadeh told reporters tonight the militants are becoming increasingly restive as time goes on without the United States returning the shah and with world opinion turning against them for taking diplomats hostage.

There was no indication here, meanwhile, that the special envoys from Europe and the Middle East countries have arrived in Tehran to argue the U. S. position with Iranian authorities.

Reports from Washington yesterday indicated that these envoys carrying details of a proposed U. S. deal for release of the hostages, had begun to arrive in Iran. The deal was said to involve release of hostages coupled with an international tribunal to investigate the crimes of the shah.

Diplomats from European and Moslem nations said they know nothing of any special mission coming here, but then they pointed out that success of any such mission depends on its ability to conduct negotiations in secret.

Ghotbzadeh said the idea of an international tribunal was not brought to Iran by any outside envoy but was developed here.

[In another development, special correspondent Michael J. Berlin reported from the United Nations that Secretary General Kurt Waldheim spoke by phone with Ghotbzadeh. A U. N. spokesman said the foreign minister agreed to Waldheim's request that he receive Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Said Hameed, who arrived in Tehran Sunday, and a Lebanese employee of the U. N. Development Program, Zohair Yammin, who is expected in Tehran shortly and will be Waldheim's new channel of communication with Iran.]

Ghotbzadeh complained once more about the basic difference between U. S. and Iranian positions: the U. S. only wants to discuss the freeing of the hostages while Iran thinks the only issue worth talking about is the return of the shah. Ghotbzadeh tonight repeated his call for a "gesture" showing that the American government and the American people understand what he called the crimes that the shah committed and the role of the United States in Iranian affairs.

He did not, however, specify what type of gesture he is looking for, nor did he say that any gesture that he considers satisfactory would lead to the release of all the hostages.

Ghotbzadeh said most of the information provided to the international tribunal, which will be composed of individuals from Iran and other nations who would be able to vote as their consciences dictate, would come from documents found at the U.S. Embassy.

These include papers that the students holding the embassy say prove that three of the hostages are CIA agents operating under diplomatic cover. Another document is a memorandum from the defense attache, who is also a hostage, saying that visa preferences should be given to top Iranian officials who provide intelligence information.

Ghotbzadeh said Iran wanted to "normalize relations" with the United States soon after the shah was toppled last February, but "even that was not honored." He said documents found in the embassy showed the United States is still trying to interfere in Iranian affairs.

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ON PAGE 1

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 December 1979

First ray of hope seen for US hostages in Iran

Spy trial threats recede, but latest domestic strife raises new concerns

By Ned Temko
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Iran has quietly put forward a compromise solution to the US Embassy hostage ordeal, envisaging a "grand jury-type" investigation instead of a formal "spy trial" of the hostages.

This, officials close to Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini said, was the meaning of a brief Foreign Ministry statement issued Dec. 7. The statement said the formula had been worked out "by the office of the Imam [Khomeini]." No date, however, was set for the planned investigation.

Foreign Minister Sadeq Ghotbzadeh told NBC television late Dec. 9 Tehran time that trials would follow for those hostages indicted by the "international grand jury." But senior Iranian officials explaining the plan privately earlier in the day strongly suggested that current plans were to substitute the less rigid forum for the trial process, not to have trials as well.

Senior foreign diplomats here were encouraged by what one termed "the first real ray of hope" for a peaceful solution to the 34-day hostage crisis. But they expressed fears that the mercurial Ayatollah Khomeini might suddenly revert to a harder line for one of two reasons:

- In a bid for national unity amid increasingly serious divisions within Iran.
- In response to any further public countermeasures from the United States. The BBC's World News Service Dec. 9 suggested, for instance, that the Carter administration was considering a possible food embargo against Iran.

"Things finally seem to be moving — not toward the ideal solution of the crisis, but at least somewhere," said a senior Western diplomat. "We [the West] have already waited a month. Maybe it's worth waiting for another week."

But there also was mounting apprehension that a rapidly unraveling Iranian revolution might tangle Ayatollah Khomeini's first, halting steps toward ending the hostage seizure.

Ethnic Turks in the northwest Iranian area of Azerbaijan — loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini's principal Islamic rival, Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari — were in simmering revolt. Followers of Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, an Azerbaijan native and outspoken opponent of Ayatollah Khomeini's plan of one-man rule, seized effective control of the provincial capital of Tabriz from pro-Khomeini forces Dec. 6.

By Dec. 9, the city radio station had changed its name to "The Voice of the Islamic Republic of Azerbaijan," Tehran news reports said. In apparent retaliation against the unrest, the Khomeini regime promptly ordered the arrest of a prominent supporter of Ayatollah Shariat-Madari on charges of "spying for the United States," one Tehran newspaper said.

[Reuters reported Dec. 9 that Khomeini supporters stormed and recaptured the Tabriz radio and television station. Not long thereafter Shariat-Madari backers launched a new onslaught on the station in an attempt to regain it.]

Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, although careful to avoid direct denunciation of Ayatollah Khomeini, told the Monitor Dec. 8 that the government was violating private pledges to give the 10 to 12 million Azerbaijanis greater control of their own affairs. Azerbaijanis make up roughly one-third of the country's population.

If unrest continued in Tabriz, "It would be their [the Khomeini regime's] responsibility," the silver-bearded Ayatollah Shariat-Madari said at his home in the Islamic religious city of Qom, about 70 miles south of Tehran.

Ayatollah Shariat-Madari — whose quick, easy smile contrasts with the usually stern Khomeini — clearly wanted to avoid a showdown with the Iranian leader. Azerbaijanis, Ayatollah Shariat-Madari stressed, did not necessarily want full autonomy, but only a greater say in running their own lives.

The problem for Ayatollah Khomeini is that other Iranian minorities as well — the Kurds in the northwest, the Khuzestanians in the oil-producing southwest, and the Baluchis near the eastern frontier with Pakistan — all seem to want outright autonomy.

"Giving in to one of the minorities means giving in to the rest," the pro-Khomeini governor of Kurdistan commented recently. One Iranian political analyst added, "The bottom line is that Khomeini could lose central control of the oil fields."

Ayatollah Khomeini could, moreover, lose control of the country. The "minorities" together make up nearly half of Iran's 35 million people.

The concern among many diplomats is that rather than tackle the issue of the minorities — let alone deal with Ayatollah Shariat-Madari's charge that Iran's new constitutional carte blanche for Ayatollah Khomeini "takes the people's right away" — the venerable Iranian leader might take a harder line against the Americans as a diversionary tactic.

The reported government arrest order against the accused "American spy" in Azerbaijan was seen as a possible indication that the Ayatollah intended to do just this.

Western and Iranian political analysts are convinced that this same strategy helped provoke the Nov. 4 embassy attack in the first place.

"At the time," one Iranian journalist explained, "Khomeini was under pressure from all sides: over the Kurds, over the chaotic economy, over women's right to divorce, over the new constitution, over everything. The idea was to whip up the country against the Americans in the hope that no one would notice the internal problems."

Still, Ayatollah Khomeini now seems to have taken the opposite tack. Diplomats point out that even many Iranian officials seem privately in favor of ending the embassy crisis.

"Perhaps," one diplomat suggested, "Khomeini will use a solution to the crisis as a way of creating a fresh consensus, at least for a time."

The Dec. 7 Foreign Ministry statement called for:

- An international investigation by a team of "anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist groups" of American "crimes in Iran" since 1953, when the briefly deposed Shah regained power with US help.

- "Introduction of the American espionage agents acting under the guise of diplomats to the [investigatory] team, placing the agents in full view of the people of the world."

- Placing "the results of these investigations before world opinion."

The statement went virtually unnoticed by foreign media. But senior Iranian officials privately recommended a second look, saying that the formula envisaged mere investigation and denunciation, rather than the formal spy trial threatened by the embassy captors.

No mention was made of a trial, and the Iranian officials said this was deliberate.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 32NEWSWEEK
17 DECEMBER 1979

BOREDOM—AND TERROR

They are awakened each morning at 6:30, and spend their day reading, smoking, writing letters and—despite themselves—listening to the ominous chants of the crowds outside. Conversation isn't permitted. Except for brief exercise periods, they remain seated in armchairs, their hands bound lightly though firmly in front of them, their feet bare. They must ask permission to go to the bathroom. Twice a week, they are allowed to take showers, though not to change their clothing. They are fed simply but adequately three times a day. At 10 p.m., they are bedded down on mattresses to get what sleep they can. For the 50 American hostages being held in the U.S. Embassy compound in Teheran, this is what life has been like for the past five weeks. Accounts provided by the thirteen Americans already released—and the sketchy word from those still being held captive—paint a picture of debilitating boredom and paralyzing anxiety, of relative physical comfort undermined by a growing tension that no one can escape.

Richard Morefield, a veteran of 24 years with the State Department, had just moved back from Bogotá, Colombia, to San Diego, Calif., with his wife and five children last summer when he was offered the post of U.S. consul general in Teheran. "We all knew the situation was potentially dangerous, and we had a family meeting to see how everyone felt about him going," says Morefield's 15-year-old son, Steven. "We all decided that if he wanted to go, he should." So Morefield went. The last his family saw of him was a brief shot in a television film clip the day after the embassy was seized by the Iranian students. "He looked sort of mad," Steven recalls. "Knowing Dad, he's probably telling the students 49 different reasons why they can't do what they're doing legally."

Occasionally, a hostage is awakened in the middle of the night and taken blindfold to another building to be interrogated. Often, the questions are punctuated by threats. Air Force Sgt. James Hughes, one of the hostages released just before Thanksgiving, was told that if he didn't give his captors the information they wanted, he or some of the other Americans would be shot. "That goes with the job," he replied evenly, and the questioning ceased. According to two State Department doctors who interviewed the returned hostages, the women were particular targets of such intimidation. Fearing that the embassy's safes might be booby-trapped, the Iranian students badgered the women repeatedly for the combinations. "As far as I know," says Dr. Jerome Korcak, "they didn't get any."

Kathryn Koob was not at the embassy when the siege began. She was at her post at the Iran-American Society on the other side of town. When the embassy fell, she stayed on the job and managed to keep a telephone line open to Washington. She was discovered a day later, arrested and taken to the embassy, where she was segregated from the other women—and pointedly excluded from the pre-Thanksgiving release. A ten-year Foreign Service veteran, Koob is described by her sister, Vivian Homeyer, as "the sort of person who says, 'Well, somebody's got to go and it might as well be me.'"

Periodically, the hostages' hands are untied for a cigarette break. The men are allowed more cigarettes than the women. When one woman complained to her guard about the inequity, she was told that smoking was bad for her health. "If you're so concerned about my health," she snapped back, "turn me loose." Because the cigarette breaks are among the few times the bindings come off, they



Reza—Sips-Black Star

Ahern: 'We will prove he is a spy'

are a high point of the hostages' day—even for the nonsmokers. At the end of one such break, one of the captured Marine guards refused to allow his arms to be retied—whereupon the room quickly filled with armed Iranians, who overpowered him.

Marine Sgt. Paul Lewis had always wanted to be a leatherneck. Folks in the tiny farming town of Homer, Ill., remember him as "a very clean-cut young fellow"—hard working, patriotic, a bit reserved. At the Marine security school where embassy guards are trained, Lewis finished first in his class of 100. His first assignment was the U.S. Embassy in Budapest. It was easy duty, though he once found himself forced to disarm a knife-wielding Hungarian. Late in October, Paul volunteered to go to Teheran. "You darn fool," his father told him. "Do you know what you're getting yourself into?" "Yes," he replied, "but somebody's got to do it." He was on his second day of duty in Iran when the embassy was overrun.

A cigarette break can be the high point of a hostage's day: Marine Billy Gallegos and Army Staff Sgt. Joseph Subic Jr.



Days spent reading, smoking and listening to ominous chants: Among U.S. Embassy personnel being held hostage in Teheran were (from left) Marine Sgt. Jimmy Lopez, U.S. Consul General Richard Morefield, William F. Keough Jr. and Michael Metrisko



CONTINUED

The hostages are not allowed to talk to each other, only to their guards, who often lecture them on the horrors of the Shah's regime. The guards also tell the hostages that they are tied up for their own good: if they were to attempt an escape, they would be killed by the mob outside the gates. The bindings are also used as a punishment, and Louis West of UCLA's Neuro-psychiatric Institute says that the treatment of the hostages seems designed to break their will. There are, West says, three D's—debility (the enforced immobilization), dependency (the total reliance on the guards) and dread (the threats of execution)—“which, when put together, will produce compliance in most people.”

Jerry Plotkin just happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time. A 47-year-old ex-salesman from Sherman Oaks, Calif., he decided last summer to set up a business to find personnel for American companies operating in Iran. He had never been there before. Plotkin arrived in Teheran on Oct. 31 and was visiting the embassy the day the students seized it. His captors allowed him to tape a seven-minute statement for a Los Angeles radio station. In it, he said he had been shown films of “a horrifying massacre” in which the Shah's soldiers fired into crowds of unarmed people, and he called on the U.S. to return the Shah.

The Iranian students occupying the embassy spend much of their time going through its files to ferret out evidence to back up their charge that the compound had been “a nest of spies.” Last week, they accused embassy narcotics-control coordinator Thomas Leo Ahern of working for the CIA. Displaying a forged Belgian passport bearing Ahern's picture and the name “Paul Timmermans,” which was purportedly found in his desk, a spokesman for the students insisted that though “Ahern was listed as a political officer . . . we will prove he is a spy.”

Teheran was Marine Sgt. Rodney (Rocky) Sickmann's first assignment as an embassy guard. He arrived there at the beginning of October and immediately loved it. “You guys wouldn't believe this place,” he wrote to his parents in Washington, Mo., describing the servants at embassy parties and the tables laden with food. “And they're calling this a hardship post!” But toward the end of October his mood began to change. “He said things weren't real good,” recalls his high-school girlfriend, Jill Ditch. “He had been up all night guarding the embassy and he said things were getting hot over there.”

For the hostages' relatives back home, the last month has been a nerve-racking experience that has driven many close to the breaking point. “You don't know if they are alive or not,” says Rocky Sickmann's mother, Tony. “They claim they are, but you don't know. You walk around in a daze.” The State Department's Iran Working Group has been telephoning all the hostages' immediate families every day, even though it rarely has anything new to report. Last week, the government brought 100 of the relatives to Washington for a briefing at which President Carter met with each family individually. Afterward, some of the families taped “person to person” appeals to be broadcast to Iran by the Voice of America, while others attempted without success to contact the Iranian Embassy in Washington for news of their relatives. In the end, there was no choice but to return home and continue their vigil. “We don't talk about the fact that he may not come back,” says Ed Prenevost of his brother-in-law, Victor Tomseth, a twelve-year Foreign Service veteran whose wife and two children were evacuated from Teheran almost exactly a year ago. “It's in the back of everyone's mind, but we try not to think about it.”

ALLAN J. MAYER with
DAVID MARTIN in Washington and bureau reports



The three D's—debility, dependency and dread—“produce compliance in most people”: Sgt. Paul Lewis, Victor Tomseth (above) and John W. Limbert Jr. (with family in 1976)

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ON PAGE A1-16

THE WASHINGTON POST
9 December 1979

Iran to Form Tribunal To Air 'U.S. Crimes'

By Stuart Auerbach

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Dec. 8 — Iran's foreign minister said today the government will form an international tribunal to review "the crimes of the U.S. government in Iran" and added that "spies" who worked at the American Embassy here would be displayed before that tribunal.

The strident tone of today's announcement by Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh contrasted markedly with the more conciliatory remarks he made at a press conference Friday, when he promised that diplomats held hostage in the U.S. Embassy who are not spies will be released as soon as possible.

Significantly, Ghotbzadeh's more conciliatory remarks were neither carried in the Persian-language press here nor broadcast by the state radio or television stations.

His much harsher statement today, however, was given full publicity in the papers, and copies of it were distributed to correspondents.

Today's statement marks a departure from previous Iranian pronouncements that the alleged spies would be tried by Islamic revolutionary courts.

Ghotbzadeh said today that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had determined that "the crimes of the American government against our Moslem people in Iran should be revealed to the world."

To do this, Ghotbzadeh said Iran will form a commission of anti-imperialists and anti-Zionists to look into "U.S. crimes in Iran" since a CIA-backed coup in 1953 overthrew the government of Mohammed Mossadegh and returned the exiled shah to power.

The spies who have introduced themselves as diplomats will be brought before the tribunal, Ghotbzadeh said, and be displayed to the people of the world — indicating the possibility of a show trial for at least some of the 50 hostages who have been held at the U.S. Embassy here for the past 35 days.

Broadcast journalists in Washington quoted President Carter as having said at a background briefing Saturday that he did not look favorably on the idea of an international tribunal with powers to investigate accusations against the shah or against the U.S. hostages in Tehran.

[A State Department spokesman immediately said any such international commission would be a "mockery" and a "flagrant violation" of international law and religious principle.]

So far radical students holding the Embassy have produced documents that they say prove that three persons in the embassy used diplomatic covers for CIA activity.

Continuing the hard-line approach, the radicals said tonight that the majority of the hostages were engaged directly or indirectly as spies.

"But they are all guilty," a student spokesman said during an interview with Romanian television. "None of them will be released."

Ghotbzadeh said Iran is determined to track down officials of the previous government of the shah "through legal means, wherever they may be."

He also promised an amnesty of some sort for former officials who voluntarily return to Iran, give information on crimes of the shah's government and "regret their actions at the court of the people."

These former officials, he said, "will benefit from the imam's (Khomeini) utmost forgiveness and affection."

But another Islamic leader here,

Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali, self-proclaimed head of the revolutionary courts, said the assassination of the shah's nephew in Paris Friday "is a warning to America. If it does not extradite the shah, these assassinations may extend to the area of the White House."

Khalkhali has in the past threatened to send "hit squads" after the shah and today said his group, Fedayan-e-Islam, had killed the nephew of the shah.

In Tabriz, meanwhile, residents of the predominantly Turkish-speaking northwestern province of Azerbaijan today prevented the governor general, Nureddin Gharavi, from returning to his office, which had been seized by local students Thursday night. Gharavi's attempt to get back in his office drew a sharp reaction from Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari, the popular Moslem leader of Azerbaijan, Iran's most populous province.

Shariatmadari said Gharavi's action broke an agreement with Khomeini. If such actions continue, Shariatmadari said, "I cannot be responsible for the consequences." He reminded Khomeini of full-scale war that Kurds have fought with Iranian authorities for their autonomy.

Indicative of the resentment that residents of Azerbaijan hold for Khomeini and the central government, they blocked a march by 3,000 Khomeini supporters and shouted, "Shariatmadari rules here."

Their anger rose again when they heard the state radio report that 100,000 persons took part in a pro-Khomeini march.

Tonight, unidentified men raided the Tehran offices of a political party with Shariatmadari — the Radical Movement headed by Rahmatollah Moghaddam-Maraghet — allied — and sacked the building.

CONTINUED

Moghaddam-Maraghe, Azerbaijani representative on Iran's council of experts, went into hiding after the raid, sources reported.

Later tonight, there was an announcement on television that evidence of CIA spying had been found in the Radical Movement offices. Khomeini and the official radio and television network have been blaming the last four days of unrest in Tabriz on the United States and the CIA. The United States has denied categorically any such involvement.

In other developments, two groups of Americans who voiced their support for the seizure of the hostages in the U.S. Embassy here showed up in Tehran today.

One group of students plans to spend the next week seeing government officials, the students holding the embassy and possibly Khomeini and the hostages. But they said their "first official act" was to hold a press conference in which they approved of the seizure of the embassy and the holding of hostages as being justified because of the massive crimes of the shah.

"The whole issue of the hostages and the question of extradition would not have arisen had the United States not allowed the shah into the country knowing full well what the consequences would be," said Franklin Glenn, a Los Angeles attorney who has defended a number of alleged political prisoners.

"The wrath of the Iranian people is a very justified wrath," added Lisa Radcliffe, a student from Berkeley, Calif.

Other members of the group are Clark Kissinger, a Chicago electrician who said he was active in the 1960s student movement against the Vietnam War; Carol Downer, director of the Feminist Women's Health Center in Los Angeles; Rebecca Chalker, a health worker and writer from Tallahassee, Fla., and Los Angeles, and Fred Hanks, an auto worker from Detroit who is a member of Vietnam Veterans Against the War and who was among those arrested for hanging out a banner from the Washington Monument saying, "U.S. Imperialism Get Your Bloody Hands Off Iran."

The other group, two University of Kansas professors, Clarence Dillingham and Norman Forer, visited the students at the embassy today but were not allowed to see the hostages. They said they had visited Iran when the shah was in power to help dissident groups here.

Also contributing to this report was Washington Post correspondent Jonathan Randal in Tabriz.

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ON PAGE A-1

WASHINGTON STAR
9 DECEMBER 1979

Ghotbzadeh To Set Up 'Spy' Probe

TEHRAN, Iran (UPI) — Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh said yesterday "spies" among the 50 American hostages in Tehran would be paraded before an international panel of "anti-imperialists" charged with investigating U.S. espionage.

In a carefully phrased four-point statement, Ghotbzadeh said, "The imam (Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini) is determined that the crimes of the American government against our people should be revealed to the world."

(State Department officials in Washington immediately protested any such commission. Spokesman Tom Reston said any trials, whatever the form, would be "a mockery" and "flagrant violations" of international law and religious principle.)

Ghotbzadeh defended the seizure of the U.S. Embassy 35 days ago and said the Islamic government would pursue deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and members of the royal family "wherever they may be."

"What happened in the American spy nest was not just a simple hostage taking, resulting from the emotions of some youths, but it is a revealing, revolutionary and aware action on the international level," he said.

Ghotbzadeh said the international panel, "with the cooperation of all anti-imperialists and anti-Zionist groups in Iran and the world," would review "the dossier of crimes of the U.S. government in Iran."

Keeping up the pressure against the captives, the foreign minister said the American embassy spies among the 50 hostages "acting under the guise of diplomats" would be paraded before this panel "in full view of the people of the world."

But he did not say whether the panel would be empowered to pass judgment on the captives, nor when it would be formed.

Diplomatic sources said the government might be seeking a face-

saving compromise and could be paving the way for the release of the hostages after they were condemned by the so-called international commission — but before they actually stood trial before Islamic courts.

Meanwhile, two University of Kansas professors, Norman Forer and Clarence Dillingham from Lawrence, Kan., representing a "Committee for American-Iranian Crisis Resolution," held 90 minutes of "exploratory talks" with militants inside the beleaguered embassy compound yesterday but did not see the hostages.

"We'll be meeting again with the students," Forer said outside the embassy gates. "We didn't see the hostages. We were just talking to the students."

Another group — six U.S. citizens — arrived here to support Khomeini's demand that Carter send the ousted shah from his Texas sanctuary to Iran to stand trial for alleged corruption and treason.

The six — from various U.S. cities — said they were an ad hoc group formed through contacts with Iranian students in the United States. They included a health worker, an attorney and an auto worker.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
9 December 1979

George W. Ball Show Trials

As some French correspondents have been insisting, the capture of our embassy in Tehran has seemed too well planned and executed to be the work solely of young amateurs. Though no one can prove it, there is some basis to believe that the whole operation is being orchestrated by well-trained Marxists whose objective is not to secure the return of the shah so much as to damage America's position throughout the Third World, and particularly the Middle East. The evidence is worth considering.

The "students" have shifted the emphasis from returning the shah to trying the embassy personnel as spies. The idea of a trial was not originated by the ayatollah; he merely endorsed a plan the students had already announced. In their treatment of the captives, the "students" seem to be following the technique used by "brainwashing" experts in preparing the Soviets' infamous show trials in the 1930s, which Stalin devised to eliminate his opposition. The students have already taken the same first steps used by the Russians to prepare their show trials: isolating the victims for a month and keeping them separated, forbidden to talk to one another, blindfolded, bound and insulated from any news of the outside world. Recently it was announced that the captives are being subjected to inquisition by "professional interrogators," which parallels precisely the Soviet method.

In the case of the Soviet trials, Stalin ostensibly turned the matter over to a prosecutor and left for a holiday. The ayatollah remains in Qom, leaving the trials to the "students." Whether he could control the "students" even if he tried is by no means clear.

One of the returned hostages reports that he was compelled at gunpoint, under the threat of death, to sign a statement demanding that the shah be returned. If the show-trial procedures continue to be followed, one would expect the accusations to be read to the victims at the beginning of the trial and—as a result of their brainwashing—they would, on inquiry, reject the right to counsel and plead guilty. During the trial they might be compelled to authenticate forged documents allegedly proving their guilt and sign confessions that the whole embassy was a "nest of espionage."

Were all this to occur—and it remains only a speculation—not only would the prospects for the hostages be grim, but the future for American interests in the Middle East would be dark indeed.

A victim of the infamous "Slansky show trial" in Czechoslovakia recently wrote that, although the "very smoothness of the judicial machinery ought to have alerted every thinking person to its phoniness," the people listening to his voice on the radio accepted the trial as genuine. Consider the far greater effect today if the brainwashed victims were to be televised as they spoke their dictated lines.

Throughout the Western world the trials would be recognized for what they were and largely discounted—except by those intellectuals who enjoy thinking ill of America. Even in the United States, there might be a fringe of the silly and gullible who automatically welcome any disparagement of their country. Self-flagellation, after all, is not confined to the Shiites.

But it is in the Third World, and particularly in Islamic countries, that such show trials could have a profound effect. For this we should in part blame ourselves. While emasculating the CIA, we wallowed so masochistically in the disclosures of its wickedness—its ham-handed efforts in Chile and its abortive attempts to assassinate Castro—that we have created the impression not only that the agency is guilty of every misdeed but also that it is 20 feet tall, with almost magical capabilities for evil.

Thus we could expect our enemies, particularly in the Middle East, to use the bogus disclosures at such a trial to blame the CIA for every act of violence that may occur in an area where violence is endemic. By stimulating anti-Americanism, the new show trials might compel major oil-producing states, including Saudi Arabia, to reduce their production under pressure from their more radical neighbors.

Obviously, the creation of a new wave of anti-American hatred throughout the Middle East could greatly facilitate Soviet penetration, since Moscow might then appear as the lesser of two evils. Or, alternatively, the Soviets might intend the trials to goad the United States into military action, since an American attack on Iran would inevitably send shock waves throughout the whole Persian Gulf area. By turning the Middle East against America, the Soviets might hope to extend their penetration not merely into a badly shaken Iran but into various soft spots in the Arab world.

The hypothesis I suggest would, if true, change some of our assumptions regarding the use of military force. The prevailing view has been that, if the United States were to use force, the hostages would be promptly shot. But the recent emphasis on the trials leads to another possibility—that, in case of an American attack, the "students" would still keep the hostages alive until they had extorted their "confessions," since it is the confessions, and not the shah, that would best serve communist objectives.

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ON PAGE A170

THE WASHINGTON POST
8 December 1979

Militants Spurn Earlier Pledge By Ghotbzadeh

By Stuart Auerbach
Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, Dec. 7 — Radical students today rejected a promise made earlier by Iran's foreign minister that some of the 50 American hostages they are holding in the U.S. Embassy here would be freed soon.

"We will release nobody, nobody at all," said a spokesman for the students soon after Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh told a news conference this morning that American diplomats who the Iranians decide are not spies will be released "as soon as possible . . . not very far away from now."

The Foreign Ministry made no comment on the student rejection. The students also said they had made no decision on Ghotbzadeh's pledge that visitors would be able to see all of the hostages.

Once again, this latest conciliatory move appears to have foundered on the wide differences on the hostage issue that are splitting the main ruling faction of this country. Ghotbzadeh is the third foreign minister—the other two lost their jobs over this issue—to have tried to get some hostages released only to have the move thwarted by the students.

When 13 black and women hostages were released last month, the students and the Iranian government leaders disagreed. According to sources here, it took the direct intervention of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to persuade the students to let the hostages go.

It is generally agreed here that only Khomeini can persuade the students to give up the hostages, but until now he has been stridently anti-American and for the most part taken the side of the students.

In a radio broadcast today, Khomeini urged Iranians to "rub America's snout in the dust," and he told them to go to their rooftops tonight to shout praise to Allah and "death to the world-devouring American imperialists." At 9 p.m., the air was filled with shouts.

Yet diplomatic observers here said Ghotbzadeh's statement could be meaningful, especially since he visited Khomeini at the holy city of Qom yesterday and was reported to have seen the students at the U.S. Embassy on Wednesday.

"Be optimistic, but keep some caution in your story," advised one diplomat from a Moslem country. "Much depends on the attitude of the United States to a partial release of the hostages."

Ghotbzadeh was unusually clear and unequivocal in his statement about the possible release of the hostages.

He said those hostages "not consciously involved in espionage, I assure you they will be freed—no problem." He added that those "who are guilty of espionage and have reached the limits of diplomatic immunity . . . those people are not going to benefit from diplomatic immunity."

Ghotbzadeh left it unclear today whether all the hostages would have to face revolutionary court trials before any would be released or whether those judged not to be spies will be let go without a trial.

He said he will make an announcement by Saturday about the trials, which if held, he said, would be before a revolutionary court judge with the students taking no active role in the prosecution.

The question of spies operating under diplomatic cover in the embassy has become a major issue here. The students have claimed that three American diplomats are CIA agents.

The three accused men are Thomas Ahern Jr., who purportedly had a forged Belgian passport and details of his cover identity in his office, and William Daugherty and Malcolm Kalp, who, the students say, were identified in a top secret cable as being CIA agents.

The students released another document today that they said shows that the U.S. Embassy here was "a nest of spies." It is purportedly a memo from Air Force Col. Thomas E. Schaefer, the defense attaché here, setting down rules for giving preferential treatment for U.S. visas to Iranian diplomats, and high-ranking military and police officers in return for intelligence information.

"Visa referral can be very valuable to the defense attaché's office for getting information not normally accessible through other means," said the alleged memo, which was stamped "Secret" and dated Sept. 18, 1979.

"Contacts are important, but only if they provide us information or open doors that will lead to valuable intelligence. I expect quid pro quo from these contacts and information that will show up in intelligence reports."

There have been rumors here that eight of the hostages—presumably including Schaefer, Ahern, Daugherty and Kalp—have been put under extensive interrogation by the students. The students have also said they want to try as spies embassy charge d'affaires Bruce Laingen and two other top embassy officials—political officer Victor Tomseth and security officer Michael Howland—who have been held in the Foreign Ministry since the embassy takeover 34 days ago.

The trials themselves appear to be a rollback from the students' original demand that the hostages will not be freed until the United States turns over the ailing and deposed shah to Iran for a trial here.

Observers here believe that government officials and some of the students now realize the United States will not force the shah to return to Iran. Ghotbzadeh in his press conference this morning, for instance, insisted at first that there were no new developments because the United States was "stubborn" in refusing to turn over the shah.

Yet later, he softened that somewhat with language that indicated to diplomats here that there is some maneuvering room to allow Iran and the United States to cut a deal that would free the hostages.

In another conciliatory gesture, Ghotbzadeh said visits to the hostages will be allowed soon, as demanded by the United States and requested by diplomats here. "The principle has been decided," he said. "Wisdom will occur."

Three weeks ago some diplomats were allowed into the embassy compound and saw some of the American

CONTINUED

captives. President Carter has accused the students of maltreating the hostages by keeping their hands tied and isolating them from each other.

Ghotbzadeh said the students thought there was no need to allow visits until "everyone slandered us around the world" by charging mistreatment. "We decided to let the world see for themselves," Ghotbzadeh said. But once again students in

the embassy indicated they might not permit visits.

Students talking to Swedish newsmen said the hostages are allowed 15 minutes of exercise, including some jogging, each day. They get three baths a week and receive a medical checkup once a week from a private Iranian physician. The students said no one is seriously ill and there are no cases of mental disorder.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-5NEW YORK TIMES
8 DECEMBER 1979

SHAH SAYS THAT U.S. AIDED IN OVERTHROW

Memoirs Say an American General Helped to Neutralize the Army Commanders in Teheran

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Dec. 7 — The deposed Shah of Iran was quoted today as having charged that the United States helped overthrow him by working behind the scenes to make sure that the Iranian Army would do nothing to save him.

This charge came in what the magazine *Now!* said was the opening installment of excerpts from the memoirs of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi, to be published this month in Paris.

"At the beginning of January this year when I was still on the throne of Iran," the memoirs begin, Gen. Robert E. Huyser, deputy commander of United States forces in Europe, arrived secretly in Teheran "with the clear purpose" of neutralizing the Iranian Army so that it would not fight for the Shah's beleaguered regime.

The Shah said, according to the magazine, that the only time he saw the general in Teheran was when the officer accompanied Ambassador William H. Sullivan for "one of the last interviews that I had" with the American envoy.

"The one thing that was on the minds of both of them was to know on what day and at what time I should be leaving," the



Gen. Robert E. Huyser

Shah was quoted as having declared. He left Teheran Jan. 18, ostensibly for a vacation, and the Government of Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar, whom he appointed, was deposed on Feb. 11.

No Comment From Washington

There was no immediate comment from Washington on today's installment, which bore the headline "How the Americans Overthrew Me."

General Huyser, currently the chief of the United States Military Airlift Command at Scott Air Force Base in Illinois, declined comment, saying through a spokesman that any statement by him "could be counterproductive to our national effort."

Though the memoirs say that General Huyser went to Teheran in January secretly, news reports at the time said he had been sent there by the Carter Administration. His purpose, according to these reports, was to try to persuade the Iranian armed forces not to stage a coup but to support the Government of Prime Minister Bakhtiar that had been appointed in a last-ditch effort to end the anti-Shah disorders in Iran.

A second purpose of the general's mission was said to have been to try to safeguard the United States planes and missiles that had been provided to the Shah but that appeared imperiled by a rising rebellion among air force technicians and cadets.

U.S. Advised Shah to Leave

Also at the beginning of January, the Carter Administration decided to advise the Shah that it would be best for the stability of Iran if he left the country temporarily. This decision followed many weeks of hoping that the Iranian leader could remain in the country and put down the rising disorders.

It was reported on Jan. 8 that Ambassador Sullivan had received new instructions allowing him to reply favorably if the Shah asked whether the envoy thought he should go abroad to give the Bakhtiar Government a better chance of survival.

According to the memoirs, excerpts from which were also published in the French magazine *L'Express* and other European periodicals, the Shah said he did not share Washington's belief in January that the armed forces might stage a coup against the Bakhtiar Government and touch off civil war.

"My officers were bound by their oath of allegiance to the crown and the Constitution," he continued, according to the publications. "As long as the Constitution was respected they would not falter. But the intelligence services of NATO and the C.I.A. may have had good reason for thinking that the Constitution would be abused. It was therefore necessary to neutralize the Iranian Army. That was clearly the purpose which brought General Huyser to Teheran."

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17 DECEMBER 1979

Nation

TIME/DEC. 17, 1979

The Hostages in Danger

If he had remained Foreign Minister, said Bani-sadr, he would not have boycotted the U.N. Security Council debate but would have shown up with a pile of documents to make Iran's case against the U.S. and the Shah. Said he: "My idea was to open the file of the Shah's regime to the inspection of the whole world as a documented case of the consequences of American domination."

During the interview, Bani-sadr provided some revealing glimpses into Iranian leaders' misconceptions about Americans. He insisted that by exposing the "entire network of corrupt dealings and ties between the Shah and U.S. Government officials," he might have caused Americans to turn on the Carter Administration. Said he: "It is only this policy that can persuade Americans to push for a different regime." He claimed that the Administration was playing a cynical game with the lives of the hostages. Said he: "I don't think that the Americans are concerned very much about the fate of the hostages. They have seized this opportunity to isolate our revolution. If they achieve this objective at the expense of the hostages, they will have paid, from their viewpoint, a bargain price."

To buttress their claims that the embassy was a "nest of spies," the students released a copy of a purported cable to the State Department. It indicated that a William Daugherty and a Malcolm Kalp, who the militants claimed were among the hostages, were CIA officers. The document also implied that there were two other CIA operatives on the embassy staff who were not named. In addition, the students displayed a faked Belgian passport and detailed instructions on how it was to be used with a set of forged immigration stamps to give the appearance that the passport bearer had gone in and out of Iran. The militants said the faked passport belonged to a hostage named Thomas Ahern Jr., who they said was the embassy's narcotics-control officer.

The existence of CIA officers in the embassy would be no surprise. Indeed, intelligence experts were puzzled that the

U.S. apparently had so few. The Soviet embassy in Tehran has a far larger complement of KGB operatives. The U.S. reduced its CIA staff in Tehran after the revolution to lessen the chances of antagonizing the new government. In any event, the accepted practice is to expel foreign diplomats suspected of being spies, not put them on trial.

With the referendum behind him, the next step for Khomeini was to name the members of his new government. But this process was suddenly interrupted by the revolt of the Azerbaijani Turks, who fol-

low the leadership of Iran's second most powerful ayatullah, Sharietmadari. They number about 13 million out of Iran's total population of 35 million, and have long sought autonomy. When Sharietmadari expressed mild reservations about the new constitution—he wanted some checks on Khomeini's power—and said that he would boycott the polls, most of his followers in Azerbaijan followed suit.

Two days after the referendum, trouble broke out in Qum, where Khomeini, Sharietmadari and most of Iran's top Shi'ite leaders live. Several hundred Khomeini supporters gathered in the bazaar, shouting slogans against Sharietmadari, and then marched on his house. Among them were young men in black shirts, beating themselves with chain flails—the traditional Shi'ite expression of penitence. They clashed with a group of Azerbaijanis who had made a pilgrimage to Qum to see Sharietmadari. Pro-Khomeini guards fired into the air and used tear gas to disperse the crowd. Later, an unidentified sniper killed one man guarding Sharietmadari's house. Subsequently, an Iranian soldier was killed and nine people injured.

The shootings prompted a march by 30,000 Sharietmadari followers in Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan province, and the march quickly turned into a full-scale revolt. The insurgents seized control of government buildings, the governor's mansion and the local headquarters of the national radio and television station. They sent Khomeini's officials fleeing with the admonition: "You return, you die!" The rebels were joined by local units of the Iranian army and air force and the police,

in both Tabriz and the nearby towns in the rugged mountains of the western part of Iran, near the borders of Turkey and Iraq. From Qum, Sharietmadari appealed to his supporters to remain peaceful. He pointedly did not criticize their revolt, but he did rule out secession. Said he: "We want to establish the framework for giving full liberty [meaning self-rule] to Azerbaijan, but it is part of Iran."

Khomeini also reacted cautiously, pleading that Iranians cease fighting among themselves and concentrate "on the confrontation with the U.S." But he acted quickly to forestall trouble in the province of Kurdistan, to the south of Azerbaijan. The 4 million Kurds, who revolted unsuccessfully against Tehran's rule last summer, had boycotted the referendum too. Late last week Khomeini's revolutionary guards that were supposed to pull out of Kurdistan stayed on. The Ayatullah also faces potential trouble among Iran's other minorities, particularly the Baluchi tribesmen in the southeast, Turkomans in the northeast and the Arabs in the southwest.

Another problem facing Khomeini is the declining state of the Iranian economy. Nationalization of banks, insurance companies and large industrial firms has caused virtual chaos. About a third of the country's work force is unemployed, and inflation is running at 40%. Nonetheless, support remains strong for Khomeini and the principles of Iran's Islamic revolution.

In the U.S. there has evolved a similarly firm nationwide determination—that the hostages must be freed. Some Administration officials see not just deadlock and frustration in the events of the past weeks, but an opportunity too. They interpret the national mood as marking the end of the Viet Nam decade of doubt about America and its role. They forecast a substantial increase in the U.S. armed forces and a willingness to make it plain that these forces would be used to defend America's just interests. ■

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SALT

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ARTICLE APPEARED
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15 DECEMBER 1979

Spotlight on Congress

SALT II

Stumbling Block

By REP. DAN QUAYLE (R-Ind.)

Although the Senate Intelligence Committee issued a scaled-down public report which raised few questions about the United States' ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the SALT II treaty, it has become apparent that the report inflated the "good news" and ignored the "bad news."

A recent newspaper column by nationally known columnists Evans and Novak revealed that a more voluminous secret report has been produced by the committee, which is restricted only to the 100 senators themselves, and raises serious questions about verification. In fact, the columnists reported that "the secret code-word report states unequivocally that the SALT II protocol (lasting to Dec. 31, 1981) cannot be verified."

There obviously are delicate security matters involved in America's intelligence monitoring capabilities, but the American public is entitled to a frank and candid appraisal which truthfully reflects our ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the treaty.

Significantly, Sen. Barry Goldwater [R.-Ariz.], vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, on Nov. 8, 1979, reversed his earlier judgment that the treaty was adequately verifiable. In a statement on the Senate floor, Sen. Goldwater said he had "doubts now of a sufficient nature to cause me to say

that I do not feel that we can depend on the verification capabilities of this country...."

The senator has expressed concern that certain new intelligence equipment, which was expected to replace monitoring sites lost in Iran, has not been put in place and there is reason to believe it will not be ready in the future.

It is apparent that the SALT II treaty imposes substantial imbalances on the United States. These imbalances range from permitting the Russians to have 308 heavy missiles while we have none; exclusion of the Soviet Backfire bomber from the treaty's limits but counting our aging B-52's; and severe limitation on cruise missile ranges.

In the light of these imbalances, it is imperative that the United States have the capability to determine whether or not the Soviets are cheating. The public report of the Senate Intelligence Committee does little to reassure us on this point—but the revelations of the Evans-Novak column concerning conclusions of the top-secret report along with the actions of Sen. Goldwater should raise a "red flag" that should be heeded.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 18HUMAN EVENTS
15 DECEMBER 1979

Conservative Forum

Buchanan Wrong on Intelligence Failure

The conservatives are making a mistake if they adopt the attitude displayed by Patrick Buchanan in his Oct. 27, 1979, column in HUMAN EVENTS. Blaming the intelligence community as a whole for so-called "intelligence failures" is uncalled for. Often times, political considerations dictate what is revealed to the public and when. Two examples out of many will illustrate this point.

First of all, the public is told that the Soviet brigade in Cuba is new. Castro says that they have been there for 17 years as a "training brigade." What is the truth? Former Air Force Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Gen. George Keegan has stated publicly on more than one occasion that the Soviets have been in Cuba since 1962 and that every President since that time has been aware of their presence. Their mission has been training, but that they are indeed a combat brigade. In fact, the number of brigades is down from three. Is this an intelligence failure or a failure of the politicians to level with us?

Dealing specifically with a charge leveled in his column, Buchanan termed Tet of 1968 as an intelligence failure. This is not the case. There were many intelligence warnings about the attack. There were intercepted radio communications about the attack, there were agent reports detailing specific targets for attack, and there were numerous other reliable indicators pointing to the attack. The plain truth is that political decisions were made by the Johnson White House to ignore these warnings because they might interfere with 1968 and the election.

Mr. Buchanan is correct in being apprehensive about the verification process for SALT II. Again, not because of the failure of intelligence. We cannot rely upon the so-called technical verification process advocated by the Administration. Our satellites are vulnerable to destruction or blinding by electronic and/or electro-optical devices held by the Soviets. They maintain the capability to fool or jam our electronic intelligence-gathering equipment. Even if this were not enough, they are also past masters of the art of strategic military deception, which means that they have the capability of using camouflage and other means of deception to fool our means of determining compliance with the SALT II accords. These facts are not new to those of us who have been in intelligence. The politicians have chosen to ignore them.

These examples are just a sampling of what is available to those who seek the truth. The failure, Mr. Buchanan, is not with intelligence, but with those who choose or not choose to employ what is learned.

—Larry J. O'Daniel
Toms River, N.J.

(Editor's note: Mr. O'Daniel is a former Army captain in military intelligence who served in the Phoenix Program in Vietnam and also served for three years on the staff and faculty of the Army Electronic Warfare School engaged and trained in electronic warfare and tactical cover and deception.)

DETROIT NEWS
6 DECEMBER 1979

Our Opinions

Sen. Levin and SALT II

A letter from Sen. Carl Levin, which appeared in The Detroit News on Tuesday, took issue with our Nov. 25 editorial, entitled "SALT II, Phase II."

The editorial argued against ratification of the treaty because the Soviets would gain strategic advantages from it and because it would be nearly impossible to verify Soviet compliance.

One of the most fearful weaknesses of this arms agreement is that while it allows each side 820 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) armed with multiple warheads, in reality it accedes to Soviet superiority because America cannot possibly build more than 550 of the ICBM's by 1985, and the Soviet Union is positioned to build all 820.

Sen. Levin dismisses this point casually, saying the United States decided long ago not to build more than 550 ICBM's and that this decision has nothing whatever to do with SALT II. What he does not explain is why Washington should concede this considerable advantage to the USSR. Why does the agreement not restrict the USSR to 550, to



establish "equivalency"? These numbers, we believe, have everything to do with SALT II.

Sen. Levin states that the United States has about 9,200 warheads, the Soviet Union about 5,000. Both sides are expected to "deploy" 10,000 to 12,000 warheads by 1985. Presumably, the senator expects his constituents to be reassured by these estimates.

But this argument once again ignores the basic question of firepower. American land-based missile silos use the "hot-launch" technique. After the tube has been fired, it must

be cooled and cleaned before reuse. Soviet missilemen use the "cold-launch" technique. The missile is lofted by compressed air and the engines are ignited above the silo. The silo is immediately reusable.

The USSR has rapid-fire capability. America does not. The Soviets can launch up to 10 warheads on some missiles. The United States is limited to three. These disparities may have a technical ring, but they are real and they are dangerous.

Sen. Levin writes of the triad — land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and heavy bombers — and says no matter what, America will have plenty of firepower to answer any first strike.

Not so. Sometime in the 1980's, the USSR will have a first-strike force capable of destroying 90 percent of America's land-based ICBM's, half the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), and 60 percent of the B52 bombers. To so cripple America's strategic capacity, the Soviet Union would require only one-fifth to one-third of its missiles. Would a president of the United States risk incineration of the nation's cities by ordering a weak retaliatory strike? This question is central. The senator has not answered it.

CIA Director Stansfield Turner and Gen. David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have assured Sen. Levin and the nation that Soviet compliance with the treaty can be verified. Their flat assertions are not enriched, however, with supporting information.

Compliance is to be verified primarily by surveillance satellites. The USSR has demonstrated an ability to blind or destroy such satellites. Further, there are too many uncounted weapons that can be quietly and quickly upgraded to intercontinental status. (How do you detect and count the third-stage rockets that convert intermediate missiles into ICBM's or count the bombs or cruise missiles hidden in the bays and hangars of the Backfire bombers that can, with midair refueling, attack this country?)

Sen. Levin is piqued by our suggestion that no conscientious senator would vote for such an agreement. Perhaps he draws no distinction between a senator who means well and one who conscientiously does his homework.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 25

AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY
10 December 1979

News Digest

New subcommittee in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has been called for by three senators to oversee the verification aspects of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 2). Sens. John H. Chafee (R.-R. I.), David Durenberger (R.-Minn.) and Patrick J. Leahy (D.-Vt.) also said they would accept assignment of such duties to an existing subcommittee if the chairman and vice chairman indicated willingness to assume such duties.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

11 December 1979

Why Soviets worry about cruise missiles

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington

Of all the new "theater" weapons the United States proposes to deploy in Western Europe to counter Soviet strength, the cruise missile is the one causing both the Western critics of the program and the Russians the greatest concern.

In all, 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs or "glickums," as they are pronounced in Pentagon jargon) would be positioned by 1983 on fixed or mobile launchers in Italy, West Germany, Britain, and Belgium — or any other Western European NATO nation that might accept them.

A cruise missile is a relatively small, pilotless jet aircraft programmed to fly a prescribed route to its intended target. NATO cruise missiles would be capable of delivering nuclear warheads on objectives in the western Soviet Union.

Soviet leaders, from President Leonid Brezhnev on down, have argued that deploying the mix of GLCMs and about 108 Pershing II fixed-trajectory medium-range missiles is an effort to circumvent provisions of the SALT II treaty, still unratified by the US Senate, which would fix essential nuclear-weapons parity between the US and the USSR.

"Are these [new] plans," asked a Soviet television commentator, "not so much plans for saving Europe" from heavy Soviet missiles aimed at West European targets, "as they say in America, but plans to circumvent the SALT II treaty and to create a superiority to the benefit of the United States after all? This is in fact a violation of the SALT II treaty."

Soviet and Western critics of the plan add that mobile-launched cruise missiles further violate arms-control accords because it is difficult or impossible to verify their whereabouts and numbers, unlike missiles in fixed silos.

US administration sources reply that although the Soviets may have to strain their own intelligence-collection methods a bit to spot the cruise missiles, "national technical means" of verification, including satellites and other methods, are adequate.

NATO governments have shown apprehension over the possible effects

on inter-allied cooperation of a SALT II ban (in a protocol to the proposed treaty) on longer-range GLCMs and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs or "slickums"). These limits, they have argued, might set a precedent for future constraints in the new arms-limitation agreements with the Soviets which the Western allies would like to negotiate.

The SALT II protocol bars deployment of cruise missiles with ranges over 600 kilometers (373 miles) until the end of 1981. The GLCM the US wants to deploy in Europe — an Air Force version of the General Dynamics-Convair cruise missile — could have a much longer range. However, it could not be operational until 1982 at the earliest, Pentagon scientists say.

Nevertheless, as a staff report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee points out, "because the protocol appears as a concession to Soviet fear of advanced US technology in the field of cruise missiles, some among the allies worry that the US will be under great pressure to extend the limits to prevent the delay of negotiations on central systems" (including the big Soviet SS-20 and US Pershing II missiles).

Therefore, European analysts argue, the expected future SALT III talks with the Soviets will see dogged Soviet efforts to extend the protocol restrictions as far beyond 1981 as possible.

The US is developing air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs or "alkims") as well as GLCMs and SLCMs. All use the same warhead, a 200-kiloton nuclear bomb developed originally for a missile designed to be launched from the North American Rockwell B-1 bomber. President Carter vetoed development of the B-1 for budgetary reasons in 1977.

The US cruise missile is steered to its target by an inertial guidance platform, periodically updated by a sensor system called TERCOM (terrain contour matching), which causes the missile to skim the earth's profile below the level of most radar detection and to detour around obstacles.

The Air Force will choose between Boeing and General Dynamics models of the ALCM, now competing in a 10-trial test flight series.

Three of the Boeing AGM-86B tests were terminated prematurely, whereas two out of the six General Dynamics AGM-109 flights crashed after launch.

Tests were to be completed by Jan. 4. The Defense Department would like to have the Air Force purchase 425 GLCMs, through 1985.

Western intelligence analysts believe Soviet cruise missiles are inferior, with only about 400 SS-N-3 "Shaddock" capable of flying more than 70 miles. About 200 are carried aboard aging "Echo-2" submarines. A new follow-on to the Shaddock — the SS-NX-12 — has an effective guided range of about 300 miles.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 24-35

THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
9 December 1979

How We Spy on the Russians

We look down from space, listen underwater, track with radar and infrared, and put agents in the field to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT

BY NICHOLAS DANILOFF

The view from CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., is superficially serene. The director's private elevator whisks the visitor to the top floor, where a corridor runs along the north face to his quarters. The passageway is warmly carpeted; the tan walls are hung with abstract paintings in elegant gold-leafed frames. By the elevator door hangs a display of medals the CIA awards its officers for especially meritorious or valorous service.

To the left is the airy office of deputy director Frank Carlucci, who made a name for himself as U.S. ambassador in revolutionary Portugal. To the right is the office of the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Retired Admiral Stansfield Turner, who occasionally invites journalists to "background" lunches but who

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declined to be interviewed for this article.

Turner has resisted strong White House pressure to speak out on behalf of the SALT treaty now before the U.S. Senate. He refuses because he says that would undermine "the objectivity" of the CIA.

The occasional visitor, lingering over the admiral's sherry and filet mignon, gazes out of the broad picture windows at sturdy Virginia oaks and tulip poplars that mask the giant espionage bureaucracy from the George Washington Parkway. Turner doesn't see the trees; he sees the forest.

What worries him, as well as others, is: Will the Russians play by the rules of the new SALT II treaty? And if they don't, will U.S. intelligence catch them cheating?

Reconnaissance satellites and other high-technology gadgetry are the CIA's tools for monitoring Soviet compliance. Thus, it was a routine event, several years ago, when a photoanalyst in the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center was scrutinizing a "close-look" satellite image of Soviet strategic missile fields. Suddenly, he noticed suspicious excavation.

The analyst paused, then consulted his superior. The first SALT pact froze strategic arsenals and clearly prohibited construction of new missile silos. The superior suggested waiting for further photographic evidence before raising the issue with higher authorities. That corroboration took time coming because in the next weeks clouds masked the missile sites. When new photos arrived, silo excavation was undeniable. Thousands of cubic yards of earth were being removed. In the end, the CIA would identify 110 sites where such work was underway.

Informed of this, Henry Kissinger, then President Nixon's

assistant for national security, ordered a "hold" on the photographs. That meant the pictures could not leave the center or be published in the periodic "compliance reports" which the CIA puts together for senior officials. Kissinger then asked for an explanation from the Soviet ambassador.

A quiet internecine battle in the bureaucracy followed. Lower officials, unaware of Kissinger's private talks with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, became concerned about the administration's apparent coverup. They began suspecting the White House of incompetence. Eventually someone leaked to the media.

Meanwhile, Dobrynin told Kissinger that the "silos" were not for missiles. They were "command and control" sites, the Russian said. Kissinger protested that the sites were identical to missile silos.

"You'll see they are different," Dobrynin said. "Wait."

Eventually, the CIA reported the Russians were fitting capsules into the silos which contained electrical cables for transmitting launch commands to missiles surrounding the command post. The administration accepted the explanation, although some officials continued to worry that the command silos could be converted to launch silos within weeks.

The flap over the so-called "3X" silos, and other ambiguous activities, led to the painful refinement within the U.S. government of a new mechanism for monitoring SALT. The focal point of the "SALT verification" bureaucracy is a CIA committee called the DCI's (Director of Central Intelligence's) Steering Committee on SALT. Its job is to look for possible SALT violations.

Every day U.S. intelligence agencies take in a raft of material on activities within the Soviet Union and around the world. The Defense Intelligence Agency assembles reports on Soviet weapons production. The National Security Agency (created by secret presidential directive in 1952) at Fort Meade, Md., eavesdrops on Soviet military communications, missile tests and radar impulses. The super-secret National Reconnaissance Office (this Pentagon agency is so secret officials are not allowed to acknowledge it exists) runs the U.S. spy satellite program. And the CIA receives reports from agents in Eastern Europe, and even from inside the Soviet Union.

The steering committee and its Monitoring Working Group sift through these materials. The steering committee does not label ambiguous activities as violations. Declaring a violation is a political judgment made only at the White House.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security affairs adviser, receives the DCI's reports and refers them to the Cabinet-level Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council. This committee, in turn, refers them to the SALT Working Group, and its subgroup, the SALT Backstopping Committee. Somewhere between the working groups and the Oval Office a decision is made as to whether a violation has been detected, and what to do about it. It is a mark of the end of Cold War that the two superpowers created a mechanism to deal with compliance problems that might arise under the first SALT agreement—the Standing Consultative Commission, also known as the Geneva SCC, which meets twice a year in Switzerland to sort out challenges. Both sides have lodged complaints. The

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Russians, for example, charged that the United States was hiding something by covering certain Minuteman missile sites with "environmental" covers. They also asked why squatters were living in Atlas missile silos which were deactivated in 1965. Both sides feel the SCC has functioned satisfactorily.

"I would say it has worked well," says U.S. chief negotiator Ralph Earle, who defended the SALT II treaty daily before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "The discussions there have been frank and open, and every dispute has been resolved."

Because spy satellite photography has played such a crucial role in watching the Soviets, the Carter administration toyed with the idea of releasing some of the high-resolution photographs in its effort to persuade the Senate of U.S. ability to monitor the agreement. But cautious intelligence veterans prevailed, and the best work of the satellites were kept under lock and key.

"What it came down to," says Leslie Gelb, who until recently was a key SALT advocate and ran the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, "was the slippery slope. If you released some photographs, you would be under pressure to release more, and there was no telling where it would end."

Some of the lower resolution photographs taken by U.S. earth-resources satellites have become available, and they offer a unique opportunity to lift the secrecy surrounding a number of Soviet installations, most notably the missile test center and space headquarters at Tyuratam. This center is one of the Soviet strategic missile test sites (the other is at Plesetsk, 62°8' North latitude, 40°1' East longitude). It has also been the starting point for all the early Sputniks, all manned flights, all planetary and lunar probes, some communications satellites and assorted military vehicles.

The Russians have tried to keep it secret, deceptively naming it the "Baikonur Cosmodrome" after the town of Baikonur, which is 370 kilometers to the northeast. Few foreigners have ever been allowed to visit the false "Baikonur," which contains 18 launchers for testing ICBMs. When visitors did come they were flown in at night.

To keep up the deception, Soviet officials passed out false geographical coordinates for the center and instructed Soviet journalists to dateline their stories on Soviet manned missions "Baikonur."

In the SALT II documents, the Russians finally acknowledged that Tyuratam is a testing site.

Any astute person, however, could have obtained a satellite photograph of the center by asking the U.S. Geological Survey to supply coverage of the geographical coordinates, 45°6' North latitude, 63°4' East longitude, the true position of the "Baikonur Cosmodrome." That Landsat satellite photograph of the center, if compared to a Soviet map, shows clearly that "Baikonur's" geography corresponds convincingly with the Tyuratam area which lies along the Syr Dar'ya River and the railway the czars built to connect Orenburg in the Urals with Tashkent. It does not correspond at all with the little sheep town of Baikonur at the end of the railway line running west from Karaganda and built between the two World Wars.

What the Tyuratam picture cannot convey is the sharpness of detail of the best reconnaissance photographs. Gloria Duffey, a former research assistant to Brzezinski at Columbia University, recalls a briefing on aerial and satellite photography she attended in March 1976 at the Strategic Air Command, Omaha, Neb.

"First they flashed on the screen a picture of the Earth, then one of North America, then one of the East Coast," she recalls. "Next they showed a picture of Manhattan. They clicked it down and you could see Columbia University. They clicked it down again and you could see the lettering on the library, names like Archimedes. Then they clicked it down again, and you could actually see a student on the steps of Butler Library reading a copy of the Columbia Spectator, and you could make out the headlines."

The Air Force, asked to supply these photographs for publication, telephoned SAC headquarters but could find no one who remembered that briefing.

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), chairman of the House subcommittee on intelligence oversight, disclosed earlier this year the best U.S. satellites can clearly distinguish an object one foot long from an altitude of 100 miles. Paul Bennett, arms control specialist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, says U.S. satellites may do better than that, defining an object as small as three or four inches from 100 miles.

Satellite photography has made remarkable strides in the last 20 years. The U.S. Big Bird satellite passes over the Soviet Union every 90 minutes, scanning large swaths of territory. On command, it can zoom in for a closer look. It delivers its take by jettisoning up to six canisters of film by parachute. These are scooped up in mid-air by "Skyhook" C-130s (see photos page 30) or helicopters, or are retrieved from the ocean by Navy ships.

The newest satellite, the KH-11, is even more sophisticated. Some of its capabilities became known because of the espionage trial of Edward Kampiles, 23, a disgruntled CIA employee who sold a KH-11 manual to a Soviet agent in Athens.

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KH-11, like Big Bird, has wide-look and close-look functions. It turns what it sees into electronic impulses which are then transmitted to earth. The KH-11 is believed to carry an on-board computer capable of comparing shots taken from similar positions in space and noting changes. Once the KH-11 images are transmitted to earth, they are reconstituted into viewable photos.

Scientists have found that "false color" images possess advantages over ordinary color or black-and-white. By taking pictures in different bands of the color spectrum, photoanalysts can spot distinctive features. For example, the human eye cannot distinguish between green paint on a missile silo and surrounding foliage of trees. But infrared photography will turn foliage bright red, and green paint blue.

"The satellite photographs are remarkably versatile," says William Colby, former director of the CIA. "We've used them occasionally to check up on the credibility of Soviet defectors. A defector might tell you something, and then you could go photograph it and see if it made sense. Or you could photograph his hometown, then quiz him about the layout of various buildings, and so forth, and see how good a memory he had, or how accurate his observations were."

Colby is an international lawyer for the Washington firm of Reid and Priest. A strong advocate of SALT II, he stresses openness.

"The more the United States and Soviet Union know about each other, the better off we'll be," he says icily. "That's what I told Brezhnev myself."

The Soviet Union, Colby says, is a closed society, despite its huge output in books,

charts, technical journals, magazines and news reports. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is unlikely to become as open as the United States in the foreseeable future. Therefore, Colby says, the American espionage effort must go on.

Besides taking photographs, satellites do numerous other jobs in the spy business.

Military communication satellites link secret agents with headquarters. These "store/dump" satellites receive, store and retransmit messages which are fired off in rapid bursts by agents and, it is hoped, avoid detection by the adversary's counterintelligence.

"Ferret" satellites listen to the other side's electronic emissions which reveal details of air defense systems, disclose heightened states of military readiness, and provide data on military operations. The United States, for example, monitored the desperate communications between ground control at the Baikonur Cosmodrome and Cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov, whose Soyuz-1 spacecraft malfunctioned, killing him on re-entry.

Before Komarov was ordered down April 24, 1967, Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin and Komarov's wife were patched through to the spaceman in distress for an extraordinary, and touching, leave-taking.

The NSA refused to release a transcript of the interchange, or even to confirm its existence, in response to a Freedom of Information petition, even though the London Daily Telegraph published an account of the incident in 1975 based on an interview with the moni-

tor who overheard it.

The monitor said the Soviet ground command directed Komarov to take certain manual actions.

"I am doing it, but it doesn't work," the cosmonaut replied in frustration.

When it became obvious both the space ship and Komarov were doomed, Komarov's wife was patched through to the craft.

"I love you, I love you," she cried in great distress.

"I love you too," he replied, "and the baby, and the baby. Go home now. Go home."

A little later Kosygin came on the air.

"You and your kind made the greatest achievements in Russian history," Kosygin said solemnly. "We are proud of you. You will always be remembered."

The ship tumbled in orbit and neither ground control nor Komarov was able to stabilize it. The main parachute failed to open properly and tangled with the emergency parachute. Just before ground control lost contact with Komarov, he screamed: "You've got to do something. I don't want to die."

One of the most difficult tasks of the intelligence community is to keep from drowning in a mass of raw data. The size of the Soviet Union—the world's largest country, with 8.65 million square miles of territory—complicates the organizational headache. The U.S.S.R. extends 6,000 miles from Eastern Europe to the Pacific and arches through 11 time zones. It stretches 3,000 miles from north to south. Knowing where to look, and what to look for, is the key to the photoanalysts' art.

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The railroads are a good starting point. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union does not have a highly developed road system, and 95 percent of its freight moves by rail or inland water. Therefore, since the balloon and U-2 spy flights of the 1950s, intelligence experts have been scrutinizing railways.

The railways lead to many interesting places—to tank and munitions factories as well as to the medium-range and intercontinental missile fields. The fields, covering dozens of square miles and containing 50 to 100 sites apiece, are typically located near spurs off the main railroad line throughout the central part of the Soviet Union.

Shipyards are relatively easy to spot because they are large installations near open water or on the Volga River where much of the work is done in the open.

Although the Soviets have begun covering over their submarine yards, eventually the boats slide down the ways and tie up at docks where their missile-launching tubes are easily counted from space.

Naval intelligence looks for other developments as well. Sometimes what is detected is confusing and deceptive, such as arbitrary changes in hull numbers. The Kiev helicopter carrier, for example, changed its hull number from 860 in 1976 to 812 in 1978.

During the last 30 years, Air Force intelligence has deployed enormous resources to identify Soviet aircraft factories and design bureaus as well as to assess their potential and actual production. History has lent a helping hand.

In 1946, the Russians dismantled whole factories from the Soviet zone of Germany and signed up thousands of German technicians to work in the Soviet Union. Knowing German factory layout and work habits, Air Force intelligence made detailed estimates of Soviet capacity. They

watched deliveries of subcomponents to factories and developed an input-output formula based on German experience and tested in practice, to predict Soviet aircraft output.

"In estimating aircraft production," says Ray Cline, CIA deputy director for intelligence from 1962 to 1966, "we can often observe aircraft parked outside factories. Our estimates may be as good as 1 percent. But what you worry about is whether the Russians will introduce a new factory secretly that you haven't spotted."

The Air Force has identified 16 major aircraft design bureaus which are associated with one to three factories. Where possible the Air Force has obtained photographs of these plants, some of them snapped by cooperative tourists or military attaches. U.S. experts are now watching for the appearance of at least two new Soviet strategic bombers to replace the TU-95 and Myasishchev-4 which are counted under terms of the SALT treaty.

Most Soviet weapons systems are derivatives of earlier technology, which has helped the intelligence community enormously in following Soviet missile development. The Russians, who were well-versed in the physics of rocket propulsion, used the German V-2 as the starting point for their first medium-range missiles.

Sergei Korolyov (1907-1966), who lived under the secret title of "chief designer of rocket-cosmic systems" for many years, is the designer of the SS-6, the Soviet Union's first intercontinental ballistic rocket. This ICBM first flew in August 1957 from Tyuratam and developed into the workhorse Vostok space booster which is still in use.

One of Korolyov's chief rivals, M. K. Yangel (1911-1971) and his Dnepropetrovsk design bureau is credited with developing the major Russian strategic missiles: the SS-7, SS-9, SS-17 and the SS-18, which can deliver 15,400 pounds of nuclear warheads.

U.S. analysts say V.N. Chelomei is the designer of the SS-8, SS-11 and SS-19 missiles; V.N. Nadiradze is credited with the SS-13, SS-16 and SS-20s.

To follow the capabilities of these missiles, the United States monitors Soviet missile tests closely. Electronic posts near the Soviet borders capture technical data which each missile sends back to ground controllers on 50 radio channels. The data tell how well the engines burn, rate of fuel flow, performance of pumps, separation of stages, guidance, vibration and so forth.

The National Security Agency operates posts at Karamusel, Bexbasi, Princep, Sinop and Diyarbakir in Turkey to follow medium-range missile tests from Kapustin Yar in central Russia. These listening posts are being upgraded to fix on strategic rocket tests as well. Two posts in Iran—Tacksman-I and Tacksman-II—acquired data from the first stage engines of long-range missiles. The United States lost these posts in the Iranian revolution and has not been able to replace their functions entirely.

To monitor the reentry of warheads, the United States built an extremely sophisticated phased-array radar at Shemya Island in the Aleutians. Known as Cobra Dane, the radar is composed of 15,360 active radiating elements which can transmit pulses to track 100 objects simultaneously. Officials say Cobra Dane can detect an object the size of a basketball at 2,000 miles and help identify a missile attack on the United States coming across the North Pole.

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"I don't believe we've missed any major tests, and we were not surprised by their first ICBM tests in 1957," says Herbert Scoville, who was assistant CIA director for scientific intelligence at the time. That is important because most experts believe the Russians would not deploy a new rocket, or new warheads, without thoroughly testing them.

The likely development of the next generation of Soviet missiles is predictable, experts say. The Russians, unlike Americans, maintain permanent design bureaus. Their products are the logical development of new technology applied to earlier systems. U.S. officials predict the Soviets will develop a mobile ICBM (counterpart to the proposed American MX) which will be solid-fueled.

"I estimate they will be using a basing mode already familiar to them like the [medium-range] SS-20," says Dr. William Perry, chief of research at the Pentagon. "The SS-20 is solid-fueled and very successful."

"They'll probably go road-mobile. They have to limit size, and, therefore, if mobile, they will go small, even smaller than our MX. Since they don't have as many roads, they will be limited in size and deployment."

Perry believes the Russians are also trying to develop a high-energy laser beam to incapacitate U.S. spy satellites.

"They seem to have made a judgment that lasers ought to be introduced into weapons technology," he says. "We are watching what they are doing very carefully."

Monitoring strategic bombers, nuclear submarines, missile silos and technology limited by SALT, of course, is only part of the intelligence community's effort against the Soviet Union. A major priority is guarding against a surprise nu-

clear attack. If the Russians were to fire their giant SS-18s against the U.S. Minuteman missile force (eventually against the MX), the United States would get about a half hour's warning. Submarine-launched missiles could wipe out cities and industry in three minutes or less. No city could be warned in three minutes, but a half hour's warning would give the White House time to shift its mobile missiles about to avoid destruction—or to fire them.

To get that half hour of warning, the United States has positioned two early-warning satellites above Panama, one looking toward the Pacific, the other toward the Atlantic. A third satellite is stationed over the Indian Ocean and stares down at the Soviet land mass. These satellites are parked at an altitude of 22,300 miles in "geo-synchronous" orbit, which means they revolve at the same rate as the earth, always hovering over the same spot.

Each reportedly carries 12-foot-long, infrared telescopes that detect the searing heat of the exhaust plumes of flying missiles. Should they detect a launch, the satellites would immediately signal U.S. command headquarters. Tests have shown that the infrared sensors are not perfect and occasionally do not discriminate between exhaust plumes and radiation reflected from brightly lighted high-altitude clouds. A similar problem last September plagued the Vela satellite, which detected a flash of light in the Indian Ocean that appeared to be a nuclear explosion set off by South Africa. But the satellite was unable to positively identify it. Some experts think it may have been a super-thunderbolt.

In addition to early-warning satellites, the Navy operates a series of ocean surveillance satellites used to spot the departure of Soviet submarines from port and to keep track of surface ships plying the oceans. An ocean surveillance satellite can spot a submarine in clear water at shallow

depths. Scientists are reportedly working on a sensor to detect hot water discharged by a nuclear sub from the cooling system around the reactor core.

Once a Soviet submarine leaves port, the Navy tries to keep track of its position at all times, although officers say they frequently can determine only its approximate location.

As part of its anti-submarine warfare program, the Navy has drawn on hydroacoustics, the science of underwater sound waves. It is a fact of physics that every moving hull makes its own distinctive noise. The bow wave, the flow of water along the hull, and particularly, the rhythmic thudding of the screw produce a telltale "signature."

One of the reasons the Navy follows Soviet ships during sea trials is to record these sound patterns on magnetic tape. The tapes are sent to the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Md., where a catalogue of Soviet ship sounds is maintained.

Underwater hydrophones, helicopters with "dipping sonar," destroyers, attack submarines and reconnaissance aircraft constantly listen for the sounds of Soviet submarines, and the Russians know it, as evidenced by articles in their technical journals. They are presumably working on countermeasures, such as blowing air bubbles around the ship's hull to alter noise patterns.

Good surveillance requires an intimate knowledge of Soviet armaments. Knowing how the Russians build their weapons

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helps in designing counter-measures as well as in building effective arms for U.S. forces. U.S. intelligence is always eager to obtain Soviet weapons. The 1973 Middle East War was a bonanza, but occasional windfalls also come along. In 1976 a disaffected Soviet pilot flew a MiG-25 to Japan which proved valuable in assessing the sophistication of the Soviet aviation industry.

The CIA's effort to raise a sunken Soviet ballistic missile submarine from the Pacific in 1974 with the Glomar Explorer was one of the most remarkable intelligence operations ever undertaken. Raising the Golf-class diesel-electric submarine could have yielded nuclear warheads, missiles, construction details, ciphers, codes, encryption devices, logs, even personal diaries with telling details about life on board.

The mission was aborted after the operation was publicized, despite Colby's efforts to prevent it. Nonetheless, the Glomar Explorer was reported to have raised part of the vessel's bow.

Among the gruesome finds aboard the sub were the bodies of some 10 crew members (out of 82). Officials familiar with the operation said the remains were buried at sea according to the Soviet naval manual. The ceremony was conducted in English and Russian, and both the Soviet and American anthems were played. Photographers recorded the scene in sound and color. A request to the CIA, under the Freedom of Information Act, to release the photographs was denied.

Greater U.S.-Soviet interaction has meant more frankness between Washington and Moscow, publicly and privately. Publicly the Soviets broke a 700-year-old tradition of military secrecy by agreeing to disclose the number of strategic offensive weapons they possess. More privately, other talks are being held. For example, Lt. Gen. Samuel Willson, a former U.S. military attache in Moscow, returned to the Soviet capital as chief of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency and met quietly with Soviet military acquaintances. Defense Secretary Harold Brown has invited his counterpart, Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, to visit the United States to continue face-to-face contacts they initiated at the Vienna SALT summit last June.

A good espionage effort is not complete without a few exotic assets and a few old-fashioned human spies. The United States has enjoyed both from time to time. Electronics experts at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow eavesdropped on radio conversations between Soviet leaders in the early 1970s as the Soviets drove around the city and talked with each other over their car radios.

"We learned a little about their attitudes in the SALT talks and got some idea about the relationships between leading personalities," says one knowledgeable source.

Nikita Khrushchev, who ruled the Soviet Union between Stalin and Brezhnev, used to joke that the United States and the Soviet Union used the same spies because there were so many double agents. Neither has stopped seeking good spies or defectors. In the late 1950s, the United States and Britain recruited Col. Oleg Penkovsky, an officer in military intelligence. He was caught in 1963, tried and executed.

But during his service, he snapped some 10,000 microfilms which included technical descriptions of weapons and their deployment. The information he transmitted proved invaluable for the study of Soviet weapons development.


"We came under great pressure from Congress to say publicly what Penkovsky reported," recalls one former CIA official. "But we always resisted. We didn't want to help the Russians in making their damage assessment."

Ambassador Malcolm Toon, who returned last month from a three-year assignment in Moscow, says spying on the Soviets will continue.

"We're both big boys," he says, "and both of us know each is going to engage in this type of activity. We both take it in stride and we are not going to let it influence our relations negatively."

Nicholas Daniloff is the author of The Kremlin and the Cosmos, a history of the Soviet space program. He worked in Moscow from 1961 to 1965 as a correspondent and now writes on national security issues for United Press International.

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Who's Watching: The SALT Verification Community

Research by Nicholas Daniloff/Chart by Gail Sanders

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FLORIDA TIMES-UNION
25 NOVEMBER 1979

Events in Iran underscore need for an effective CIA

"The lesson from the events in Iran is that America needs a stronger Central Intelligence Agency.

"Our intelligence operations have been operating almost as if America has one arm tied behind its back, while the rest of the world is swinging with both arms.

"Why aren't we anticipating these problems rather than reacting to them?

"Why must we be faced with no effective options between being humiliated and sending in the Marines?"

These statements by Pennsylvania Sen. John Heinz are hardly original — just about any man on the street could make them today — yet noteworthy for two reasons.

One is the timing: All this has been said before — but now people are ready to listen.

Back in 1975 veteran CIA "street man" (spy) Mike Ackerman told why he resigned in a copyrighted article in the *Miami Herald*. His decision came after a secret meeting "with a Communist source who was risking his life to see me.

"I realized I could not guarantee his security. There was no way I could promise

him that some irresponsible member of Congress or (CIA) ex-employee wouldn't leak his information or that some reporter wouldn't blast it all over the front page."

Former CIA Director William Colby earlier this year wrote (prophetically) in the *Washington Star*:

"It is often wise to use the minimum necessary intervention (CIA type operations) rather than order carrier task forces or Marine amphibious groups to the alert."

Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, at about the same time, summed matters up bluntly:

"(Today) there is no intelligence agency of any consequence within the United States government."

The second reason that Sen. Heinz' statement is important is that he puts the blame where it should be — upon the very body which can do something about it:

"Unfortunately, the blame for this sad state lies as much with the Congress as with the administration. In its effort to correct abuses Congress has reined in our intelligence community to the point where it is seriously handicapped in its basic mission."

BLUEFIELD TELEGRAPH (W. VA.)
15 November 1979

Unleash The CIA?

One of the "benefits" of 20th Century communications is that virtually everyone in the world knows that a ragtag mob of hysterical Iranian students has demonstrated that the United States will meekly accept illegal acts against our citizens and our property overseas.

There also is little doubt that a number of groups in other countries, noting our apparent helplessness in the face of the Iranian outrage, are giving serious consideration to committing similar crimes against us. And why shouldn't they, since it seems such an easy thing to do?

Not too many years ago, the United States would have seen to it that a fanatic like the present ruler of Iran would not have been able to achieve that position, or if he did, he would have been speedily overthrown. The CIA once knew quite well how to arrange such things.

Even in its present battered state, that agency may still know how to function in that area, despite the beating it has been taking from various members of Congress who think things like that aren't very nice.

If we manage to get our citizens out of the clutches of these nuts without bloodshed, or if we don't, someone in Washington had better begin giving serious thought to letting the CIA deal with this and similar situations, if it is still capable of doing so.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 19

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
9 December 1979

William Pfaff

A Blunt question: What's spying without intelligence?

PARIS—The most striking thing about the Anthony Blunt story in London—the "Fifth Man"—is that it was not really like a spy novel at all. Blunt behaved, he claims, as a gentleman, an idealist. It was idealism, he says in the statement given journalists Nov. 21, that made him a Marxist in the mid-1930s, and caused him to become a spy for the Soviet intelligence service.

But he did no great harm, he claims. He passed on military information at a time when Britain and Russia were allies. He indignantly denies that any British agents died as a consequence of his actions.

After the war, Blunt says, he changed his mind about the Soviet Union and stopped passing them information. But in 1951 he cooperated in the defection of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean. After that, he resisted repeated interrogations by British counterintelligence, keeping his secrets until 1964 because of "personal loyalty; I could not denounce my friends." In that year he was again approached by the security people who offered him immunity, and he talked.

The affair has a homosexual element. Burgess and Blunt were close, although the latter denies that they were lovers. Maclean, although married, had been homosexually compromised by Burgess.

One reads between the lines of Blunt's statement words written by E.M. Forster, the English novelist ["A Passage to India," "The Longest Journey"]: "If I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope that I should have the guts to betray my country. . . . Love and loyalty to an individual can run counter to the claims of the State. When they do—down with the State, say I, which means that the State would down me."

But of course the state did not down Blunt. That is exactly the reason for the present scandal. Blunt came out of it very well; he was given the job of Keeper of the Queen's Pictures [and kept it even after confessing]; he was made a knight for his services to art. It looks as if even now he will not do badly.

Forster, though, said something else just before his remark on friendship. He said "I hate the idea of causes." He said that at the back of every great cause or creed there is "something terrible and hard for which the worshipper may one day be required to suffer." But in the case of Blunt, Philby, Burgess, and Maclean, all worshippers of communism, this hard thing was not required—unless permanent residence in Russia can be taken as suffering.

It may be; it seems to have finished off Burgess. Blunt also preferred to take his chances in London, even though his

Soviet contact ordered him to leave with Burgess in 1951. "I couldn't bear the thought of living in Russia," he said.

No one suffered anything worse than exile. No one had his fingernails removed or was connected to the electricity supply while being questioned. There were no "terminations with extreme prejudice," to use a phrase which is, regretably, of American origin.

Philby, under suspicion, nonetheless was sent off to Beirut with good jobs writing for The Economist and The Observer. He got away to the Soviet Union in 1963, according to one account, because when the intelligence service told him to come back to London for more questioning, he refused, and there was nothing to be done because it was foreign territory.

James Bond would have known what to do. Graham Greene, in his latest novel about British spies, "The Human Factor," has a bloodthirsty doctor in the security service who responds to the suggestion of a superior about the way to handle a Blunt—a suspected traitor: "I quite understand. He should die quietly, peacefully, without pain too, poor chap. Pain sometimes shows on the face."

The real Secret Intelligence Service seems not to have been up to this kind of discreet decision and action. Its critics would seem, though, to have Greene-like standards. The SIS is said to have

been slack and class-conscious, excusing Blunt, the vicar's son, while lower-middle class spies like George Blake and William Vassall were locked up.

No doubt there is something in this. People do look after their own; class justice does function nearly everywhere, and certainly in England. Friends look after friends. That is what Forster was writing about.

The suspicion remains that none of this is quite important. It can be argued that spying in peacetime produces very little that is useful. In peacetime—or Cold War—what is needed is not spies but intelligence, and intelligence comes from deep knowledge and understanding of a country and a political culture. It does not come from stolen secrets or double agents.

Good intelligence would have spared the United States its present grief in Iran. Spying was, and remains, irrelevant. There were all too many American spies in Iran between 1953, when the shah was restored to power with CIA help, and last year. There was at the same time a near-total lack of intelligence about Iran.

That is a problem beside which double and triple agents, old-pals, protection, student communism at Oxford and Cambridge, and the rest are trivial matters. And the more people concentrate upon spies, the more we are distracted from the problem of intelligence.

[Mr. Pfaff, the author of several books, writes political commentary for New Yorker magazine.]

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-16

THE NEW YORK TIMES
10 December 1979

U.S. Studying Ways to Bolster Strength in Mideast

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 9 — President Carter has instructed his senior advisers to examine several alternatives for bolstering American military power in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, including the establishment of a permanent military base in the region, Government officials said today.

Although Mr. Carter appears to have ruled out the use of military force in the crisis in Iran for the time being, officials said the Iran situation had created high-level interest in working out a new strategy for coping with turmoil in the area.

Senior aides are said to disagree on what steps should be taken in the near future, but a senior official said there was "an emerging consensus" that the United States had to strengthen its presence in the region and to cement military ties with friendly governments there.

In line with this view, officials said the Administration was now discussing the creation of a special military command for the Middle East and the Persian Gulf as well as the establishment of one or more military bases in such countries as Saudi Arabia, Oman or Somalia. Many nations in the area have said in the past that they would not permit American troops to be stationed on their soil.

Pentagon Lists Options

At a meeting at Camp David two weeks ago, the officials said, Mr. Carter asked Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draw up a list of long-range options for strengthening American forces in the area. They said that the Pentagon's list as well as other military alternatives were discussed last week by Mr. Brown and other Cabinet members at a meeting of the National Security Council.

Although White House aides declined to discuss the outcome of the meeting, a defense aide said the Pentagon received a memorandum last week from Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mr. Carter's national security adviser, instructing military planners to determine which nations around the Persian Gulf could provide "host country support" for American forces.

Other officials reported that in coming weeks the Administration would be holding discreet talks with pro-Western governments in the area on the questions of closer military ties and the possible stationing of American naval and air forces.

After the ouster of the Shah of Iran early this year, Secretary Brown visited several moderate Arab nations and reportedly raised the possibility of an American base with leaders in Saudi Arabia. Although the Saudis are said to have expressed keen interest in continuing military support, the idea of an American base was evidently ruled out on the ground that it would provoke more radical governments in the region.

Strategic Importance of Region

The Iran crisis is said to have underscored the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf. The Administration has accelerated plans for creating a 110,000-man "rapid deployment force" for use in military conflicts in the area, and officials said additional steps were being considered, including the following:

¶ A permanent naval and air presence might be established in the region. The United States now keeps a small, three-ship force in the Persian Gulf at Bahrain, and larger naval task forces periodically sail into the Indian Ocean, using facilities at the British island of Diego Garcia, 2,500 miles southeast of the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia could provide naval and air facilities, but officials said the Saudis, after the recent turbulence there, were highly unlikely to agree to an American base. A more likely candidate, they said, was Oman, which owns the strategically situated island of Masira, near the Strait of Hormuz. Another possibility, officials said, is the Somali port of Berbera in the Arabian Sea, which was used by the Soviet Navy until it was ousted in 1978.

¶ Military ties with pro-Western governments might be expanded. In addition to creating permanent bases, officials are discussing arrangements in which the United States could use other military facilities on a temporary basis.

¶ A new military command might be established. American military commanders in Western Europe now direct any military operations in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. But officials said Secretary Brown was studying the possible creation of an integrated air, sea and ground command for the Middle East.

¶ Intelligence operations might be improved. Officials said that both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency had been ordered to improve methods for collecting information on political currents in the region as well as Soviet military moves. The effort to improve intelli-

gence, they said, was given fresh impetus last month by the discovery that Moscow had quietly concluded a large arms deal with Yemen.

While the Administration is clearly moving to expand the American presence in the area, officials said it was unclear how far or fast Mr. Carter would go. Officials in the State Department reportedly oppose the establishment of a base in Oman or elsewhere for fear it would isolate pro-Western governments and draw fire from radical Arab countries. The idea of using ports in Somalia is also controversial, with some aides contending the United States could become embroiled in the conflict between Somalia and its Soviet-backed neighbor, Ethiopia.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE F-3

WASHINGTON STAR
9 DECEMBER 1979

Hugh Sidey

Rising troubles show need to work back alleys again

The United States used to have a pretty good back alley act going in the shady parts of this old world.

But we started to close it down about five or six years ago. Pity. We might have saved ourselves some real trouble if we had had more information from the bazaars of Iran. And the future might be a little more certain if we had more of a feel of the barrios of Latin America, and we had the will to use that information and maybe a little cash and maybe even a little muscle to encourage the people who like us, or to dissuade those who might have other ideas.

There is simply no way to calculate how much trouble has been turned off or reshaped in the last 35 years when our intelligence operatives discovered it in manageable amounts. But we do not do that any longer. A nation of Eagle scouts and half backs, we have been told, should not teach young men to steal codes, run arms and sometimes kill.

Back alleys is a euphemism for anyplace where we can get a handle on the adversary. The U-2 was in a back alley 15 miles above the Soviet Union. The Glomar Explorer was in another while grappling for that sunken Russian submarine three miles down in the Pacific Ocean. So were those agents who dug the tunnel into East Germany in 1956 and tapped into the Soviet phone lines.

Few people know how much intelligence we really got out of that listening post, but when it was discovered our allies took delight in our ingenuity, and the enemy knew we were still alley fighting.

The guys who slithered around and learned about the terrorist plot to assassinate Golda Meir, picked up the time for China's first nuclear explosion, flashed the very hour when Soviet tank crews topped off their gas tanks in 1968 just before moving into Czechoslovakia — those guys were good in the alleys.

But most of them are out of it. They read history in funny little houses in Italy and tend roses in Norfolk. But the old urge sometimes rises. A member of the French Secret Service called a friend of his in the CIA a few months back when Ayatollah Khomeini was still living outside Paris. "My God," he pleaded, "let's take care of this now."

Codgers like Averell Harriman, who have seen a lot of the world, believe we ought to continue the silent war in Poland or East Germany or wherever.

The other night when a huge December moon cast a breathtaking luminescence over this troubled city, a former ambassador who had fought for American honor through four decades remembered the parting words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1969: "When you are thinking about the future, I don't believe for a minute in blind historical forces. People are doing these things around the world."

A few days ago a former spy gathered for a few beers with his buddies from the days gone by. What a collection of talent, he mused to himself as he looked around. There was a man who had known the court of Jordan's King Hussein as well as his own family. There was another who had moved among the rulers of Saudi Arabia as if he was one of them.

There were wonderful memories and stories like the one about the CIA's resident lock picker and safe cracker. He had the fingers of Pablo Casals. The agency used to ship him around the world to get in and copy the code books in critical embassies. He failed infrequently. But one elaborate entry plot was frustrated when a rusty garden gate was closed and locked with a huge, old-fash-

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ioned key. "Fingers" was not prepared for such a Mickey Mouse development.

After our season of disenchantment with the CIA there is a rising demand all over Washington for a better underground early warning system than we now have. There also is real debate about restoring some of the protective secrecy that was stripped from our intelligence activities and getting the agency back in covert operations.

Information is power in this dangerous world. Helping friends and thwarting enemies is once again an obvious necessity of survival. It is so much easier to keep a few squads of skilled operatives in the back alleys than it is to move the fleet around.

FORT LAUDERDALE NEWS

27 November 1979



**Don
Pardi**

ABOUT TIME

The "Iranian Thing" was untenable from the beginning. It was really an act of war by a nation which dares not use traditional means to wage war.

The restraint of our government throughout the affair has been admirable and we may all be proud of our posture. We have not been humiliated; on the contrary, we have shown ourselves to be cognizant of our strength, the use of which was not warranted by the event.

The days of "gunboat diplomacy" and utterances like "Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli dead!" went out when the possibility of total world destruction came in. At least we are not ready to precipitate that possibility over this relatively innocuous matter.

Alternate influence; the pressure of economic reprisal and the existence of a captive 50,000 students within our borders were bound to give pause to those in Iran who were responsible for the misadventure.

But we should face it. We backed the wrong horse in Iran and our intelligence forces there were fast asleep. The main thing to be learned from this whole matter is that the CIA is in reality an important feature of our defenses which, as all the other features, should continue to be built and reinforced by people of the greatest competence and patriotism, backed up by a planned foreign policy.

If the CIA had not been badly weakened during Watergate, would all of this in Iran have happened?

Perhaps. Some of the things which have happened tempt one to wonder whether our intelligence forces consist more of foreign than American agents. Controls within the agency have been lax, and punishment of traitors has been lenient.

There now, you have something else to worry about.

Pleasant dreams.

EXCERPTED